Journal of the History of Ideas

Edited by Arthur O. Lovejoy
in association with

Crane Brinton
Gilbert Chinard
Morris R. Cohen
Francis W. Coker
Richard P. McKeon
Perry Miller
Marjorie H. Nicolson
John Herman Randall, Jr.
J. Salwyn Schapiro
Louis B. Wright

Managing Editor:
Philip P. Wiener

Assistant Editor:
Joseph T. Shipley

VOLUME II, NUMBER 3
JUNE
1941

Lancaster, Pa., and New York
Journal of the History of Ideas, Inc.
College of the City of New York
1941

Journal of the History of Ideas

VOLUME II JUNE 1941 NUMBER 3

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ARTICLES

PAGE

Symposium on Romanticism

The Meaning of Romanticism for the Historian of Ideas
Arthur O. Lovejoy 257

The Economic Philosophy of Romanticism ..... *Goetz A. Briefs* 279

German Romanticism as an Ideology of Cultural Crisis
Eugene N. Anderson 301

Romantic Historiography as a Political Force in France
Jacques Barzun 318

Romanticism and the Religious Revival in England
Hoxie N. Fairchild 330

• • •

The Nationality of Philosophy and Bertrando Spaventa ..... *Marcel Grilli* 339

BOOK REVIEW

Karl Mannheim's *Man and Society* ..... *John H. Randall, Jr.* 372

BOOKS RECEIVED 381

PERIODICALS AND REPRINTS RECEIVED 389

VOLUME II, NUMBER 3 JUNE, 1941

THE MEANING OF ROMANTICISM FOR THE HISTORIAN OF IDEAS[1]

BY ARTHUR O. LOVEJOY

The title of this paper was suggested by the distinguished Committee who planned this Symposium. It presumably conveys a question which the speaker is expected to answer. Questions can hardly be answered unless their terms have an understood meaning, common to those who ask and those who answer, and unless they contain no presuppositions about facts that are contrary to fact. The present question, however, contains two terms having no understood meaning, and at least one supposition contrary to fact. Of these peculiarities of the query propounded, the Committee were, I am sure, fully sensible; and I suspect that their subtle but benevolent design was to formulate the topic in a way which would give the speaker an excuse for calling attention to some still current confusions which pervade the general subject under consideration.

I

The two troublesome terms in the question are "meaning" and "Romanticism." The trouble with them is not that they lack meaning, but that they have too many meanings, so that, when they are used without qualification or explanation, it is impossible to know what the user is talking about. However, of the many senses of "meaning," it is pertinent here to distinguish only two, namely: the sense which the word presumably has when you ask (for example): "What *is* the meaning of 'meaning'?" *viz.*, what is the word the name of, to what object or phenomenon does it point, or of what concept is it the verbal counterpart, in the usage of some person or persons; and second, the group of senses in which the word "meaning" stands for an attribute, not of words, but of things or events, and denotes, not signification, but "significance," or consequence—or major consequences. If one is asked, in this

[1] This and the four following papers were contributed to a Symposium on "The Romantic Movement in Europe in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century," at the meeting of the American Historical Association, Section on Intellectual History, held at New York City, December 30, 1940 (see this journal, I, 1940, p. 505). The first paper has been considerably expanded for publication.

second sense, "What is the meaning of Romanticism?" one's answer would express a judgment about what chiefly makes the historical thing called "Romanticism"—if there *is* any such thing —"important," what aspects or what effects of it are most noteworthy or momentous.

It is thus not clear which of two questions this discourse should try to answer—or whether, perhaps, it should try to answer both: *i.e.*, what is the signification of the word "Romanticism," and what, historically considered, is the main significance of the thing, Romanticism? However, it is obvious that the second question cannot be answered until the first is answered, since you cannot communicate to another any observations about a thing unless you and he both understand by the name of it the same thing.

But here the other equivocality of terms in the title presents itself. The first question cannot be answered. No man can say what is "the meaning" of the word "Romanticism"; for meaning, in this sense, is determined by usage, and in its relatively brief life of less than a century and a half this word has acquired so many—and such incongruous and opposed—meanings that no lexicographer has ever yet come near to enumerating them correctly and exhaustively. Next to the word "nature," "romantic," with its derivatives, is possibly the most equivocal in the language—a fact which it is of some importance for historians to remember. That it is sufficiently remembered by most writers on literary, philosophical, political or social history cannot, I fear, be said—though the historians of modern literature are perhaps the greatest sinners in this way, one of their favorite employments being to introduce new explicit or implicit senses of Romanticism, with a fine indifference to the others already in use. The amazing diversity of its meanings I have already attempted to exhibit—though incompletely —in a paper read before another learned body, composed of philologists and literary historians.[2] I shall, for the sake of brevity, assume that it furnishes sufficient proof, if any were needed, that "Romanticism" has no generally understood meaning and has therefore come to be useless as a verbal symbol. And thus, finally, the question propounded contains an assumption contrary to fact, namely, that there is such a thing as *the* meaning of "Romanticism" for "*the* historian of ideas."

These semasiological preliminaries may seem an unduly pedantic

[2] "On the Discrimination of Romanticisms," read before Modern Language Association of America, 1923; published in *PMLA*, XXXIX, pp. 229–253.

and logic-chopping approach to what is presumably meant, after all, to be a discussion of a historical topic. But few things, I think, are more needful for historians of ideas—and every good historian is in some degree a historian of ideas—than to get rid of the logical confusions associated with the use of this linguistically extraordinary word "Romanticism," and, in fact, to cease asking, and trying to answer, the first question suggested by the title of this paper. For an answer to it, whether expressed or implied, will either (a) contain the factually false assumption which I have indicated—*viz.*, that the word has one understood and accepted meaning—or else (b) it will be a personal definition of the word, conveying no information except about the definer's private taste in terminology, and not open to discussion, or comparison with any objective matters of fact—since personal preferences in the definition of terms are not discussable, provided the definitions are not self-contradictory. Yet those who propound definitions—new or old—of "Romanticism," appear usually to suppose that they are *not* merely uttering a verbal proposition—a statement of the signification which they choose to attach to a term—but are putting forth a proposition of historical fact, capable of discussion and verification. This singular confusion in most instances can be seen to rest upon a vague, tacit assumption that there is a kind of determinate entity existing prior to the definition, an object or an essence, or Platonic Idea—which *must* be the thing that the word "Romantic" or "Romanticism" denotes, but which, when it is discovered, must then be assumed to be exemplified or embodied in all the writers or writings which have been conventionally called, or which the particular historian or critic is accustomed to call, "Romantic." In determining what this Romantic essence is, the inquirer is usually guided by his own associations of ideas with the word, the connotations which it chiefly has for him,—or sometimes, in the case of those for whom "Romantic" is an adjective of disparagement, guided only by a determination to apply that damning epithet to all the ideas or tastes which they most dislike. The result of this sort of procedure is not only the vast terminological confusion to which I have already referred, but a vast amount of bad history—the reading into texts or doctrines which have come to be commonly classified as "Romantic," of all the characteristics or theses which one has, by a largely *a priori*, non-historical method, determined to be the pure quiddity of

"the Romantic," *das Wesen des Romantischen*. These are, I am aware, dogmatic-sounding assertions; but probative examples could be cited by the dozen, if there were time for them.

Nothing, then, but confusion and error can result from the quest of some supposititious intrinsic nature of a hypostatized essence called "Romanticism." But there is a quite different sort of inquiry into which our initial question may be converted; and such an inquiry would make for the elimination of confusion, and is indispensable for the understanding of the history of the past century and a half, and, consequently, for the understanding of the contemporary intellectual, moral and political situation; and this inquiry is primarily the business of the historian of ideas, and requires the application of a specific method of analysis proper to that study. Its starting-point is a massive historical fact which no one is likely to deny—namely, that in the last quarter of the eighteenth century, especially in the 1780s and 1790s, there were discovered, invented or revived, chiefly in Germany, a large number of ideas which had been relatively, though not always absolutely, unfamiliar or uninfluential through most of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; and that the total impact of what we may call, for short, the new ideas of the 1780s and 1790s (including revivals of old ideas under "new"), as they developed, ramified, and were diffused during the following decades, profoundly altered the habitual preconceptions, valuations, and ruling catchwords of an increasingly large part of the educated classes in Europe, so that there came into vogue in the course of the nineteenth century and in our own a whole series of intellectual fashions—from styles in poetry and styles in metaphysics to styles in government—which had no parallels in the preceding period. The result was—to resort to the hackneyed but apt metaphor—not one, but a whole set of "climates of opinion," in which species of plants either unknown to the earlier eighteenth century or only germinant then, came to flourish mightily. The "newness" of these ideas of (*e.g.*) the 1790s was, for the most part, not an absolute newness; it lies in the contrast with the dominant ideas of the immediately antecedent age, and with what may be called the "old ideas" of the 1790s, exemplified, on the political side, in the French Revolution. For, roughly, in that decade two revolutions were taking place—one, external and political, in France, which was the culmination of the *Aufklärung*, the other, primarily in the realm of abstract ideas,

mainly in Germany, which was only somewhat later to manifest its political consequences—some of them, indeed, only in our own unhappy day.

To call these new ideas of the 1780s and 1790s "Romanticism" is confusion-breeding and productive of historical error above all because it suggests that there was only one such idea, or, if many, that they were all implicates of one fundamental "Romantic" idea, or, at the least, that they were harmonious *inter se* and formed a sort of systematic unity. None of these things are true. The new ideas of the period—even when held, as they often were, by the same individual minds—were in large part heterogeneous, logically independent, and sometimes essentially antithetic to one another in their implications, though their full implications were not always at once discerned; and some writers traditionally labelled "Romantic" were influenced by some of them, others by others, and yet others, I suspect, by none. But though there is no such thing as Romanticism, there emphatically *was* something which—for lack of any other brief name—may still be called a Romantic period; and one may perhaps speak of—not a, but several, Romantic movements: the period in which this array of new or newly energized ideas emerged into prominence, and the movements which consist in the propagation of one or many of them, in the drawing out of their initially latent consequences, logical or pseudo-logical, in their alliances with one another or with various older ideas and fashions of thought, and in their interaction with certain more or less permanent affective elements of human nature. For my own part, at any rate, I am—in a spirit of compromise—willing to speak of such a period and of such movements—meaning, approximately, the half-century 1780–1830, but especially its second decade, and the movements in which any one or more of these ideas conspicuously manifested themselves. In what follows I shall be chiefly concerned with some of the ideas of those German writers who, in the 1790s, first introduced the *term* "Romantic" as the designation of a new tendency or fashion of thought.

Now the question: What were the new, or newly *active* and peculiarly influential, ideas of the 1790s and what were their vicissitudes and developments in the subsequent decades? is a factual and therefore a properly historical question. But it is a question in the history of ideas; and it therefore, as I have said,

requires the application of a method of investigation appropriate to that study. And the nature of this method, as applied, not to the life-history of a particular idea but to the integral study of a period, still appears to need some explanation. Given the prerequisite knowledge of the relevant texts, the first task of the historiographer of ideas is a task of logical analysis—the discrimination *in* the texts, and the segregating *out of* the texts, of each of what I shall call the basic or germinal ideas, the identification of each of them so that it can be recognized wherever it appears, in differing contexts, under different labels or phrasings, and in diverse provinces of thought. And in this part of the task the historian—unhappily—must usually begin by carefully scrutinizing the most recurrent and crucial terms in his texts—the most prevalent formulas or phrases or sacred words—in order to determine what and how many distinct ideas appear to be expressed by, or associated with, each of these terms in the minds of the various users of it. For once a word or phrase or theorem has gained vogue and sanctity, it is likely to be used by different writers in quite different senses—usually without their being clearly aware that they are doing so.

For example: it is, I suppose, commonly recognized that *one* of the relatively new phenomena of the Romantic period was a new or, at all events, a much wider and intensified, vogue of the highly abstract and equivocal term "infinite." It is notorious that such phrases as *Streben ins Unendliche* or *Sehnsucht nach dem Unendlichen* or *Annäherung zu einer unendlichen Grösse,* were peculiarly dear to the German *Frühromantiker* as expressions of their ideal of life or of art. But, as I have elsewhere pointed out, the term "infinite," as used by one or another of these writers, had at least five distinct, though not in all cases mutually exclusive, senses or applications.[3] All of these senses obviously had something in common, and that something was, historically, highly important. The common element was the negative element. The "infinite," whatever positive meaning might be connected with the word, meant at least the not-limited or not-completed, the *Unbegrenzt* or *Unvollendet*—in *some* sense of limit or completion. And the sanctity of

[3] "Schiller and the Genesis of Romanticism," *Mod. Lang. Notes,* 1920, pp. 138 ff. *Cf.* also H. Rehder: *Die Philosophie der unendlichen Landschaft: ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der romantischen Weltanschauung,* 1932; E. L. Schellenberg, *Das Buch der deutschen Romantik, die Sehnsucht nach dem Unendlichen,* 1924; F. Strich, *Deutsche Klassik und Romantik; oder Vollendung und Unendlichkeit,* 1928.

the word in most of the new writers of the period was evidence of a tendency to a new presupposition about what is excellent or valuable—and also about the nature of things, the constitution of the universe or the course of history. It was a presupposition contrary to a feature of what may be fairly called the main—not the only—earlier tradition of European thought, at least in value-judgments of all kinds, and not in these alone. There were important opposing strains in the older tradition, but the most prevalent and orthodox tendency had been to think in terms of finites, and to regard limitation as an essential element of excellence, at least for mortals. In logic and science, the first thing needful was to have precisely *defined* concepts and terms; in a work of art, the first essential was that it should have one limited theme and a clear-cut and readily recognizable "form," so that, as Schiller declared in the essay that gave the decisive initial impetus to the early Romantic movement in Germany,[4] the essence of classical art is that is a *Kunst der Begrenztheit;* in literary style, the supreme merit was the clarity that comes from using words which immediately convey clear and distinct ideas, express exact and therefore limited meanings; and in human character and conduct, the mark of excellence was to observe metes and bounds and to be moderate in all one's desires, ambitions and pretensions. The historic process, too, in the Christian tradition—in spite of opposing Aristotelian and other influences—was conceived as a finite thing, having a beginning, a middle and an end—neither an interminable undulation, nor an endless recurrence of similar cycles, nor even a perpetual movement towards an infinitely distant and therefore unattainable goal. Now the German Romantics of the 1790s were in conscious and zealous—though not in consistent or unwavering—revolt against all these assumptions, but first of all in the theory of art. They conceived and proclaimed themselves to be the prophets of a new, a "modern," art—and "modern" is what *they* primarily meant by "Romantic"[5]—which should be a *Kunst des*

[4] *Ueber naive und sentimentalische Dichtung;* see my "Schiller and the Genesis of Romanticism" in *Mod. Lang. Notes, loc. cit.*

[5] *Cf.* my "The Meaning of 'Romantic' in Early German Romanticism" in *Mod. Lang. Notes,* XXXII, 1917. For an example, *cf.* A. W. Schlegel's Berlin *Vorlesungen über schöne Litteratur und Kunst,* 1803–4 (ed. Minor, 1884, Pt. I, III, p. 7): "eine romantische, d. h. nicht nach den Mustern des Alterthums gebildete Poesie." So the title of the Third Series, *Ueber die romantische Poesie,* is explained as meaning "eine Geschichte und Charakteristik der Poesie der Haupnationen des neueren Europa, oder der romantischen."

Unendlichen. The new valuation, the revolt against "the finite," speedily passed over into other provinces; and since one of the most pregnant differences of taste or habit in categories is that between a habitual preference for the limited and well-defined and a habitual preference for "the infinite," this one among the ideas of the 1790s has had many and far-reaching consequences.

But in spite of this common element in the new vogue of the word "infinite," when any more positive and concrete significations were attached to it by German writers of the 1790s, it could serve as the catchword for several quite distinct and, in part, mutually antagonistic tendencies, since there are numerous varieties of "the infinite." These, again, I may not take the time to enumerate; I merely recall the general fact in order to illustrate the indispensability of a careful semasiological analysis in the first phase of the intellectual historian's study of a period.

When this phase is completed—when he has discriminated and listed as exhaustively as he can the separate "ruling ideas" which distinguish the period, or the particular group of writers in it with whom he is concerned, his next task is to examine the relations between these ideas. And the relations he will need to look for are of three kinds: logical, psychological, and historical—and especially, under the latter, genetic—relations.

The first two of these inquiries I have distinguished from the strictly historical because they are procedures of analysis and construction which need in some measure to be carried out in the historian's own mind before he goes on to confront their results with the historical evidence to be found in his sources. It corresponds to the phase of constructing tentative hypotheses in the work of the natural scientist. By logical relations I mean relations of implication or opposition between categories, or tacit presuppositions, or express beliefs or doctrines. When he has ascertained the currency and influence of a given idea in his period, the historian does well to ask himself, what does this idea logically presuppose, what does it imply, and with what other ideas is it implicitly incompatible—whether or not these logical relations were recognized by those who embraced the idea. For if it should turn out that some of its implications were not recognized, this may become a highly important, though negative, historical fact. Negative facts are of much more significance for the intellectual historian than is usually appreciated. The things that a writer,

given his premises, might be expected to say, but doesn't say—the consequences which legitimately and fairly evidently follow from his theses, but which he never sees, or persistently refuses to draw—these may be even more noteworthy than the things he does say or the consequences he does deduce. For they may throw light upon peculiarities of his mind, especially upon his biases and the non-rational elements in his thinking—may disclose to the historian specific points at which intellectual processes have been checked, or diverted, or perverted, by emotive factors. Negative facts of this kind are thus often indicia of positive but unexplicit or subconscious facts. So, again, the determination of not-immediately-obvious *in*compatibilities between ideas may lead to the recognition of the historically instructive fact that one or another writer, or a whole age, has held together, in closed compartments of the mind, contradictory preconceptions or beliefs. Such a fact—like the failure to see necessary positive implications of accepted premises—calls for psychological explanation, if possible; the historian must at least seek for a hypothesis to account for it.

By the psychological relations of ideas, I mean, so to say, elective affinities between them not properly logical in character—the tendency of one, through some process of association by similarity, or often through the ambiguity of the terms used to express it, to suggest or evoke others. These transitions often pass, with the writers in whom they appear, for logical ones. But especially important for the historian, under this head, is the consideration of the natural *affective* concomitants of various ideas—the kinds of feeling—even, if you like, of "bodily set"—which, when entertained, they tend to arouse, the moods or attitudes to which they are congenial, what I have elsewhere called the "types of metaphysical pathos" which go with various types even of highly abstract notions or doctrines, and are perhaps the real secret of their appeal, at least to the lay public. Philosophy, historically considered, like Nanki Poo in the opera, can sing, and has sung, songs adapted to every—or almost every—changing mood or passion. Into the highly controversial question whether changes of dominant mood beget the philosophies, or changes in philosophy the moods—or sometimes one and sometimes the other—I do not propose here to enter; I merely suggest that the historiographer of ideas must be alert to note the connection between specific ideas and philosophies and specific moods. "Connection" here includes repug-

nancies. A not uncommon historical phenomenon is a repugnancy between a dominant doctrine in, for example, aesthetics, and the actual tastes of those who feel obliged to subscribe to that doctrine. It has been pointed out by acute students of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century English criticism that most critics of the period seem to have really liked and admired Shakespeare, while the critical principles many of them professed required them to damn him—at least with faint, or much-qualified, praise. This is even more apparent, I think, in those German critics of the early 1790s who were still classicists of the straitest sect, but were, in a few years, to promulgate the new program of *die romantische Poesie*. One factor—though only one—in causing them to reverse their position was, I suspect, that their strong, but repressed, taste for Shakespeare predisposed them to accept a new philosophy of art—and in particular, of poetry—which would justify their taste.

When the intellectual historian of a period has thus considered the logical and the hypothetical psychological relations of the major unit-ideas which he has found prevalent in the period, he must then, of course, return to the historical data, to observe how far the logical relations between these ideas were in fact manifested as operative factors in the thought-tendencies of the time, and what psychological relations among them can be actually seen at work in the minds of their spokesmen. In this latter inquiry he will often, if lucky, be able to discern a sort of genetic relationship between one logically distinct idea and another—to note the nature of the transitions in thought by which one gave rise to a quite different one, and into what combinations or idea-complexes it entered.

For example: the *original* "Romanticists"—the German introducers of the term, the Schlegels and their group—were preoccupied at the outset chiefly with two peculiar problems: (a) What are the essential and distinguishing characteristics of classical, *i.e.*, Greek, art and thought and culture, on the one hand, and of non-classical, *i.e.*, modern art, etc., on the other? (b) How are these differences to be explained historically? They began their reflection on these problems while still assuming the superiority of the "classical;" their lucubrations on the subject are an episode in the history of the quarrel over the Ancients and Moderns. Now their answer to the second question was that the fundamental differences between classical and "modern" ways of thinking must be due to one or

both of the two great historic events which brought the ancient culture to an end: the introduction of Christianity and the invasions of the Nordic or Germanic peoples. This suggested to them, in part, the answer to their other question. If you want to know, in terms of basic ideas—of preconceptions, valuations, or emotional susceptibilities—what distinguishes the classical from the modern or "Romantic," you have but to determine wherein the Christian view of life or of the universe fundamentally differs from the Greek, or the Germanic or Nordic from the Latin or Mediterranean. At first they (certainly Friedrich Schlegel) conceived the former, at least, to be a difference for the worse. But in their attempt—much influenced by Schiller's essay to which I have referred—to formulate the "essence" of the "modern" or Christian *Lebensanschauung,* they came (through processes which, once more, it would take too long to analyze here) to find this in certain propensities or assumptions such as the craving (to which I have already referred) for infinite values or infinite objects for thought or imagination to contemplate, or for the will to aim at, a love of mystery, otherworldliness, an awareness of the duality of man's constitution, a preoccupation with the inner life, and a sense of man's inner corruption—all of these being contrasted with the classical sense for "form" and limits, the supposed Greek love of clarity, absorption in the beauty of this world, "objectivity" (*i.e.,* looking out and not in), untroubled unity of personality, and "serenity." And some, at least, of the former propensities or assumptions these writers found congenial to their own imaginations or temperaments; and they thereupon abruptly turned from what they conceived (with a good deal of historical error) to be the classical mode of art and thought to its opposite, which they had already named "Romantic."

But this conversion was clearly much facilitated by the influence of another idea which has its own pre-history, but was especially potent in the Romantic decades: the idea that a man—and especially an artist—ought to be of his own time, to express in his life or art the characteristics, the ideas, the spirit of his age.[58a] He will neither be true to himself nor *en rapport* with his contemporaries if he does not do so. If, for example, he is a dramatist, he must

[58a] This became an especially influential idea among the French Romantic writers and artists of the 1820s. On this see George Boas, *"Il faut être de son temps,"* in *Jour. of Aesthetics,* I, 1, 1941, pp. 52–65.

exhibit in his characters the emotions and motives which he understands—those by which men of his time are moved. A modern man, then, should *be* "modern." But since "modern" or "Romantic" meant mainly, for the early German Romanticists, "Christian," and since for them the spirit of Christianity was best exemplified in the Middle Ages, what at first looked like a sort of revolutionary modernism proved to be identical (in part) with a kind of medievalism.

Now in noting these phenomena which I have roughly sketched, the historian is at once (a) discriminating certain (by no means all) of the more characteristic ideas of the Romantic period, (b) observing the processes by which some of them generated others, and (c) recognizing the complex groupings which they formed in individual—in fact, in numerous individual—minds of the time. When he has done this, the ideas fall into a pattern, of which the diverse modes of relation, logical or psychological, between them are, as it were, the framework. And—though this is perhaps a counsel of perfection—one has not, I think, fully understood the Romantic period as a historic phenomenon—has not grasped what was then going on—until he has apprehended this pattern. It could be at least suggestively portrayed graphically, though the diagram would need to be an extremely large and intricate one.

But when the historian has thus traced these genetic processes, the passing-over from one idea to another, and noted one particular combination of ideas which resulted, he has still to observe that each of the units of *that* complex presently broke loose from its original context and went on its own separate way, generating, in different minds, yet other ideas or entering into other combinations. Thus, out of one group of assumptions made or theorems evolved by the Schlegels, Novalis, and their circle, of which I have tried to suggest roughly the components and their genesis, a whole series of distinct notions and thought-movements emerged. Was it to be assumed, for example, that "modern" or "Romantic" art, as a result of the preoccupation of Christianity with the inner life, is, or should be, peculiarly introspective? Then modern "poetry" has before it as its special province the whole field of subjective states and their infinite nuances, and finds its best expression in the psychological novel or play, especially in those exhibiting subtle moral conflicts in the soul of the hero—already exemplified, or supposed to be exemplified, in Shakespeare's *Hamlet*. This, it will

be remembered, is one of the themes of Chateaubriand's *Génie du Christianisme.*[6] With this, the novel, as the form best adapted to this purpose, tended to assume a new dignity and pre-eminence among the literary *genres.* But it was no far cry from this idea to that of the superiority of the *realistic*—but the psychologically realistic—novel in general; so that a French literary historian has not unintelligibly written of "the realism of the Romantics." *Madame Bovary* is certainly neither medieval, nor mysterious, nor vague, nor otherworldly, nor particularly characterized by *Unbegrenztheit;* it has often been described as an attack upon the "Romantic" temper; but it has nevertheless a filiation with one of the elements in the idea-complex of the *Frühromantiker* of the 1790s and the French Romantics of the following decade, as that element developed in isolation from the others. But, on the other hand, Mr. Lascelles Abercrombie assures us that "there is an element directly opposed to romanticism; it is realism." Thus a truly romantic taste in "Views," or landscapes, finds the "pleasant thing in them" to be "a certain blur or dimness, which prevents the eye from being lost in a throng of things positively known, and at the same time stirs one to guess at the infinite possibility the blur contains of things which might be known." "The best thing our minds can do for us is

> In keeping us in hope strange things to see
> That never were, nor are, nor e'er shall be."[7]

Now in insisting that this is the *truly* "romantic" thing, Mr. Abercrombie was simply expressing his own taste in the use of that adjective; but it happens to be true that this note, as well as the other I have just mentioned, was one of the elements in the original idea-complex of the German Romanticists of the 1790s; so that from it a literary tendency opposite to realism could also develop, or at least could gain reënforcement: the cultivation of a mysterious vagueness, the poetry that hints at what cannot be expressed, at least in words, the art that seeks always to convey a sense of something vast and ineffable in even "the meanest flower that blows." This too is "Romantic" in the sense of one, but only one, of Friedrich Schlegel's definitions: "romantisch . . . in jenem weitern

[6] Pt. I, Livre ii, chap. 1; iii, chap. 1, 8, 9.

[7] *Romanticism* (1926), p. 44.

Sinn des Wortes wo es die Tendenz nach einem tiefen unendlichen Sinn bezeichnet.'"[8]

In a similar way, then, could be pointed out the later separate fortunes, vicissitudes and alliances of each one of the ideas that constituted the particular combination, in the minds of the original avowed Romanticists, of which I have attempted to indicate summarily the process of formation. But let it not be supposed that this combination contained *all* the new or peculiarly potent ideas of the 1790s. It includes only a group of them which were, at that time, especially associated with the *word* "Romantic." There were others, equally important, which sprang from other sources and developed in other ways—though often absorbed by the same minds and in that sense combined with the former. In the total pattern, these, too, with their relations to the others, would have to be incorporated. But that is too large an enterprise to be attempted here.

II

I suppose, however, that most of the learned company I am addressing are primarily interested in political and social history; but most of the slight illustrations hitherto given of the application of the method of the historian of ideas to the study of the Romantic period have not been obviously pertinent to political or social history. They have had to do with seemingly non-political notions, belonging initially to the fields of literary criticism, aesthetics, or quasi-aesthetic valuations, or religion, or metaphysics. The reason for this lies in a fact which the political historian needs to bear in mind—namely, that most of the new ideas of the 1780s and 1790s *were* originally aesthetic or religious or metaphysical ideas. But they are not on that account less pertinent to political history. For they were the sort of ideas that, when accepted and developed, could modify men's general ways of thinking profoundly, and because profoundly, widely—in many diverse fields, including the political. And if one were to consider the "meaning," in the sense of the historic significance, of—not "Romanticism," but certain ideas of the Romantic period—from the point of view of 1940, their political consequences may well be regarded as the most significant. For a particular group of these ideas, continuously at work on the minds of the educated and reading public for fifteen decades, have produced in our own time a sort of culminating joint-effect, which is

[8] *Gespräch über die Poesie*, 1800.

at least an essential and conspicuous part of the monstrous scene presented by Germany and by Europe today. That the revolutionary—or counter-revolutionary—political events of the past twenty years would not have occurred but for these earlier alterations in fashions of thought, it would be hazardous to maintain. For most of these events are merely new instances of familiar types of historical phenomena which seem to repeat themselves in ages or among peoples whose ruling ideologies are extremely dissimilar. The rise of dictatorships, for example, is an old story. It is, doubtless, possible only under certain conditions; but no uniform underlying general ideas seem to be among those conditions. A political phenomenon which, even in our own time, appears almost simultaneously in, *e.g.*, Germany, Italy, Russia and Spain—countries whose recent intellectual history has certainly been very different—can hardly be explicable as due to the prior prevalence among their peoples of identical fashions of thought. Equally old is the lust of conquest and the emergence of military conquerors on the grand scale—though we had fondly and foolishly supposed the day for such things to be over. I am, therefore, far from suggesting that the rise of the dictatorships and the return of an era of wars of territorial aggrandizement in Europe have their sufficient condition in the changes in ideas which marked the Romantic period; and I recognize that there is room for question whether those changes were even among the necessary conditions for the present recrudescence of those ancient evils. Nevertheless, it is certain—and notorious—that all these contemporary revolutions have had distinctive ideologies—*i.e.*, idea-complexes—associated with them, and that their leaders—some of whom are past masters of practical political psychology—seem to regard the inculcation of these ideologies as indispensable to the success of their revolutionary enterprises and the permanence of the "new orders" they wish to establish. The ideologies may be, in great part they indubitably are, only "rationalizations" of the ambitions, or delusions of grandeur, of the leaders or of the passions of their followers; but even so, the rationalizations are found necessary, before those ambitions are converted into deeds or those latent passions into mass-action. A Hitler or a Mussolini is not more sedulous in the strengthening of his armaments than in the propagating of his ideas—the ideas which, on the one hand, serve his purpose, but on the other, can appeal to the minds of his followers because those minds have already been "conditioned" for their reception.

Now, out of the many "new ideas of the 1780s and 1790s," there were three which—though at the outset they were not political at all in their reference—were destined to be transferred to the domain of political thought and sentiment; to which the German—and in less degree the general European—mind was increasingly conditioned by a series of influential nineteenth-century writers; and the *fusion or combination* of which, I suggest, has been a factor in the production of the state of mind upon which the totalitarian ideologies depend for their appeal. These three are by no means the only ones of which the same might be said; but they are, I incline to think, the most fundamental and most important, though the estimate is certainly debatable. They consist in a sort of apotheosis of conceptions associated with three words; the German words are for the present purpose the most appropriate: *das Ganze, Streben,* and *Eigentümlichkeit.* If terms ending in *-ism* must be had to designate these ideas, they may be called holism or organicism, voluntarism or "dynamism," and diversitarianism.

1. The first—which is now familiar enough—was a relatively new idea about the relation of the individual to the whole—the idea of organism, in its logical or metaphysical sense. The political liberalism of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had, it need hardly be recalled, usually conceived the individual as primary. This is the essence of the doctrine of natural rights; it is not really less characteristic of the presuppositions of political utilitarianism. The reality with which politics was concerned was the human person, conceived as a possessor of intrinsic rights, or as a claimant for the means of happiness. He had, admittedly, relations to other individuals, and—at least in the natural rights theory—moral obligations towards them. But the relations and obligations were *between* individuals as such; and though the interests or instincts of the individuals required them to combine in organized aggregates, such as the State, these were secondary, derivative, and merely instrumental to the assurance and adjustment of individual rights or the satisfaction of individual needs and desires. The whole was just the aggregate of its parts, and apart from them was nothing; and the dominant conception of scientific method, like the dominant political theory, proceeded, in its investigation of any complex thing, by an "analysis" or "resolution" of it into its ultimate component parts. To understand *it,* you had but to take it to pieces, to know the parts and *their* characteristics and the laws

of their action, and how many of them there were in the given complex—and your problem was solved. But a strain of German thought in the late eighteenth century—which had had earlier foreshadowings in Shaftesbury, Stahl, and others—tended increasingly towards a reversal of this whole way of thinking—towards giving primacy and a mystical sanctity to what was called "the Idea of the Whole," as defined by Kant in the *Critique of Judgment:* "An Idea [of something] which must determine *a priori* all that is contained *in* it"—of a "product of nature" in which, "just as every part of it exists *through* all the others, so every part is also thought as existing *for* all the others and for the sake of the Whole (*um . . . des Ganzen willen*), that is, as a tool or organ (*Werkzeug, Organ*)."[9] Kant was talking about a natural organism—a tree; but, as is well known, the conception was speedily carried over into the provinces of metaphysics, of morals and, especially, of politics. The "Idea of the Whole" came increasingly to mean, in its practical application, the idea of the political State. The details of this process are exceedingly various and complex, and cannot be analyzed here; happily, Professor Anderson and Professor Briefs are to deal with some important parts of the story in their papers. But the general result of the repetition of this conception, by many greater and lesser teachers, in diverse forms and with or without qualifications, was the conditioning of the mind of individuals to think of themselves (to a degree perhaps unprecedented in history) as *mere* members of *das Ganze,* as "tools or organs" of the national State—as existing *um des Ganzen willen*—and as finding the interest and value of their existence in the realization of the ends of the State, which are by no means merely the summation of the private ends even of all of its members. Without a long prior conditioning, then, to this idea, among others, the totalitarian ideology would not, I suggest, have the potency that it has, either in Germany or Italy.

The distinguished president of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Professor Cannon, in his recent presidential address, has argued that the political analogue of the biological organism is democracy, and that "the human body is the best democracy." I venture to disagree, but there is no time to state the distinctions which would justify this disagreement. But in any case the historical effects of a conception, especially of one

[9] *Kr. d. Urteilskraft,* Pt. II, 65; A288.

of the great metaphors which play so large a part in the history of ideas, are not necessarily, or, perhaps, normally identical with its logical implications; and it will, I think, be generally agreed by historians that the vogue of the organismic conception in the nineteenth century has *not* made for what is commonly understood by democracy.

2. But the practical tendency of this idea is profoundly modified by its fusion with another idea of the 1790s. This is the assumption of the primacy, in reality and in value, of process, striving, cumulative becoming, over any static consummation—the dislike of finality, *das Abgeschlossene,* and in particular, the peculiar sensibility to the pathos of struggle, which is, by necessary implication, a struggle *against* something or somebody, some *Anstoss* or antagonist. *Streben,* as everyone knows, was one of the most sacred words of the German Romantics—and it was necessarily, for them, a *Streben ins Unendliche,* a striving without a terminus; and in spite of the various other senses and applications which this formula could and did receive, its vogue tended in the main towards that apotheosis of "the Will" which, astonishingly combined in Schopenhauer with its polar opposite, a Vedantist and Buddhistic quietism and otherworldliness, found its natural culmination in Nietzsche's gospel of the *Wille zur Macht,* that "Dionysian philosophy" of which "the decisive feature," as he writes in *Ecce Homo,* is "the yea-saying to contradiction and war, the postulation of Becoming, together with the radical rejection even of the concept *Being*"—the "tragic" temper which seeks "to be far beyond terror and pity and to be the eternal lust of Becoming itself—that lust which also involves the joy of destruction."[10] The notion of *Streben* was originally, and even in Nietzsche largely remained, an ideal for the individual. But it too, naturally enough, has been converted into a political idea; and Nietzsche, as Professor Brinton has shown,[11] has become the chief official philosopher of Nazism—after Hitler. But as a political idea, this second notion has been fused with the first. The individual, as essentially an organ of *das Ganze,* the State, does his striving through the

[10] *The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche,* tr. by A. M. Ludoviei: *Ecce Homo,* p. 72. Part of the citation is quoted by Nietzsche himself from *The Twilight of the Idols* (*Götzendämmerung*).

[11] Crane Brinton, "The National Socialists' Use of Nietzsche," JOUR. OF THE HIST. OF IDEAS, I, No. 2.

State, which is the embodiment of the Will to Power. If it is to be effective in this capacity, it must be completely integrated; it can permit no struggles within itself, between its parts—for example, no class-struggle and no party-conflicts. The parts must be strictly regimented, *gleichgeschaltet*, for the service of the whole. But the nation or State itself takes on the rôle of the insatiable Romantic hero—in which its members can, indeed, vicariously share. It must ever strive for expansion, external power, and yet more power, not as a regrettably necessary means to some final rationally satisfying goal, but because continuous self-assertion, transcending of boundaries, triumph over opposition, is its vocation. As the personification of the present German State, Adolf Hitler is Carlyle's "infinite bootblack" endowed with all the power of a great people and a vast military machine. It is true that, somewhere in *Mein Kampf*, Hitler shows, in one passage, some embarrassment at the thought of the finitude of this planet. When the "superior man," *der höchsstehende Mensch*, through struggle has once made himself master of the world, there will be no more opportunity for struggle, but only a tedious reign of universal peace. But Hitler puts the awkward thought from his mind; the evil day is at least a long way off; *also, erst Kampf, und dann kann man sehen was zu machen ist.* Hitler is, in short, a kind of vulgar, political and sanguinary Faust, *der immer strebend sich bemüht* upon the international scene—a Faust, I need hardly add, before his redemption.

3. One of the most revolutionary of the ideas of the 1790s was an assertion of the value of diversity in human opinions, characters, tastes, arts and cultures. This had, it is true, a long prehistory, which cannot be told here;[12] but in the original German Romanticists of that decade it reached a climax and became one of the chief articles of their creed. It was revolutionary because it reversed a presupposition that had been dominant for some two centuries: the presupposition which may be called uniformitarianism. By this term I do not mean the assumption that individuals and peoples are *in fact* identical in their characters and beliefs and ways of living. It was evident—to the reformer of the Enlightenment all too painfully evident—that they are not. Uniformitarianism is the assumption that what is most important, most valuable,

[12] I have dealt with it more fully and tried to show its sources in *The Great Chain of Being;* see especially Lecture X.

normal, in men consists in what is the same in all men, and that their actual diversities in opinion and cultures and forms of government are evidences of departures from the norm of human life. And this was a natural and seemed an obvious inference from a very common assumption concerning the nature of truth. To any given question that can be asked or any practical problem with which men are confronted, it seemed evident that there can be only one true or correct answer. There is one right generic way of performing any kind of task—of writing a play or an epic, painting a landscape, building a house, organizing and governing a society—and (this was a postulate usually tacitly or explicitly associated with the uniformitarian preconception) any man having normal human faculties is capable of discovering the one true view or the one correct rule of practice, for himself, by the unaided—provided it be also the uncorrupted—light of nature. For there is, in that admittedly very mixed compound called human nature, a faculty, the *gemeine Menschenverstand,* which is the organ for apprehending or revealing the one true answer to any question to which an answer is needful for man, the universal and invariant objective truth. What is rational is uniform; and what is not uniform is *eo ipso* not rational; and diversity is therefore the easily recognizable mark of error. In a sense, every man has a latent potential knowledge of such truth, by virtue of his possession of *le bon sens ou raison* which, as Descartes declared, is *la chose du monde la mieux partagée* and is *naturellement égale en tous les hommes*—and therefore has nothing to do with time or place or race. But in most of mankind it has been buried under a vast mass of accumulated error—that is to say, of differences in beliefs, valuations, laws, practices. These errors were the product of a long, increasing series of unhappy accidents—*i.e.,* of lapses from rationality on the part of the multitude, misled by a few men actuated by the love of power—priests and kings. The vehicles of the transmission of these errors—what were called *les préjugés*—from generation to generation, were tradition, custom, (whose tyranny was so bitterly denounced by Montaigne and Charron and many lesser writers), and above all, the early education of children. The task of the lover of humanity, the reformer, the educator, therefore, was less to discover and show to men new truths, than to purge their minds of the historic accretion of non-rational prejudices, and thus to allow the pure, clear light of nature within them to shine forth of

itself. For, among all the extremely numerous senses of the sacred word "nature," in its normative use, from the sixteenth to the late eighteenth century, the most common and potent was that in which it summed up this whole uniformitarian complex of ideas.

But to the Romantics of the 1790s (following Herder) it appeared that the diversity of men and ages and peoples, in their ways of thinking and feeling and expressing themselves in arts and institutions, is "natural" and necessary, and also supremely desirable and right. And from this pregnant premise they drew two opposite consequences, of which the second was to prevail over the first. The assumption made initially for tolerance and catholicity. All the historic manifestations of human nature are good, and the cultivated man will train himself to appreciate and enjoy them all. But the other inference was that it is the first duty of an individual or a people to cherish and intensify the differentness, idiosyncrasy, *Eigentümlichkeit,* with which nature has endowed him or it. This, like the ideal of *Streben,* was, at the outset, applied largely to the individual, especially to the artist; but it also tended to be applied, and in the end to be chiefly applied, to the nation or race. So applied, it eventually destroyed, in many minds, the conception of a universal standard of human conduct and the sense of a common human destiny. It gave respectability to what the eighteenth century had meant by *les préjugés.* It seemed to lend a new philosophic sanction to that unreflective or animal nationalism which had long been a potent factor in European politics, but which, in the *Aufklärung,* had appeared to be on the wane among enlightened men. It tended to substitute for the piety towards humanity as such an exclusive piety towards one's own folk and its peculiarities; the very word "humanity," beloved by the earlier liberals, began to be *démodé,* and it became, as is well known, almost a commonplace in the Romantic period to say that there are no "men" but only Frenchmen, Germans, Englishmen, *et al.* Finally, when combined with that "permanent affective element of human nature," the collective, mutually re-enforcing *amour-propre* of the group, it was easily transformed into a conviction of the superiority of what is distinctive of one's own people —its "blood," its *Volksgeist,* traditions, *mores* and institutions— and of its right to dominate all lesser breeds.

Of these three among the ideas of the 1790s, any one, by itself, might have worked out to historic issues quite different from those

that actually resulted—and, in fact, when not combined with the others, did so. For example, if the first had not been combined with the third, the "whole" to which the individual is to subordinate himself and whose ends he is to seek might have been construed as humanity—which is, in fact, the only real social totality —and a tendency towards this interpretation may be seen in Novalis's *Die Christenheit oder Europa;* and the second and third, when taken as ideals for the individual, have always been at variance with the first. But when, and in so far as, these three ideas are (however incongruously) combined, one may discern, I think, an important part (though, assuredly, far from all) of the pattern of ideas behind—or associated with—the fateful political events of our own time: the idea of a national State whose members are but instruments to its own vaster ends; in which, therefore, no internal oppositions or disagreements in individual opinion can be permitted; which, however, is itself dedicated to a perpetual struggle for power and self-enlargement, with no fixed goal or terminus, and is animated by an intense and obsessing sense of the differentness of its own folk, of their duty of *keeping* different and uncorrupted by any alien elements, and by a conviction of the immeasurable value of their supposedly unique characteristics and culture. A host of other factors and events between the 1790s and the present, of which nothing has been said here, have, of course, contributed to this outcome; I have merely attempted to suggest, in a deplorably but unavoidably sketchy fashion, that there is a certain specific historical connection between the intellectual revolution of the Romantic period and the tragic spectacle of Europe in 1940.

Johns Hopkins University

THE ECONOMIC PHILOSOPHY OF ROMANTICISM

By Goetz A Briefs

Adam Heinrich Müller represents both the rise and the climax of political and economic thought within the Romantic movement. With him this thought draws to its natural end and develops its inescapable logic, circumstances having been what they were. The philosophy of the counter-revolution was destined to play into the hands of the party of restoration as well as of the reactionary forces, so long as it had to offer nothing but a mirage, an *umbra temporis acti.*

At its outset Romanticism had exercised an influence chiefly in the spheres of *belles lettres* and art. The vision had only occasionally penetrated further, *e.g.,* in Novalis's pamphlet *Christianity or Europe* (1799). However, between 1799 and 1809, the year in which Müller published his *Elemente der Staatskunst,* political events had taken place which shook the whole European world and affected Romanticist thought tremendously. Austria and Prussia had been defeated by the Son of the Revolution, German states were under his heel, German troops under his command. These events had already disillusioned many representatives of German thought who before had openly voiced their admiration for the French Revolution—Fichte is a typical example. A hothouse temperature developed for what was already rising as nationalism. After 1805–1806 the idea of the nation got a deeper grip on individuals and social groups; it lost its merely academic meaning and acquired something of the character of a political necessity. Edmund Burke had played the rôle of an awakener to Gentz and Friedrich Schlegel; he became a prophet to Adam Müller. The conservatism of the great Irish statesman and writer underwent in the work of Müller a translation into the intellectual and sentimental vernacular of Romanticism. Out of this general situation there arose the new phase which we may call political and economic Romanticism.

Of course, there is the problem whether or not Romanticism is able to face the great issues of government and nation. The difficulties are twofold: they rest in the Romanticist mind and in the subject-matter itself. The Romanticist mind may briefly be charac-

terized as dynamic subjectivism and subjective dynamism. This mind dissolves being into becoming, therefore it prefers direct intuition, the "idea," to the mere concept, since only ideas permit us to catch the flow of life, whereas concepts are dead, static, unable to seize or embody the fullness of life which is permanently "becoming." Consequently, what we would call to-day "causal analysis" of political and economic phenomena yields to a metaphysical approach, which aims at understanding life as a total process. Schelling had offered the term "organism" as expressing the real essence of the nation and of state-life: political thinking has to be organic. No chemist's approach can adequately deal with life. Only intuition grasps the nature of state-life fully.

This mental attitude had to cope with a highly realistic object, with a very unsentimental reality, the state. It has as its proper "reason" the *raison d'état*. It strives for stability, power, security, continuity. In its policy of self-preservation it is traditionally unsentimental. In addition, the contemporary state was the absolute state in Germany, the usurping and dictatorial state in France. However, the historical occasion for the Romanticist was the fact that the whole political system in Europe was really in a process of becoming—and it was this feature which made a Romanticist approach possible in the sphere of politics; in fact it called for a Romanticist interpretation. Never so much as just at that time had it become evident that state and nation are the vital basis for man's existence—existence interpreted in the Romantic meaning of the term, not in a biological or utilitarian meaning. War had shaken the static, absolutistic, mechanical conception of the state; war therefore was eulogized as the demiurge of the state conceived as something constantly in process of becoming. It appears at once where lay the connecting link between Romanticism and the contemporary situation.

The catastrophe of the German state unveiled to Müller the interdependence between socio-economic and political life. State and economic life are one whole. The idea of liberalism that the real social entity is the economic society establishing and circumscribing within a limited sphere the scope and activity of the state is utterly rejected. There is no such thing as a society or a nation outside of and prior to the state. The state is the Form of Being of society; from the state the latter gains its order and its foundations. The state comprises the totality of life, in fact "The

State is the totality of all human affairs.'"[1] It is the only and real *Totalgestalt,* as we should term it in modern phraseology. No spheres exist outside of the state; man is a political animal in his whole being, not merely in one or other province of his being. The fundamental philosophy of the French Revolution as well as of British liberalism is thus sweepingly rejected. State and society are not separate entities; the state is not a mere instrument for the protection of private property and personal freedom. The characteristically liberal division of life into a public and a private sphere finds no room in the Romanticist argument.

From this standpoint of a metaphysic of the state, the distinction between the true state and the revolutionary state becomes necessary. It is significant for all Romanticist thinking that things have a metaphysical order, and only if they are constituted according to this order and live up to it, are they in their true status. Again, it characterizes the Romanticist approach, and in particular Müller's, that thinking proceeds in an antagonistic or polar fashion, in antithesis: it was only toward the end of his life, and not without deep regret, that Müller abandoned this mode of thinking. All true forms of life harbor such antagonism: frequently Müller speaks of a sex-duality permeating the whole of creation. It is this inherent duality which causes all living organisms (and such an organism is the state) to grow, to unfold themselves. In each moment of their becoming a momentary "mediation" between the antagonistic elements takes place, a sort of *modus vivendi,* making room for a new tension between the dual forces inherent in life. It is this play of antagonisms and mediations and new antagonisms and new mediations which presents the true nature of life in its total aspect. Müller realizes that this fact requires a proper terminology for its expression; not concepts which are rigid and static but ideas which permit us to comprehend the permanent flow of life, of the state; this flow can only be grasped by the proper methodological tools; and the tools are the ideas. Only in a later phase of his writing did Müller consider ideas as being transcendent realities in the Platonic meaning of the term.

It goes without saying that the liberal and individualistic interpretation of the state finds no favor in the eyes of Müller or any other of the Romanticists. The state is a living organism, it grows,

[1] *Von der Idee des Staates;* in Adam Müller *Ausgewählte Abhandlungen,* ed. J. Baxa (Jena, 1921), p. 15.

it unfolds itself from its inner antagonistic dynamism, it is immortal; it is a *macranthropos*, as Novalis had already denominated it. Every single one of these criteria challenges the liberal conception and interpretation of the state. Burke, and those following him, the early Romanticists, had already remarked that the notion of individuality does not apply to persons only; it applies just as well to any other phenomenon in history or nature. The accentuation of the individuality and personality of collective units and entities diminishes the uniqueness and value of the human individual. It is at this juncture that Müller and the idealistic philosophers, in particular Fichte, part company; and, to a certain extent, even Müller and Novalis. The more Müller places the accent on the state as an immortal substance, the weaker grow the relations between Fichte and him. The idea of freedom, based on ethical will, animates the Fichtean philosophy; but no longer, and certainly not in the same way, does it play its rôle in Adam Müller's thinking. To be sure, he acknowledges the idea of freedom, and sees in it a great and never-idle power within civil society; however, freedom is here only a desire to maintain one's character (*Eigenheit*), to uphold one's own opinions, one's activities, one's attitude, one's total form of life (*ganze Lebensform*) against others. This freedom is centrifugal; against it there arises the centripetal idea of law; this law is a historical product developed through long generations, and it limits the claims to freedom raised by the now living individuals. Past generations speak through the historical law regulating the life of the present generation. In the Law, as a product of the centuries, there is revealed a hidden reason and wisdom. This philosophy traces its origin to French traditionalism as formulated by de Bonald and de Maistre.

The organic whole which is the state is the mysterious and blissful "alliance of past and present generations."[2] The heritage of bygone generations raises its claim against the needs and desires of the present. Consequently the state cannot concern itself with the needs and desires of the present only; this would mean giving the right of way to the "natural laws of egotism." Individuals pass away, the state is eternal; therein lies its supreme right as against the claims of individuals. The state is far more than—it is in fact, qualitatively different from—a mere guarantor of an economic society of private individuals, as liberalism would have it.

[2] *Loc. cit.*, p. 14 and *passim*.

In fact, the claim of the individual, as the philosophy of the Enlightenment envisages it, is no reality at all; man as such does not exist; only men and women exist, and they build the family. And the family is the element of the state, not the so-called individual. The family is the state in embryo; it allies various generations and both sexes at the same time and in the same place. It is the perfect model and pattern of the state. If the state may be called the great alliance of the generations, the family may be termed the little alliance of bi-sexual generations. As all political reality arises from the family, the philosophy of government has to start from the same unit. Man is a being who incessantly needs supplementing and aid; this is what, on a lower level, the family, and on a higher level, the state offers him. Stability and permanency are provided for all political and social institutions by the stability and permanency of the family.

The state is not directly built upon the family. Between it and the family there are corporate organizations, entrusted with the fulfillment of basic governmental functions. Müller presents four such corporations (*Stände*): The nobility, the clergy, the merchants, and the trades people. He calls them the "eternal estates"; their reciprocal relationships (*Wechselleben*) constitute or materialize the life of the state (*erfüllt das Leben des Staates*).[3] The very idea of order and stability in the State implies an hierarchic gradation among these estates: at the top are an aristocracy and the clergy, at the base of the social pyramid are the trades-people. Neither peasants nor journeymen are mentioned; they are represented by the estates to which they belong. The feudal lord represents also his dependent peasants. The state thus appears as "the intimate integration of the totality of the physical and spiritual needs, of the entire physical and spiritual wealth of the entire internal and external life of a nation, resulting in a comprehensive, energetic, infinitely dynamic, and living entity."[4] From this standpoint any question as to the ends of the state is meaningless: there is nothing outside of the state for the sake of which the state exists and to which it would tender its services. In fact, to assume "ends" of the state outside of itself would jeopardize the existence

[3] Cf. *Agronomische Briefe, passim,* in J. Baxa's edition; also "Von der Teilung der Arbeit und vom geistigen Kapitale," in Adam Müller, *Schriften zur Staatsphilosophie,* ed. R. Kohler (München, 1923), pp. 51 ff.

[4] Baxa, *loc. cit.,* p. 9.

of the state as soon as other means might be found to realize such ends. However, "the state serves all ends by serving itself."[5] Nothing stands above the state—not even the sciences; they perish and evaporate whenever they divorce themselves from the state.

To be sure, this is a totalitarian doctrine of government. However, it would be wrong to confound it with modern totalitarianism. It is the totality of a universal (comprehensive), integrating and inspiring *Gestalt*, not the totality of an organized mechanical and absolute *Pan-politie*. The state Müller envisages builds itself up in an organic hierarchy of quasi-states, the corporate orders and the families. They too have sovereignty in their own domain, they have a restricted autonomy, they fulfill functions which the central government cannot arrogate to itself. Abiding in their proper station in the whole, they serve themselves and by doing so serve the whole. Here there appears a sort of pre-established harmony in the true state, resembling the pre-established harmony between individual interests and the common welfare as expressed by Adam Smith—and yet how different is the former from the world-view of economic liberalism, with its reliance on individuals competing with each other in an otherwise anarchic society! The true state of Adam Müller nowhere recognizes the rights and claims of "interests"; solidarity links together all activities both in family and in political life. The requirements of state administration may call for a departmentalization, but the heads of the various ministries should not display any particularism; *e.g.*, the Minister of War should be likewise concerned with the problems of the Ministry of the Interior; the true Minister of Justice should keep in mind the whole of the state; the Minister of Spiritual Affairs should concern himself with the whole state organization as a moral institution, etc.[6]

The true state embodies four ideas, and these four ideas institutionalize themselves in the four estates. In every state the four ideas should preserve among themselves a scientifically correct balance. However, historical and other circumstances may confer a privileged status on one or another of the estates. In a commercial state like England, for example, the Minister of the Treasury will wield a predominant influence and perhaps be the Prime Minis-

[5] *Von der Idee des Staates, loc. cit.*, p. 16.

[6] Adam Müller on Adam Smith, Baxa ed., p. 41.

ter. In a military state like Prussia, the Minister of War will exert his influence on all other departments. A poor state will give preference to the Minister of Justice. Of course, in the European plurality of Powers such prerogatives of military or financial strength may give rise to tension and even to war. Müller would not admit this argument. To him Europe is a sort of a federation built upon individual states; its metaphysical foundation is the idea of Christianity. To be sure, the nations of Europe at present recognize only what Müller calls the "private character of Christ"[7]—they disregard His political character. They therefore misunderstand (*verkennen*) the sacred institutions of medieval times handed down to our age. They ignore the eternal and stable character of these institutions. They conceive the state after the fashion of the ancient philosophers, "as a beautiful but passing entity,"[8] and thus there arises the discordance between a personal Christian religion and a public (political) pagan religion. Therein lies the menace to the unity of Europe and of mankind. Europe should conceive itself as a federation of Christian nations guided by the Church; the various nations should complement each other with mutual services; only thus would disappear the menace which lies in the lack of balance between the states. Let us add: only on this basis would a true unity of mankind be possible. Of course, it is the very nature of the state to be one among many; but this need not imply a pagan hostility among them.

However, Adam Müller is no pacifist. His conception of the state as a highly active dynamic being loaded with antagonisms, and surrounded by other states prevents any bias towards a Kantian "Eternal Peace." He had no use for the concepts of international law and for the balance of powers; to him, that is all too formal and superficial. The idea of a European equilibrium is acceptable only if understood "as equal growth of and reciprocal development and assistance among the states." If they clash, the issue is so great that nobody can adjudicate the case: "How could any individual fully grasp the vital necessities of these immense state-individuals?" The states are persons, therefore they cut into each other's vital spheres; each of them desires to grow and pre-

[7] Adam Müller's paper *Dass Christus nicht für die Menschen, sondern für die Staaten gestorben sei;* reprinted by R. Kohler, *loc. cit.*, p. 68.

[8] *Loc. cit.*, p. 69.

serve its own national character. Hence, war belongs to the very nature of the state. War is the great school for the formation of the nation's character; war shapes the states, strengthens their individuality and personality. No moralizing yardstick may be applied to the militant state. An internal urge to grow, dating from generations past, and subconsciously exerting its influence on the living generation, is the true motive power behind war. This is a Romanticist apologetic for war which deviates substantially from the conservative appreciation of war as expressed by de Maistre or de Bonald. The warlike spirit of a Prussian subject whose father was a civil servant of the Prussian state here transforms war into a metaphysical and praiseworthy necessity without ever so much as adverting to the Christian notion of war as being the consequence of the *ordo corruptus* of human nature. Leopold von Ranke and other Prussian historians were to learn much from this Romanticist concept of the state. Through them, the political philosophy of Romanticism reaches down into our present world.

The philosophy of the state is complemented by the philosophy of a community of true states. "Make up your minds to believe in two things . . . first of all in the state, in the national form of a civil community inherited from the forefathers, in the state as an association for life and death tending toward a definite local and national form of Empire (*Reich*) . . . secondly, in consequence of the first article of your creed, to believe in a lawful community of true states, even if for the time being only two or three states would join in it." Mere patriotic feelings toward one's own state are not enough; there remains "an unfilled place," an "unsatisfied longing."[9] Herewith Müller paid his tribute both to the cosmopolitanism rampant in his age and to the memory of the Holy Roman Empire of old and the concomitant *Res Publica Christiana.* The plurality of the states could not possibly be the last word—certainly not for an organic world-view such as Romanticism claimed to represent. The hierarchic structure of being could not possibly end in a vacuum or an anarchy replacing the states. And, of course, the uppermost sphere had to be based on a metaphysic, that is, on a religious universalism. The Christian religion reached far beyond the realm of private affairs—it was an eminently political reality, the foundation of the family, of the state, and of a federa-

[9] *Loc. cit.*, pp. 72–73.

tion of states. The title of one of Müller's publications clearly brings out his standpoint (*cf.* footnote 7): "That Christ died not only for man, but also for states."

This philosophy of the state strikes political liberalism at its most vital point; namely, its separation of state and society and the subsequent subordination of the state to society. It was just this divorce of society from state which made room for a liberal and individualistic system in economic life. Liberalism wherever it links up with individualism, recognizes only one strictly social institution: the market. The market is the link connecting the individuals, and they meet here in competition. From their economic equipment the individuals derive their economic function, whether as capitalists or landlords or workers; the markets decide their economic fate and their social position. To all this Müller objects: there is no separation between state and society; both exist in an inseparable unity; within it, economic life is but one sphere, and neither the basic nor the supreme sphere. The sphere of economic life reaches beyond tangible material things; besides material capital there exists also moral capital (*geistiges National-Kapital*);[10] besides the labor of the present generation there is the labor of generations past as a cooperating and contributing factor. Furthermore the economic sphere is ruled by the law we found operating in state life, by the mystery of reciprocity in all the spheres of life: (*Von dem Geheimnis der Gegenseitigkeit aller Verhältnisse des Lebens*). Economic life is a reciprocal process among the members of a national state—it is not a competitive struggle among economically sovereign individuals. However economic necessities may divide the trades, it is the vital function of the body politic to integrate the separate parts into one whole. Division of the arts and sciences is conditioned on their close corporate organization. The guilds, in turn, live in a sort of marriage with the corporation of trades (*der bürgerlichen Gewerbe*), and these in turn strive for a reciprocal permeation with the agricultural corporation as represented by the aristocracy. Adam Müller saw this order realized in the medieval period; he feels, indeed, inclined to believe that it is an eternal order of economic life. He is prepared to admit all the logical consequences of this doctrine with regard to the concepts fundamental to economics: with regard to private

[10] *Loc. cit.*, pp. 47–48.

property, labor division and labor organization, the market, the determination of prices, national income and its distribution, money and credit. Of course, this implies on principle a refutation of the whole body of liberal and individualistic economics. Politically and historically it means the rejection of those reforms which Baron von Stein and Hardenberg initiated after the breakdown of the Prussian state in 1806–1807.

The economic philosophy of liberalism had come to Germany in the Smithian form. Müller had been in his youth an enthusiastic admirer of Smith. The radicalism of the Smithian system appealed to the citizen of the Prussian capital which in that period, most of all since Frederick II, had been the center of rationalism in Germany. However, rationalism in Germany is an imported product, and more than anything else an attitude of the intellectual classes. Underneath it the Germans have always harbored a profound irrationalism, a propensity for mysticism. Between these two urges the German soul has always swayed—more in the Protestant north than in the Catholic south; long centuries of Mediterranean influence had been at work in the latter and had produced a better balance between the rational and the irrational attitude to the world. It is the medieval era which glories in having established this balance—but there was no Prussia in the medieval era, it did not enter the scene of history until the sixteenth century. Müller is a typical representative of this cleavage in the northern German soul. Freely accepting in his youth the rampant rationalism of his environment, he drew more and more away from it, as he advanced in years, and he ended by settling down in the physical and religious center of the German Mediterraneanism of his age, in Vienna and in the Catholic Church. His case is typical; almost all the Romanticists came from the Protestant north and ended in the Catholic south, and a good many of them, like Fr. Schlegel, Brentano, Novalis, took the final step with Müller, whereas others, like Gentz and Tieck, lingered round the gates of Catholicism without ever entering within its pale. It is the observation of this fact which led Joseph Nadler to the assumption that Romanticism is basically a northern German and Protestant movement manifesting a longing for the springs of German life still preserving their refreshing purity and richness in "the unbroken tradition of Southern Germany and of Catholicity."[11]

[11] Jos. Nadler, *Hochlandkämpfe von gestern und morgen,* pp. 59 ff. in *Wiederbegegnung von Kirche und Kultur in Deutschland* (München, 1927).

However that may be, Müller drew away from the Smithian economic rationalism, from the Enlightenment philosophy of natural law, and from all that it implied in the sphere of economic life. He never ceased to admire Smith; he calls him "the great and wise and good man," he speaks repeatedly of the "august Adam Smith," etc.[12] He even is of the opinion that with regard to the situation in England Smith had been right, although he (Smith) overlooked the fact that it was only the peculiar political and national strength of England that offered the secure foundation of its economy. Again, he remarks that Smith would have been right if the economic individual existed as a reality. But it is just this that Müller denies on principle. There is no such thing as an independent economic individual outside of the state. There is no wealth outside of the state. And precisely at this point we find the parting of the ways between Romanticism and economic liberalism.

To demonstrate the opposition between the liberal and the Romanticist philosophy of economics we shall trace the basic principles of economic individualism and set forth the objections raised to them by Müller; in addition we shall outline his own economic ideas.

The first principle of individualistic economy is freedom of the individual to dispose of his property and his faculties wherever, whenever and however he pleases. This implies freedom of private property and freedom of enterprise.

Müller objects, first, to the freedom of private property as handed down by the Roman law and accepted by Adam Smith. Property in this form excludes the necessary reciprocity between man and matter, according to which "man needs to be a person for the sake of matter, and needs matter for the sake of the person, and neither of these relationships can be dealt with separately from the other." Absolute private property "is nothing but a spasmodic clinging to the singularity (*Einzelheit*) of things which nature gave us for the purpose of separating and dividing them for transformation into sexual interrelationships (*um sie in Geschlechtsverhältnisse zu überführen*)."[13] Moreover strict private property is impossible because it would mean the withdrawal of the things owned from consumption by the civic society and their utilization

[12] High admiration of Adam Smith is frequently expressed in Müller's writings, *e.g.*, Baxa, p. 17, R. Kohler, pp. 11, 111, 222, etc.

[13] Cf. the chapter *Von der Gewerbefreiheit*, Baxa, pp. 34 ff.

by others (*dem Mitgenuss entzogen sein*). But "whatever is excluded from the reciprocity of production and consumption . . . is to be judged as dead."[14] Absolute private property is incompatible with the organism of the state as well as with the individual as an organism; just as air is useful only if it is accessible to all and becomes destructive to anybody who would transfer it into his private property, so it is with other ownable things: they admit no exclusive claim upon them by any individual. The property of a community, *e.g.*, of a family, is itself an organic entity; it cannot be conceived as an independent sum-total; being an organic entity it cannot be divided because it does not consist of tangible things but of "reciprocal relationships and convergences of relationships and conditions." Ownership, therefore, is a social relationship concerning the services of material things. This opens the road for the juxtaposition of a "moral capital" beside the material capital; in every process of production this moral capital cooperates with material capital goods.

Müller distinguishes between three forms of property: there is, first, private property of individuals; it entails relationships between man and matter for the sake of man. There is, secondly, corporate property; it implies a relationship between man and matter on behalf of man's moral obligations towards others, as towards the family, the community; such also is feudal property. There is, thirdly, state property, which includes man in his relationship to matter with reference to the preservation of the whole. Only individual consumers' goods may be absolute property. Otherwise each property is a mixture of the three above-mentioned kinds of property, since everybody must be prepared to share his property, even that consisting in his person, with others, or to transfer it to the state. Thus rights to property always split into threefold claims and obligations. When looked at superficially, it would seem that property is nothing but usufruct; "however, property in the real meaning of the term is only possession in common (*gemeinschaftlicher Besitz*); private property is only usufruct and transitoriness (*Vergänglichkeit*). This usufruct and transitoriness are indispensable because only through them does the higher, real and stable property become both possible and visible."[14]

[14] *Ueber die Errichtung der Sparkassen,* Baxa, p. 38.

Landed property stands in a privileged category of its own. The national soil is the basis of national economy, "the permanent, in fact the eternal, heritage of the whole immortal state-family": and this should be reflected in the legal and economic treatment of it. "Land must be represented by families and never by individuals." Land offers the basis of existence to the nobility as an immortal estate (*ewiger Stand*): in fact, the noble families are in a way *glebae adscriptae*.[15] The peasant belongs to the nobility and the adscription covers him also. Free transfer of land should not be permitted, neither should the mortgaging of land. Only by special permission of the government should the sale of land be allowed. Land is not a commodity but the basis of state and national and family life. Fief and Allod in land are self-guaranteeing forms of property, whereas commercial property has its guarantee only from state protection. "God and the nature of things" gave priority to feudal property; allodial property grows only out of feudal property and finds itself limited and conditioned by feudal property. Even the most abstract form of private property, money, is included in the solidarity of property; money is fief or "feod": only at the moment of circulation is the substance of money really money, and in that moment it is feod.

Müller objects, secondly, to freedom of enterprise as a tenet of the liberal economy. Included herein is the freedom of labor and the freedom of engaging in trade. Free enterprise is "an unregulated activity of everybody, where one wave of industriousness devours the other, instead of the rule of incessant work."[16] Only as one element in union with others may free enterprise and free labor find recognition; indeed, only as an element supplementary to the national and incorporated functions of feudal agriculture, of corporations and of guilds. The fewest opportunities of freedom of enterprise and labor offer themselves in the domain of agriculture; it is a trade which is, by its very nature, averse to economic freedom, both as regards ownership of the land and labor engaged in it.

Müller objects, thirdly, to freedom of contract. This freedom is derived from the Roman law concerning property and commerce.

[15] Cf. *Die Innere Staatshaushaltung; systematisch dargestellt auf theologischer Grundlage* (R. Kohler ed.), p. 287; also the remarks of Wilhelm Roscher in *Geschichte der Nationalökonomie in Deutschland* (München, 1874), p. 774 ff.

[16] Baxa edition, *loc. cit.*, p. 34.

Freedom of contract triumphs in a private economic system; such a system fails to recognize the political and national premises on which it rests. Wherever the government claims the right and the duty to regulate production and consumption and where, simultaneously, the economic system is ordered in corporations and guilds, there is no room left for freedom of contract. The Minister of the Treasury, *e.g.*, must exercise influence on the direction of wants and hence he must control production; this means that he supervises private economy and this supervision in turn excludes freedom of contract. All wants must be directed toward the state; a single provision of the "Roman Law" favoring private property and destroying traditional master-and-servant relationships may do more harm than all wars can do. "The preachers of free enterprise claim indeed that each portion of private property may, at the pleasure of its owner, enter and leave each possible circle of a common property (*Gesamtvermögen*)." This is a system of "false liberty, the real focus of all the economic confusion characteristic of our age."

The modern "allegedly liberal industrial system threatens to engulf the entire natural order of things in Europe"; it may lead to a universal catastrophe. Against the wild mechanical freedom of the liberal system Müller pleads for "the old corporate freedom." The letter of the Smithian economic freedom serves as a weapon and a palliation for a bad cause; it delivers the whole state to the discretion of industry, it transforms all trades into business, all labor into wage-labor, and recognizes only one social entity, the market. This market is an insufficient means of regulating the wants of the whole according to their graded needs, their provisional or permanent nature, their rank. Most of all does this hold true of agriculture; the urban trades "may, without suffering substantially, depend on the oracle of the market."

All these objections express the Romanticist protest against making economic life a private affair, in the double sense that economic life is made a domain of individuals only, and that it, in isolation from the whole of the national life, follows its own laws. Müller denies the typical liberal assumption that economic life is an autonomous self-regulating automatic sphere. All merely private economy is unproductive. Intimate correspondence of all provinces of life, led by political and religious life, offers the guarantees of security and stability and of the utmost productivity.

The state has the function of preserving the equilibrium between the various parts of the commonwealth.

We can thus see how little the second principle of an individualistic economy corresponds to the system as developed above. The principle of exclusive self-responsibility[17] presupposes just that individual and his freedom whose existence Müller denied. The social units are the family, the corporation, the guilds. Each carries responsibility for its respective sphere, but in a subsidiary way. Personal responsibility rests on the producer, the householder, even the consumer; it is a moral and social responsibility rather than economic. In a corporate system responsibility is something qualitatively different from what it is under a liberal system; it is a constructive element and not, as in a liberal economy, a disruptive one. Individualistic self-responsibility caused the separation of capital from labor, and shifted to the laboring poor a burden which they could not shoulder. It unburdened the conscience of the better-off classes and individuals; it contributed to the great process of alienation that permeates modern societies. It led to more individualization of business, to more concentration of capital, to more poverty, to increasing exploitation and destitution of the worker who was "reduced to a mere wage-laborer to be thrown on the dump-hill when no longer useful to the big economic machine." And then the Poor Laws and taxes had to provide for the victims[18]—what a proof of the error of liberalism! This system ignores truly social functions and truly social organization, hence it lacks any clarity in the distribution of liabilities and responsibilities. Social solidarity is perfectly forgotten: hence the inner frictions and diseases of a liberal economy. A corporate order would divide and allot responsibilities and would carry them as a relationship of solidarity of all groups towards the whole and of the whole towards the groups. The stronger ones could not shift their burden to the weaker ones and the weaker ones would not be overburdened just because they are weak.

All this implies a repudiation of the third basic principle of an individualistic economy, namely self-interest as the guiding principle of economic life (*Ibid.*, p. 74). This principle is really destructive; it has broken up the traditional relationships between the social groups as motivated by a spirit of mutual aid, loyalty, chari-

[17] *Ibid.*, pp. 67, 75. R. Kohler edition, pp. 273, 288 and *passim.*

[18] Baxa edition, p. 67.

table service, and trust. Instead it places the social relations on a mere cold cash basis. This principle of self-interest was particularly destructive to agriculture, most of all in England. Agriculture became a mercantile trade, the former reciprocal relationships between landlord and tenant were depersonalized. The cash-nexus threatens to permeate the whole society. The present generation recognizes no higher values than utilitarian ones and self-interest; it is not aware of the fact that this leads to a servile state and makes man unable to build up a free state-community. Only the voluntary and personal submission of the various members under the "omnipresence of a common will" preserves man's true freedom in the free state.

The fourth principle of an individualistic system, the principle of free competition, certainly finds no place in an order of the sort Müller envisages. Competition presupposes alienation between men, and the absence of moral obligation of one towards another; it is based on the right of the strong to victimize the weak. Competition dissolves the social order into a dynamic social process, a permanent flux leading to general insecurity, to social and political instability and to a very unhealthy mobility of all social forces. Competition unleashes greed, and uses it as a principle of order and as a unifying element in an atomized society. Müller utterly rejects competition both within the nation and in its foreign trade. Foreign markets are beyond the influence and supervision of the national state, they tyrannize over production; they destroy the "sacred alliance between the people and the soil" (*ibid.*, p. 73); they dissolve the interconnection of all cooperating members of the national society. The state is incessantly exposed to the menace of foreign commercial power and therefore of foreign military strength. Every member of the national society is, in his very existence, dependent on uncontrollable foreign conditions and his fatherland is less and less able to guarantee and to protect his status. Competition can establish only mechanical relationships between man and man, only dead connections between man and his property. Competition is unable to take cognizance of the category of *eigentlich producierendes Gesamtvermögen,* really productive community-capital (*ibid.*, p. 36). According to Müller, life in nature and society is conditioned on sex differentiation; production rests on reciprocal sexually differentiated factors, and these factors have their own social order. Community of goods or of women

cannot individualize its offspring—but free competition is a sort of communism in that it dis-individualizes the factors of production and places them all on the same level (*ibid.*, p. 36). Free competition destroys the "organic" order of the state and society, it deranges the natural relationships between the different factors of production, it leads to the production of "riches" but not of wealth and it dissipates the heritage of a millenium (*ibid.*, p. 39). It was the basic error of the liberal school that it mistook the production of material wealth for productivity, hence it overlooked the relationship between man and things, between person and community. It got rich instead of wealthy. Müller, in opposition to Adam Smith, declares the definition of the true wealth of nations to be that condition where "wealth guarantees itself." The liberal philosophy ignored the fact "that the mere existence of wealth is not enough; by its political and social conditioning it must have the power to individualize itself as the wealth of a definite person, of a definite 'estate', or of a definite state; that is, it must be able to defend and maintain itself against the whole covetous world." The true wealth of nations presupposes a political order and a religious foundation; only on such a basis can wealth be stable and self-guaranteeing.

* * *

This juxtaposition of the liberal and the Romanticist economy shows us the wide gap which separates them. Against the rationalism of Smith, Müller exalts a higher *ratio*, the *ratio* of historically matured forms, the *ratio* of that which *is*, as against that which, from an individualistic standpoint, *should be*. Müller defends the *ratio* which made agriculture the true basis of nations and states; he develops the *ratio* which justifies a lesser degree rather than a greater degree of division of labor, the employment of smaller capital units rather than concentrated capital, the preference of internal trade and commerce over international free trade. He would prefer national self-sufficiency (autarky) of a sort to unlimited free trade. He might have proposed "national freedom of nourishment" against free importation of grain, and he would have thereby anticipated a slogan which a century later became current in Nazi Germany. No doubt he would have proclaimed himself a strict anti-capitalist if that term had been known in his age.

Political Romanticism was prosecuting its war on a double front. Its primary attack was directed against the Revolution—Romanticism is to that extent, a counter-revolutionary force. On the other front it fought against the all-pervading bureaucracy of the absolute state and against the mercantile policy of that state. The battle was on between the forces of reaction on the one hand and the rising bourgeoisie representing a liberal and individualistic world-view on the other hand. What exactly did the Romanticist political and economic philosophy mean in this struggle?

First of all we have to recognize that Müller never developed anything like a political and economic program and platform, nor did any other of the Romanticists. The Romanticist idea cannot be condensed into formulas for social action, and the Romanticist mind was too subjective even to attempt such a formulation. This mind is not *avide d'actions*. Moreover, the Romanticist canonized the past and also believed in the growth of life; the opposite school believed in anything but the past or growth. The battle was on between the old ruling classes and the newly rising middle class. Action was what the situation required, but the Romanticists were averse to action. Hence the remarkable lack of adaptation of the Romanticist ideas to the realities of their age. They came too late, the *medium aevum* was over; and they came too early, as we realize today: the artificial and coercive impetus toward a pseudo-Middle Age was not yet ripe.

However, there was a significance in Romanticism which predestined it to cooperation with the traditional powers and made it finally play into the hands of the reaction. The Romanticist belief in the state, in authority, in a well ordered and hierarchically graded society inevitably favored the powers that were, against the powers that deviated from every tenet of this creed. As a matter of fact Romanticism, as K. Mannheim[19] noted, has at least this much to its historical credit—that it developed a philosophy of conservatism and transformed into a rational system what had been hitherto only a much contested practice and a highly doubtful reality. In the most critical phase of their existence the pre-liberal state and its ruling classes were presented with a justification of their standpoint and claims which appealed not only to reason (by introducing history as a superrational process) but also to senti-

[19] Karl Mannheim, "Das conservative Denken," I, 110 ff. in *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Socialpolitik*, Bd. 57, Heft. I.

ment and will, to the fullness of man's nature. This was the hour of birth or re-birth of political conservatism—an event of far-reaching consequences, as we fully realize only today. Long after its decline, and in an altered form, political Romanticism has become a vital factor in European history. It is not as a party program but as a set of ideas that Romanticism has become a forceful reality. And this was accomplished only by a characteristic amalgamation with mass-demands for social security, stability and order, with a rebellion of certain socio-political strata against the tenets of political and economic liberalism. Out of this amalgamation emerged, in a typical political about-face, present day National Socialism.

Even in its own heyday, however, Romanticism was not entirely devoid of political and economic consequences. Political and economic liberalism had already gained some attention in Germany prior to the Napoleonic wars against Austria and Prussia. After the crushing defeat at Jena and Auerstadt the Prussian King called the western German Baron von Stein and entrusted to him political, administrative and economic reforms. Stein was a moderate liberal; he held the feudal order in land to be obsolete, the guild system in the urban trades ripe for disestablishment, and the centralized bureaucratic administration destined to be replaced by a system of local administration. He believed that freedom and education towards self-help would unchain very valuable forces both for the political resurrection and the economic reconstruction of Prussia. Only the terrible catastrophe of the Prussian state could have induced the King even to consider such measures; they were in his eyes only the outgrowth of Jacobinism; and in fact they ran counter to everything Prussia had ever stood for. The decrees of 1808 provided that serfdom and bondage should cease by November 11, 1810. Moreover, the peasant should, under certain indemnities to be paid to their previous lords, acquire full ownership of their lands. Guilds should lose their economic and administrative functions. Hardly had Stein been appointed and the liberal reform initiated when opposition began to rise in the old ruling classes. We know that as early as 1808 Fr. von Gentz advised Müller to take up the defense of the feudal order and of the aristocratic classes. Müller responded as early as the following year with his *Elemente der Staatskunst.* The opposition against the reform scored a first victory when Stein, at Napoleon's insti-

gation, was dismissed. Hardenberg succeeded him. He placed Müller on a waiting list so that he could draw a salary; but Hardenberg showed no inclination to follow Müller's suggestion to have him simultaneously edit a paper as organ of the liberal opposition and an official gazette fighting the liberal organ. Müller, with his resources exhausted and realizing that waiting would not lead anywhere as long as Hardenberg carried on the reforms initiated by von Stein, followed his friend Gentz and went to Vienna. Now the keystone of the Stein-Hardenberg reforms had been the Royal Decree of 1811 concerning the emancipation of the peasant lands from all feudal burdens and obligations. The decree had been applied in relatively few cases when the Russian Campaign broke out. During that campaign and the Wars of Liberation practically nothing happened—except one thing: the wave of national enthusiasm which swept over the people in all walks of life aroused the deepest suspicion in the mind of the King. He did not want Prussia to be saved by the people; it might lead to further demands; and he had had more than enough of all this reform talk. Naturally he needed the support of the people in the tremendous task of defeating Napoleon; but it had to be understood by all that the Royal Government exercised supreme authority and command, whilst relying of course on the loyalty of its obedient subjects. And it was on this very point that Romanticism had already done its work; the privileged classes of all grades had received a philosophy of conservatism which taught them that their privileges were based on solid historical foundations and possessed an immortal *ratio,* even a *super-ratio,* more respectable than the upstart *ratio* of the democrats and liberals. It is understandable that this group, to which belonged von der Marwitz (as a typical example), ascribed the victorious outcome of the war to the old social and political system, and interpreted the loyalty of their subjects as the crucial test of the old Prussian order and tradition. In the eyes of this group the reformers were Jacobins who destroyed, or at least tried to destroy, everything that had made Prussia great. The Romanticist political and economic philosophy provided the smoke-screen and the sentimental basis for a reactionary anti-reformist policy which was started as soon as the storm was over. Moreover, there was a general desire for peace and order, for stability which had been so long lacking. In this atmosphere the work of reform was revised, in particular with regard to the

emancipation of the peasant lands. A limit was set excluding large masses of smaller peasant tenants; only the tumultuous years from 1848 on led to their inclusion also; in 1850 the goal was reached. However, in the meantime large numbers of the smaller land-holding peasants had given up, since they found no decent living, in fact no living at all, on what was left of their land after ceding substantial parts of it to their former lords. Moreover, many of the peasants included under the Act of 1816 (called the Declaration Act because it was supposed to make specific the provisions of the Regulation Act of 1811, whereas in fact it emasculated that Act by providing just what Stein had vehemently striven to avoid) had sold out their land to the noble landholders and had moved into the cities. Parenthetically—these peasants formed in the cities the first beginnings of the Prussian urban proletariat; moreover, many who remained on the land but had insufficient acreage formed the typical land proletariat, while their sons and daughters in turn swelled the ranks of the urban proletariat. There is discernible here a link between the political and economic doctrine of the Romanticists and the spread of Marxian Socialism in Germany, and particularly, in Prussia. The inclusion likewise of the commons did its share in undermining the precarious basis of many peasant land-holdings. The ideas of local self-administration also underwent revision for the worse.

It would be unjust to exaggerate the share which political Romanticism had in this flood of reactionary activities. Metternich and the Prussian nobility together with a king filled with absolutistic ideas might well have succeeded without the aid of Romanticist thought. But one thing is certain; they would have succeeded with a worse conscience and with less confidence and less facility than they actually did. The historical achievement—and it is a great one—of Romanticism is its contribution to political and economic conservatism; it presented that conservatism with its key-notions and some basic ideas. Prussian conservatism fed on the Romanticist heritage up to the day when it accepted Nazism and entered the fateful "combination" with the Nazi movement. However, the Prussian conservatives could mistake Nazism for a congenial movement only because Nazism as it grew up in Southern Germany, had adopted certain Romanticist elements which had their foundation in the German south: the old German *Reich*-idea, the idea of "community" as the basis of life, the ethical idea of

mutual responsibilities, the idea of a hierarchy of social groups, and many other analogous ideas.

It may be true that political Romanticism expired when it entered—in the person of Müller—into alliance with Metternich. However, given this philosophy and the existing circumstances, with whom else could it have allied itself? The alternative offered by the situation was either a liberal and democratic policy or a "conservative" one. Every single tenet of the political philosophy of Romanticism pointed in the direction of a conservative policy, and conservatism then meant reaction. Who else but the conservatives insisted on the ideas dear to Müller, on the historical order and hierarchy of the state and the social structure? Who more earnestly defended the past or embodied more fully the medieval traditions than they? Where were the nobility respected and protected in their historical rights and their social and political functions if not within the circle of the so-called reaction? The ideas of loyalty, solidarity, social responsibility, time-hallowed institutions—into what political vernacular did these fit except the reactionary one? Who presented an organic idea of the state and an organic structure of society, if not the conservatives? By an inescapable logic the Romanticist ideology was drawn into the only camp which its very nature and the historical circumstances made congenial—into the camp of the reaction. Müller, by allying himself with Metternich, took more than a symbolic step; he followed an inherent personal and historical necessity.

Georgetown University

GERMAN ROMANTICISM AS AN IDEOLOGY OF CULTURAL CRISIS

By Eugene N. Anderson

The Romantic movement in Germany accompanied and expressed one reaction to the social transformation from the culture of caste and absolutism to that of class and constitutional rule. The Romanticists sought to formulate the ideals of a society in the making. While dependent for lack of practical experience upon aesthetics or ethics for their basic standards, they strove to compass the whole of life.

The influence of the French Revolution greatly accelerated the social changes in Germany and stimulated the young German Romanticists to an outburst of creativeness in all phases of life. The decade or so beginning in the last half of the 1790s saw the culmination of movements already under way in both the sociopolitical and the aesthetic-intellectual spheres. The participants in each spurred on those in the other, and in this short time of crisis, cultural forms and directions which have conditioned German life down to the present were fixed. In reflecting the characteristics of the crisis, Romanticism manifested, sometimes in exaggerated ways, those of the cultural change which the crisis brought to a head.

During these few years the young German Romanticists felt the danger to German culture from the French Revolution and Napoleon to be less political than intellectual and spiritual, and they endeavored to oppose it by ideas. While considering all aspects of life, including the political, they were especially concerned with the emancipation of individualities and the discovery of the manifold richness of the world. This period witnessed the fullest expression of German Romanticism as a total way of life. In the succeeding years the danger became acutely political, and the German Romanticists were compelled to subordinate their preoccupation with the widening of art and the enrichment of individual experience to social and political ideas and actions, particularly as formulated in nationalism and conservatism. These three cultural ideals, Romanticism, nationalism and conservatism, shared qualities evoked by the common situation of crisis; but by estab-

lishing exclusive, impersonal standards of value the latter two destroyed the unique features of their predecessor.

German Romanticism has usually been studied with a view to discovering its unique, differentiating features. While recognizing the value of these investigations, this essay will seek to exhibit in Romanticism certain common characteristics imposed upon the responses of individuals by the condition of cultural transformation and crisis. It will avoid definition in favor of cultural analysis. It will show how Romanticism used elements which, individually, were not peculiar to it alone, but which, brought into relationship by the situation, constituted the essential patterns of Romantic thought and action.

The young German Romanticists in the period under discussion, though differing on many points of detail, were all acutely aware of the fact that they lived in a time of swift transition from one culture to another. Their philosophizing about history and their describing of utopias manifested a deep concern with the problems of this cultural crisis; they wished to know where they stood in the course of history and where that course was taking them.[1] The French Revolution, they thought, marked the dividing line between two ages, either as the last phase of the old age or as the first of the new, and they wished that German Romanticism should provide the essential forms for the future. The writers regarded themselves as media of expression of this culture, the coming of which they tended to regard as inevitable.[2]

The fact of living in a time of cultural crisis conditioned the thinking and acting of the young German Romanticists as no other experience did. It forced them to deal not merely with a single aspect of life but with the totality of man, society and the universe. The crisis involved all values; it affected not merely the parts of man's existence but the whole. While compelling each person to seek his own salvation as best he could, it also forced him to look for support from the group. In the decade or so beginning with the late 1790s Romanticism offered a way of deliverance for persons caught in a crisis.

As is to be expected, the fundamental ideology of German Romanticism has to do with the nature of the particular, of the whole, and of the relations between them. The Romanticists applied this

[1] Novalis's *Die Christenheit oder Europa*, 1799, may be offered as typical of this concern.

[2] See Novalis, *Schriften*, edited by Paul Kluckhohn and Richard Samuel, II, 78.

ideology to every element in the world, whether man or divinity, family or nation, individual or state, peace or war, concept or book, speaker or audience, an act or an institution. The particular, they thought, should be an individual expression of the whole. "Every man," wrote Schleiermacher, "should in his own way represent humanity," or as Friedrich Schlegel said, "No man is only a man, but really and in truth he can and should also be the whole of humanity." In the same manner the whole is also an individuality, and the Romanticists could not conceive of the existence of a particular apart from the totality. "Community, pluralism, is our inmost characteristic," wrote Novalis, and his friend Friedrich Schlegel declared, "Whoever out of exaggerated egoism separates himself from the total world must in the end lose all true higher reality, for this depends upon commonalty; only in union, in connection with the totality of all spiritual forces of the universe can one develop one's self completely and achieve eternity." In another place he wrote, "Entire humanity shall become an individuality, a lovingly united and morally developed whole," or as Novalis said, "a universal individuality." And Novalis regarded society as "nothing more than living in common (*gemeinschaftliches Leben*): an indivisible thinking and feeling person."[3]

If both the particular and the whole should be individualistic, each in its own way, the Romanticists had to find a means for bringing them into intimate relation. The difficulty which they confronted in doing so is attested to by the diverse formulations of their answer. In every case, however, the solution was fundamentally the same. "Every man," Friedrich Schlegel wrote, "is a small world: the more many-sidedly he develops his character-

[3] These quotations are all taken from Paul Kluckhohn, *Persönlichkeit und Gemeinschaft. Studien zur Staatsauffassung der deutschen Romantik.* (Halle, 1925), pp. 5, 6, 19–21. This excellent book has been extensively used for this essay. It contains a wealth of quotations from the sources, which were more judiciously selected than interpreted. But Kluckhohn's short book is indispensable for anyone working in the field of German Romanticism. In addition, I have found useful the writings of Alfred von Martin, Andreas Müller, and the many excellent articles especially in two journals, *Die deutsche Vierteljahrschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte* and *Dichtung und Volkstum*. The writings of Josef Nadler, Carl Schmitt, Friedrich Gundolf, Julius Petersen, Fritz Strich and Franz Schulz were of less use than those by the scholars mentioned above. My reading in the sources has been mainly confined to the works of Friedrich Schlegel, Adam Müller, Baader, Novalis, Eichendorff, Görres, and the sources published in the volumes in the series, *Deutsche Literatur in Entwicklungsreihen*, (Leipzig, 1928 ff.).

istics in a higher sense, the more the purpose of the world, the endless richness, will be attained." Steffens applied the same thought to education. "Education has a two-fold aim: it should place the whole in the parts, and indeed wholly, undivided, ruthlessly, as if the whole were there entirely for the particulars, . . . so that the peculiarity in question should develop itself without hindrance; but it should also sacrifice the particular for the whole . . . as if the particular existed only for the whole. . . ." Novalis spoke of the state in similar terms: "the more spiritual and living are the members, the more living and individual is the state." And Steffens expressed this view as follows: "If the burgher is bound to the state not with his whole life but with only a part of it, he is of necessity a servant; for all tearing asunder of the individual man makes him unfree."[3a] The Romantic solution to the problem of relationship between the particular and the whole may be summed up in the old formula, so paradoxical to rationalists: one serves the group best by realizing one's self most completely; one is most free when one is most willing to sacrifice one's self for the group.[4] It is a formula with a dialectic as the core.

A society functioning at a fairly even pace would deny the practicality of such views; but to a people in a time of swift cultural change anything was possible. The Romanticists witnessed the destruction of forms and ways that had seemed eternal, the sudden upsurge of novelties of which they had only dreamed. With institutions collapsing, unknown men becoming rulers, boundaries made flexible, serfs obtaining freedom and property, with, in short, a condition of seemingly complete flux, the potentialities of the single individual expanded enormously. God no longer kindly came down to man, the Romanticists thought, but man could and should climb toward Heaven;[5] transcending the restrictions of mere rationality man could and should become a total personality, a complete unity of body, mind and soul, the image of the universe.[6] The Romanti-

[3a] Kluckhohn, pp. 8, 24, 53, 86.

[4] A contrast between the social situation out of which arose this idea and that of the principle of enlightened selfishness should prove interesting. The two ideas have some points in common. In fact, the latter idea amounts to about one-half of the former, and might easily develop into the group ideal if a situation of cultural crisis should arise.

[5] "Of his own accord when nothing more binds him man climbs toward Heaven." Novalis, II, 77.

[6] See Novalis's remarks about "a universal individuality, a new history, a new

cists were exaggerating and universalizing the emancipating and exciting characteristics of the first phase of a cultural crisis.

By undermining standards while at the same time stimulating emotional and thought processes, the crisis led the Romanticists to explore the metaphysical and religious bases of ideas and practices. The early maturity of individuals which the situation of swift cultural change entailed[7] turned their attention upon the profoundest questions of life and death, of the state and nation, of personality and of God. Taking seriously Kant's epistemological dualism,[8] many of them refused to be deprived of the *Ding-an-sich* and asserted the reality of both the sensuous and the supernatural world.[9] The relationship between the particular and the total grew so rich and complex that it could only be expressed by a symbol. The mystery of the God-man became laicised and universalized; mystery entered into the simplest thing; even the state, the Romanticists thought, should reach its highest character by becoming poetic. Romanticism reflected the astonishment evoked by the extraordinary events of these years of crisis. Could human beings alone, even though exalted as they should be, have brought about the French Revolution, transformed European culture, opened up a new era? The most incredible act seemed the most credible. By way of semantics, the keen interest in which is characteristic of a time of rapid change in cultural values, the Romanticists tried to find the appropriate symbol for the union of earthly and transcendental elements to be found in the state, the personality, in everything.[10]

---

humanity." "Who does not with sweet shame feel himself to be of good hope?" he asked. Novalis, II, 79.

[7] In *Ahnung und Gegenwart* (completed in 1812) Eichendorff wrote: "Our youth enjoyed no light, care-free play, no joyous quiet, as our fathers did; the seriousness of life gripped us early. We were born in battle, and in battle we shall perish, either defeated or victorious." Hermann Freiherr von Eichendorff, *Joseph Freiherr von Eichendorff. Sein Leben und seine Schriften.* Dritte Auflage, edited by Karl Freiherr von Eichendorff und Wilhelm Kosch (Leipzig, 1923), p. 67.

[8] See Müller's criticism of Kant for having furthered the belief in the separation of body and spirit. Adam Müller, *Vorlesungen über die deutsche Wissenschaft und Literatur,* edited by Arthur Salz (Munich, 1920), p. 111.

[9] "I will not let myself be robbed of the real world," quoted from Novalis by Alfred von Martin, "Das Wesen der romantischen Religiosität," *Deutsche Vierteljahrschrift fur Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte,* II (1924), 375 ff.

[10] "We live in an age in which because of the general confusion of speech and of views of things one can work through to nature and to the truth only by way of a

The search for realities focussed the Romanticists' attention upon the process of living. The speed with which things were changing around them, the importance of organic force in conditioning these changes, the zest and excitement of so much action, heightened their appreciation of the sheer fact of being alive. Everything seemed in movement, man, nature, God, and the historic results of their work. Referring repeatedly to the educative influence of the crisis, Adam Müller shaped his theory to the fact of living movement. He condemned all previous analyses of the state and of political economy for having dealt with these institutions in a condition of peace. He declared that in peaceful times egocentricity and materialism dominate the individual, the state falls apart, and the theorist describes a situation of decay.[11] The present crisis had shown the circumstances, he said, in which the state becomes completely itself. It must be in the natural condition of simultaneous peace and war, when each element in the state fulfills its total potentialities and merges with all the others in a common purpose and a common life.[12] Since Müller was fashioning his ideas in the crisis situation, he screwed up his courage by claiming universal validity for them. European revolutions and wars demanded such furious living, such strenuous defense of the right to live, that the Romanticists rushed to the extreme position of regarding these conditions as normal, or of believing that, if they were not normal, they should be. The conception of the state as of the personality expressed the Romanticists' proposals for coping with the plight of the times. It reflected an excessive concern with the organic and the living, with movement and action, with the total steeling of one's self for the rigors of this swift-changing age.

The cultural crisis produced sinister effects as well, and these

---

strict but flexible, unabstract and living speculation." Adam Müller, *Die Elemente der Staatskunst* (F. W. Hendel Verlag, Leipzig), p. 60.

[11] See Müller, *Die Elemente der Staatskunst,* pp. 54, 288–289, and elsewhere.

[12] This idea is a main theme of Müller's volume on *Die Elemente der Staatskunst.* See for example the following statement: "The close union, the marriage of the spirit of peace and arms under the guardianship of one and the same divine idea . . . constitutes the nature of the state; when once separated . . . they involve the state in a struggle for life and death. Energetic war separated from living peace . . . leads to brutality; peace without the accompaniment and omnipresence of weapons results in slackness. Both elements, which in union would have been heightened and mellowed to a glorious manifestation of life, now waste and poison each other." (P. 151.)

had to be overcome. The individual became uprooted, isolated, anxious. The uncertainty excited his nerves and strained his emotions. He confronted a world of turmoil and danger, the harsh impact of unexpected forces. He became remarkably sensitive to problems of relationship with elements—human or otherwise—which affected him, and he craved unity with those capable of aiding him. The Romanticists sought to assure themselves of intimacy with other individuals and with things in many ways. They made a cult of friendship; they lived together in intimate groups; they frequently collaborated with such harmony that they called the resulting work a child of their marriage. Literary forms using the spoken word were favored because of their personal quality. The Romanticists personalized all things, and put them in relationship with each other.

The longing for unity with others drove the Romanticists to glorify the family and the corporative social orders, gilds, estates, the church, hansas, republics, the state. "The genius of the state," wrote Novalis, "shines in every true *Staatsbürger*,"[13] a comforting belief for one seeking social unity. Such a *Staatsbürger* would feel the indispensability of the "organs," "living members,"[14] intermediaries between the individual person and the ever larger forms of the social and governmental hierarchy. The monarch, the state and the nation occupied the most exalted places, for they related the other forms with humanity and with God. Novalis's description of the position and character of the monarch resembles that of Christ. And Adam Müller wrote that "Nature wishes particular states, basic nationality, with the whole revolutionary apparatus of this age."[15] The Romanticists recognized that the past could not be restored, and expressed ideals especially about the state which would preserve German culture in the present crisis and inaugurate the happy age to come. The experience of the times, they wrote, had proved that in order to survive a state must have a constitution which is both monarchical and republican, or, as Friedrich Schlegel said, "The complete state should be not merely democratic but also aristocratic and monarchical, and all be organized into an absolute totality." Novalis declared that "Every *Staatsbürger* is a state official. He has his income only as such."[16] Thereby he demanded

[13] Quoted in Kluckhohn, p. 52.
[14] Quoted in *ibid.*, pp. 71–73.
[15] Kluckhohn, p. 77.
[16] Kluckhohn, pp. 75, 60, 48.

the extreme form of political unity, which, if taken literally, would have allowed small room for initiative and independence on the part of the individual. Novalis did not mean the statement to be so sharply interpreted, but the fact that he wrote it reveals the strain which the crisis imposed upon these Romanticists.

When the German Romanticists wrote about economic affairs, they started with the same objective in mind that they had in discussing all social forms. They wished to bind individuals together into a working unit. It was Adam Müller who most fully applied these conceptions in the economic sphere, asserting that even landed property had mobility; and he weighed the significance of things, as he did that of persons, according to the influence which these things or persons exercised in society. The characteristically Romantic economic theory which Müller elaborated from such premises has been well analyzed by Professor Briefs, and need not be set forth here. It is to be noted, however, that Müller continued an older tradition, in treating economic matters as *political* economy, and that he endeavored to associate the theorist and the practitioner in close working relationship. Thereby he would have elevated himself, the theorist, to a position of public importance; but even apart from personal considerations he argued that only in this way are relations most intimate, living most abundant, the state secure.

The German Romanticists shared with the nationalists a common distrust of guidance of human action by reason. No rational institution, no man-made association would reassure them, for they had seen these fail in the French Revolution. The insecurity which results from a condition of cultural transition forced the Romanticists to exalt those forms in which relationships are based on irrational ties, marriage, the family, organism (if not taken too literally),[17] and to use them as models for less closely knit institutions like the state. They attributed to man the instincts and drives by means of which complete unity with others would be achieved. Görres and Eichendorff spoke of the "instinct of freedom," of "loyalty," of "obedience," of "loving devotion."[18] In every case the Romantic assumptions about the nature of man are funda-

[17] The figure of the organism was not much employed by the Romanticists during the 1790s, but the general sense of it was to be found in the writings then as well as later. See Kluckhohn, pp. 84–85.

[18] Kluckhohn, pp. 95–96.

mentally the same, and in every case the power of love suffuses these instinct-driven individuals and binds them irrevocably together. The uncertainty and insecurity of the period were counterbalanced by the super-charged emotionality of romantic love; the easy relations of the rococo period tightened into these close bonds. Excessive danger to the individual in a society in travail called forth the unusual demand for support, the reassurance of love from others.[19] The Romanticists' thoughts and feelings focussed upon love; their most profound experience was that of love. "Love makes individuals able to communicate and to understand," wrote Novalis. "Unselfish love in the heart and its maxims in the head, that is the sole, eternal basis of all true, indissoluble union," he added. Baader called love "the true organic and organizing principle of life," "the true common spirit," or as Steffens said, "the foundation of entire existence" even in the state. Friedrich Schlegel declared, with no intention of religious impropriety, "I do not know whether I could worship the universe with my whole soul if I had never loved a woman," while Novalis wrote that one "lives in the state in the sense in which one lives in one's beloved." Faith in romantic love made certain that social unity could be achieved and underlay the Romanticists' conception of the state or of any important group as a marriage.[19a] The analogy harmonized with the Romanticists' metaphysical assumption that the particular potentially contained the totality. Irrational and transcendental powers, the heart and the spirit, the poetic and the philosophic, enabled each individual, isolated, uncertain, anxious, to realize oneness with the group.

The speed of cultural change, the occurrence of so many unexpected events, also awakened in the Romanticists a profound sense of the significance of time. Living, movement, relation, time, these four elements constituted different aspects of the romantic *Weltanschauung*. The Romanticists had to live intensely while they could; they must compress into each occasion the totality of existence. A unit of time had a full life of its own. The sensitivity to the present was accentuated by the speed of its passing. But the rate of change also aroused within the Romanticists the longing

[19] See the excellent article by Erich Fromm, "Selfishness and Self-Love," in *Psychiatry. Journal of the Biology and Pathology of Interpersonal Relations*, II, Nov., 1939.

[19a] Kluckhohn, pp. 22–24, 48, 88, 52.

for something which persisted. Duration seemed to them a basic standard of value. Institutions, in which time condensed, preserved the wisdom of human experience, and tradition and custom revealed transcendental powers. The spirit of the folk spoke through them and kept man from erring too far from the laws of God and nature. The analogy of the live being portrayed the relation between present, past and future. The sense of past time led to the study of history and the wish to preserve one's heritage; it disclosed fixed values and lent assurance as to the course of mankind. The sense of future time made one aware of one's responsibility for that which was to come and to desire reform for its sake. The living thing endures for its allotted time, leaves its imprint, and passes away. It harmonizes the qualities of movement and duration; the inorganic does not. The Romanticists, eager to be themselves in an age of seeming chaos, everywhere applied the conception of a living individuality.

When movement is so pervasive it demands explanation. The Romanticists' acute awareness of the changes going on was manifested in their abiding concern with this problem. They explained change by means of the dialectic and the theory of opposites, which in spite of variations in emphasis and detail essentially conformed to a pattern. "Unity can never be represented except in diversity," wrote Adam Müller, "or diversity except in unity."[20] The Romanticists were describing to their own satisfaction that which seemed to occur around them. In the crisis the one extreme generated a contrary extreme; a new form arose, only to initiate the process all over again. The theory afforded great comfort to a society in the course of disintegration.[21] The inevitable functioning of the dialectic even relieved the individual of responsibility for social action. The natural law of opposites would restore the righteous and destroy the wicked. It assured the Romanticists of the victory of their revolution against the French Revolution; the living ideal would conquer the dead one, humanity would enter an

[20] Kluckhohn, p. 64 note.

[21] In *Versuch einer neuen Theorie des Geldes* (Jena, 1922), p. 120, Adam Müller wrote: "When nature has meant two things for each other and wishes to see them firmly and enduringly bound, it gives them such a great difference, such a definite tendency toward eternal hostility, that they can do nothing else than unite for life and death. . . . Wishing unity, it ordered duality, the separation of all creatures into two sexes, in which the endless and complete hostility must bring about an endless union and satisfaction."

age in which the ideas fundamental for cultural creativeness would be restored to power and would guide mankind along the path of eternal progress. The worse conditions became, the more optimistic Adam Müller felt, for he recognized the infallible sign of speedy revival.[22]

The situation in Germany seemed especially favorable to the flowering of Romanticism. Although classicism had taken vigorous hold of German intellectual life, especially in the eighteenth century, as contrasted with France and Italy the influence had endured for a relatively short time. The classical culture provided for the Romance countries the fundamental elements which the Gothic tradition did for Germany. The German Romanticists attached themselves to this tradition, and feared that the flourishing intellectual and spiritual life in Germany might be harmed or destroyed by French domination.[23] The German people could scarcely have initiated a revolution in the name of rationalism, for they lacked any means of unified public action. An Estates General could not have convened in Germany, or even in that accumulation of territories, Prussia. The German revolution took the form of a counter-movement against the revolution in France. From the beginning German Romanticism sought to defend German culture against the French Enlightenment; a few years of experience with the French Revolution aroused the young Romanticists actively and ardently to oppose their ideals to it. Conservatism was implicit in German Romanticism, not in the sense of any subsequent political party, but as a potential attitude. One can defend or conserve any type of social system. The Germans had to maintain against rationalism and the French a culture which in its institutional structure was that of the *ancien régime*. German Romanticism accepted it, wished to reform it somewhat, idealized it, and defended the idealization as the supreme culture of the world.[24] This was the German counter-revolution.

[22] Novalis wrote: "That the time of resurrection has come, and just the events which seem to be directed against its revival and threaten to complete its fall, have become the most favorable signs of its regeneration—this cannot remain doubtful to an historical mind." Novalis, II, 77.

[23] I do not wish to imply that the German Romanticists rejected all of classicism. They found in the history of classical antiquity many elements which suited their needs and views, and adopted them.

[24] See the quotations from the Romanticists given in Kluckhohn, p. 94. One wrote: "The simplest and strongest guarantee is the historical interdependent living

The individuals who formulated the Romantic ideals constituted a relatively small number of intellectuals. That they originated in various social groups, and in both Protestant and Catholic circles, attests to the emancipating and stimulating effect of a situation of crisis. These persons of diverse backgrounds could most readily come together around ideals which romanticized the institutional *status quo*. Their criticism of rationalism as incomplete was in conformity with the irrationality of the crisis, and the Romantic desire to recognize realities and the need for the union of all in defending German culture against the French Enlightenment and the Revolution strengthened this attitude. The acute menace to the German way of life led to the exaltation of this way to the point of divinity. The Romanticists even consecrated to defensive purposes the belief in cosmopolitanism, the one respect in which the German had escaped from the essential control of the German cultural structure. They endowed their culture with universal validity and asserted that it enjoyed the devotion of nature and God, that if it were destroyed humanity would be vitally wounded.

The condition of swift cultural transition favored the ideals and activities of youth and early manhood. The opportunities for achieving great things seemed limitless; if the individual would seize them, his throbbing heart (one had no time for the drudgery of rationalistic study), his enthusiasm joined with some talent promised success. Youth thought it could create or seek new, subjective values in harmony with its emotions. Faustian passion drove it to compass all life, past, present, and future, and it felt anarchy to be the generative ground of its perfection. Exaggerations and superlatives belong to youth and crisis, and they belong to Romanticism.

The Romanticists were as active as circumstances allowed. To accuse them of aesthetic idleness, or to condemn them for not having been Bismarcks or hard capitalists seems grossly unfair. In the areas open to them they lived strenuously, turning out numerous books, establishing and editing magazines, trying many forms

of king and folk in an indivisible national whole, the centuries-old bond of love and devotion in common joy and want, in other words, not the dead concept of an abstract king with an arithmetical number of subjects to be ruled, but the living individual king." Another wrote: "The more joyously and freely the state develops, the more powerfully, grandly and in every respect purely does the royal power come to the fore. The nature of the royal power arises wholly from the freedom of the burghers; every republic is necessarily a monarchy."

of expression, absorbing many varieties of knowledge. The devotion to the blue flower did not reduce their energy. Scarcely any age in history has been more productive in writing and music, or more fertile in ideas. The Romanticists even wished eagerly to be politically important, and when the War of Liberation broke out, they used their powers to the full in fighting and in propaganda. It took courage to denounce Napoleon and to exalt the Germans, to be partisan in internal conflicts over reforms. The Romanticists showed far more bravery than many of their carping contemporaries. None the less, it is true that in their trust in spiritual values, the Romanticists easily inclined to substitute ideals for material and political realities. Ideals narcotized these young enthusiasts against the unpleasant features of the time and secured them a retreat in the romantic world of their own making. The Romanticists compensated for the weakness of earthly forces by belief in the enormous strength of transcendental power. Wishing ideal and practice to harmonize, they could consummate the union most easily in the realm of imagination. The crisis stimulated the traffic in ideas, which, like Romantic interest in magic, might provide short-cuts to security; but it did not favor systematization, and the stress upon guidance by feeling reduced planning to relative insignificance.

The romantic ideal of identity and immanence has a conservative tendency. The belief that each object personifies in its particular way the total universe affords a total basis for a total defense of the individuality. The highest criterion of value to the Romanticist consisted in an individuality's containing its own justification, its own purpose. This view precluded any attack against the particular in the name of an objective standard. Where nature and God reveal themselves in the individual the defense seems complete. The German Romanticists were interested, not in the question of what to conserve, but rather in that of how to conserve it. Differing from the nationalists in that they recognized the nation as but one among many individualities, they provided the ideological foundation for the defensive union of all German groups against the French. The low estimate of rationalism and the exaltation of custom, tradition, and feeling, the conception of society as an alliance of the generations, the belief in the abiding character of ideas as contrasted with the ephemeral nature of concepts, these and many other romantic views bolstered up the existing culture. The

concern with relations led the Romanticists to praise the hierarchical order of the *Ständestaat* and to regard everything and everyone as an intermediary. The acceptance of the fact of inequality harmonized with that of the ideals of service, duty, faithfulness, order, sacrifice—admirable traits for serf or subject or soldier.

Not confining themselves to this earth, the Romanticists imposed their social views upon the relations between God and man. God was transformed into a super-romantic individual, an "endless individuum," "an abyss of individuality," "the most personal of all forms."[25] No longer an absentee Creator or an arbitrary patriarch, God acted as a romantic monarch, the father of a large romantic family, the head of the social and transcendental order of which the Romanticists approved. Christ's rôle as mediator between God and man was imparted to all the units in the social hierarchy; from the simplest item to the most complex institution, each should serve as an intermediary.[26] Adam Müller maintained that he was fashioning his plans for the state according to Christian teaching; but in doing so he forced Christ to condemn the ideals of the French Revolution, to sanction the principles of inequality, estates, monarchy, and to justify, *mirabile dictu*, the existence and practices, at least in idealized form, of the modern state. God and Christ became the patrons of the German cultural lag, and were endowed with the appropriate qualities for fulfilling their new duties.[27]

Müller and the Romanticists found God and Christ so amenable that they mobilized the deities for their plans for the future. God and Christ dutifully opposed the universal domination of Napoleon, assured the future primacy of German culture, and supported the ideal of the union of mankind, divided into nations and states, under one religion and one church.[28] "Christ will remain," Müller wrote,

[25] Kluckhohn, p. 8.

[26] See among others Adam Müller, *Die Elemente der Staatskunst*, p. 422.

[27] See Müller, *Die Elemente der Staatskunst*, p. 401, where the chapter begins which is entitled "That Christ died not merely for men but also for the states." Müller complained that while the private character of Christ had been understood, the political had not been. But not stopping at this point, he added: "The secret of rule lies in obedience; all exaltation, which the soul desires, lies in free subjection; all freedom, in devotion to the fatherland and to Christ." *Ibid.*, pp. 434–435.

[28] See Alfred von Martin, "Der preussische Altkonservatismus und der politische Katholizismus in ihren gegenseitigen Beziehungen," *Deutsche Vierteljahrschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte*, VII (1929), 489 ff.; Alfred von Martin, "Das Wesen der romantischen Religiosität," *ibid.*, II (1924), 375 ff.

"the center and ruler of all national and federative life,"[29] and the very title of Novalis's famous work, *Die Christenheit oder Europa,* resounds with a similar cry. These Romanticists aimed not merely at a new world order but at a rebirth of Christianity, romanticized to be sure, as the unifying and guiding force of this order. "Have patience," Novalis declared, "the holy age of eternal peace will come, it must come, when the new Jerusalem will be the capital of the world."[30]

During a crisis the Romantic dialectic assists the elements of change or reform but also those of conservatism. Where there is freedom, there must be counter-freedom, where equality, inequality, where a follower, a leader, where movement, stability. Multiplicity of forms is necessary for completeness; out of the interaction of opposites God and nature create life. The *ancien régime,* with its variety of estates, privileges, ways and customs of many ages and many places, offered fruitful soil for the creative functioning of the dialectic. Adam Müller expressed the Romantic will to stand above partisanship and find the true answer in the position of the higher third, the mate to Hegel's synthesis. By this means the Romanticists provided authoritarianism with a natural and divine foundation. The crisis-situation might accelerate the working of the opposites and stimulate rapid cultural change; but the dialectic sanctioned strong resistance to change even during the crisis. Once the latter had passed, the dialectic ceased to express a social need, and if preserved as a theory it was made to function so slowly that a single cultural system could appear as a norm.

The Romantic conception of relationship postulates the presence of two original elements, the particular and the whole. When this theory is applied to society, it may easily lead to a struggle for supremacy between them. Appreciating the threat of the superior force of the whole over the particular, Romantic writers enhanced the significance of the latter to the point of being a totality in itself. During a crisis the freedom of the creative particular is vital, and the Romanticists praised it with enthusiasm. None the less, the whole preserves its potential power, and the Romanticists tended to ignore the fact that it might be dominated by an absolute monarch, a self-centered aristocracy, determined to maintain as fully as possible the existing social structure. One half of the relationship

[29] *Die Elemente der Staatskunst,* p. 423.

[30] Novalis, II, 84.

might do its part in the crisis while the other obstructed the efforts to free the individualities for action. The polarity between individual freedom and initiative and group compulsion and authority was one which the Romanticists were never able to escape. They remained swinging between the two extremes. But society, which was organized around group institutions, found the issue easier to decide: it simply preserved most of the group institutions, by sheer force of inertia, and the individual had to conform. That was the case in Germany.

The Romantic theory functions only if aggressive leaders like Stein are present, leaders who feel with the Romanticists the effects of the crisis situation but who bring to this situation a rich, practical experience. The Romanticists themselves could not have executed fundamental reforms. By reverencing tradition, they preserved the power of the backward-looking royalty and aristocracy. The threat of conservatism and restoration lay in constant attendance upon the active individuality. The Romantic ideal tended to intoxicate a group of intellectuals in a cultural crisis. It was admirably suited to the risky position of a bureaucrat-professor or a writer eager for state favor: it could be either radical or conservative, idealistic or realistic, according to need; it beautified and transcendentalized Prussian society; it could mean to everyone that which he wished it to mean without running much danger of modifying the *status quo*. It was as socially safe an ideal as could appear in a crisis.

On the whole the Romantic leaders did not claim to be messiahs. Their effort to know reality and their view of all persons and things not as isolated units but as intermediaries (*Mittler*) between others intimately related to them, indicate a certain modesty. Those among them who inclined to estimate their historic importance at an unusually high rate were of burgher or peasant origin. Loose from their social bases, they strove toward position and fame. Since political activity was practically closed to them, and since the economic opportunities open to a burgher were meagre and carried a social stigma, they chose the somewhat irresponsible and specious career of a writer. During the crisis, they rose with the rising power of ideas; but materially and psychologically they remained dependent upon the institutional *status quo*. As they grew older, they lost the youthful capacity for romantic enthusiasm. By the time Napoleon crushed Austria and Prussia, they were al-

ready transferring their interest from personal problems to social and political ones. They were discovering that some things were worth fighting for. While their work contributed to the Stein-Hardenberg reforms, it also furthered the Junker resistance against these reforms. The Romanticists began to repudiate their own ideals. They began to seek solace and security in revelation, to revere form and authoritarianism. Catholicism, which shared so many common characteristics with Romanticism, afforded a refuge for some.[31] After 1815 the Restoration served a similar need. Transcendental dogma, either religious or secular, gave these footloose intellectuals the solid basis which caste and property provided for the aristocracy and the throne for royalty. Romanticism as a full way of life lasted as long as the cultural crisis favored the ferment of ideas and the accompanying enthusiastic optimism.

The ideology of Romanticism became as traditional for Germany as that of the French Revolution for France. Much of German history during the past century pertains to the search for unity and defense. Much of it portrays the struggle of the forces of the *ancien régime,* so powerful in Germany, against industrial capitalism. German conservatism, liberalism and socialism alike were affected by the persistence of this cultural conflict and in greater or less degree absorbed elements of Romanticism. In a nation which through centuries had acquired the habits of particularism, Romanticism offered the best ideological means for drawing together the diverse elements. Whenever a crisis threatened or occurred, Romantic theory reappeared.[32]

The American University

[31] Alfred von Martin, "Romantische Konversionen," *Logos,* XVII (1928), 146 ff.

[32] The similarity between the situation out of which arose German Romanticism and that of National Socialism is evident. A cultural transformation which quickly came to a head in a political crisis evoked the demand for a total reintegration of ideas and life and the search for a total view of things, events and personalities. The Romantic period dealt with in this essay deserves to be re-studied because it sought answers to problems which have become acute once more in our own day. None the less, it should not be forgotten that the aesthetic values and the individualism of the Romanticists would be anathema to the political-mindedness and group-domination of National Socialism.

ROMANTIC HISTORIOGRAPHY AS A POLITICAL FORCE IN FRANCE

By Jacques Barzun

Let me take it for granted that Romanticism is something wider than a set of literary canons and a group of literary men; that it was a temper characteristic of a whole epoch and able to override differences of opinions; and that we should view it as we view the spirit of the Renaissance, including many species under its generic character and excluding only those few persons who were complete dissenters from the major assumptions of the age.

So understood, the Romanticist is, regardless of his politics, a devotee of history. History is in fact the great discovery of his period and the stamp of his thought.[1] The Romantic interest in the diversity of customs and manners, in local color, in the middle ages, in new and remote scenes, is an essential part of the historical spirit. It marks the breaking down of the abstract Reason of the previous age, and the return to concrete and living detail. To see life as conflict and contradiction, as a process of growth and evolution, is to see life historically, and it is thus that the Romanticists saw it.

In France, practical reasons made the Romantic period an era not merely of history but of historiography. Under the Napoleonic censorship which came before, all genuine discussion had been repressed.[2] Under the restored Bourbons, long pent-up political feelings burst forth in print. But although the Bourbons were more liberal than Napoleon, they were by no means lovers of a free press. Many still found it advisable to express political ideas indirectly, through the writing of histories. Historiography became a channel for political agitation, at the same time as history became a symbol of the Romanticist outlook on life and a forecast of future struggle.

The idea of struggle was of course implicit in the Romantic view of man. But again it was historical circumstance that perverted the originally liberal notion of struggle *in* life to the illib-

[1] See Gooch, *History and Historians in the Nineteenth Century,* London, 1913, chs. IX–XI, and Halphen, *L'histoire en France depuis cent ans,* Paris, 1914, pp. 60 ff.

[2] Even Mme. de Stael's book of travel and literary criticism, *De l'Allemagne* (1810) was confiscated because it taught the French to admire foreign masters in literature. Letter of Savary, Minister of Police, to Mme. de Stael, 3 Oct. 1810.

eral one of struggle *for* life. For one thing, the French Revolution was too readily interpreted as a battle between classes. For another, the Napoleonic empire had made aggressive war a permanent feature of national life, and the Treaties of 1815 had done nothing to quench the patriots' thirst for revenge. Lastly, the hope of progress towards a fuller liberty seemed most vivid when expressed as a long historical conquest over privilege. These were three inducements to draw from history the lesson of struggle, and to make it fit the battle of present politics.

In the resulting chaos of opinions, the search for representative men reveals a kind of apostolic line beginning with Chateaubriand and ending with Edgar Quinet.

Though Chateaubriand's lifework did, indeed, begin and end with historical writings, his importance lies principally in the impetus he gave through all his works to other men who later became politicians and historians. This he achieved through his rehabilitation of the barbarian invaders of the fifth century as a subject for history. Now why should the Frankish chieftains of late Gallo-Roman times concern political writers at the beginning of the nineteenth century? The answer is not simply that they were new and picturesque; it is that they meant national origins. Upon the place of the Franks in French history depended modern views of class privilege and form of government.

Anyone concerned in our own day with contemporary theories of class struggle and race superiority must in fact go back to the writings of that earlier period in order to find the first popular use of these powerful doctrines. The discussion turned upon the historical problem, "Were the French originally Gauls, Romans, or Franks?" Chateaubriand, as the scion of a noble family, says that when he writes "our fathers" he means the Franks, but he adds that the Romans and the Gauls also contributed traits of character and special institutions of enduring value.[3] An eighteenth-century sceptic like Voltaire might say of researches into origins, Why bother?[4] But the evolutionary historical attitude made the question seem frivolous and ignorant. The appeal to history having replaced the theory of natural rights, forms of government can be understood only by studying their slow growth from the very beginning of things. Hence it mattered very much to the Bourbons and

[3] *Les Martyrs,* Notes sur le Livre IV, p. 437.

[4] Voltaire, *Oeuvres,* ed. Beuchot, vol. XXIX, pp. 471 and 442.

the *émigrés* of 1814 who was who, and who held what, in the days of Clovis and Charlemagne.

Though the Revolution had divided France by digging "a deep ditch filled with blood," Chateaubriand felt that it had also provided a new point of view from which could come a new national history, part plebeian, part aristocratic, and part royalist, with all the original races contributing their share.[5] The Romantic historian had enlarged the scope of ideas already current in the eighteenth century, when the race controversy was limited to the narrower conflict between royal prerogative and aristocratic rights,[6] and he hoped that a Reasoned Analysis of French History[7] could stop the feud.

But the future would not let the past bury its dead. Chateaubriand's foremost disciple was Augustin Thierry, who gave the race theory of French history a much sharper tone. His first historical works appeared in newspapers and were meant to be read politically. In the *Conquest of England* he argued that the native Saxon liberties had been crushed under the Norman tyranny of William and his successors. From then until 1688 the spirit of freedom had carried on a long war with its oppressors: two principles were at grips, embodied in two races. The application to France was easy to make. Thierry was carrying forward the work of French liberation by showing that it had irresistible historical momentum. He spoke for those to whom the *status quo* was but a wretched compromise between liberalism and reaction; and the popularity of this view is attested by the reception of Thierry's writings. His various works went through dozens of editions in a short time and the demands made upon him by editors and publishers very soon contributed to loss of health and eyesight.

Meanwhile, Thierry's contemporary Guizot, whose Romanticism bore few and very dry fruits,[8] had also been using history to urge political lessons on the Bourbons. Moderate in all things, Guizot espoused the race-class theory in a mild form. He assumed like most others that the Revolution was a war between two peo-

[5] *Etudes Historiques,* p. 22.

[6] See my book, *The French Race: Theories of its Origins and their Political Implications,* N. Y., 1932, ch. VII ff.

[7] *Analyse raisonnée de l'histoire de France,* édition complète de 1850.

[8] Guizot admired Sir Walter Scott and Fenimore Cooper, and thought that every historian should infuse something of their art into his narrative, but he obviously was the last man to succeed in such a genre.

ples, and he has in consequence been picked out by Marxists in our day as the first formulator of the class-struggle. But Guizot did not make it a principle of universal application. Personally he favored the theory of a gradual intertwining of the several racial strains throughout Europe, freedom being the great contribution of the Germanic race.[9] This is, of course, his policy of the *juste milieu* modeled on England. France had enough "Germanic blood" to be free, but the outcome of the Revolution seemed to be ill-understood by those governing under the Charter of 1814. Royalty had been re-established, not monarchy, and if the Bourbons did not understand this they could not endure.

Even this mild doctrine incurred disfavor and Guizot's lectures at the University were stopped when he lost office in 1822. His successor at the Sorbonne, Auguste Trognon, was a much younger historian also inspired by *Ivanhoe,* Manzoni, and Victor Hugo.[10] His work, which is not distinguished as literature, amounts to a quiet acceptance of the race-class doctrine, followed by a strong appeal to patriotism. With him, the French people emerges from the usual survey of its origins as a truly unified nation.[11]

This gives us three or perhaps four distinct historical attitudes towards the question of origins, each one matched with a different shade of contemporary policy. We have Chateaubriand's theory of racial addition, which supports the elder branch of the Bourbons; Thierry's theory of racial isolation and conflict, which is liberal and democratic; Guizot's theory of a recent equilibrium, which implies England's constitutional perfection; and finally Trognon's theory of a merging of elements, which makes for liberal nationalism.

Endless variations were played upon these leading themes. The student of the period sometimes feels that every adult Frenchman between 1800 and 1850 must have been compelled to set down his own ideas about the Franks and the Gauls, Clovis and Charle-

[9] Guizot, *Histoire de la Civilisation en Europe,* 3e leçon, Avant-Propos, and Preface of 1855.

[10] He was a protégé of Royer-Collard, a tutor to one of the sons of the Duke of Orleans, and a literary critic who fought for the new Romanticist writers. His *Etudes sur l'Histoire de France* were published in 1836 and contain the substance of his lectures delivered in 1822, when Trognon was 27 years old. Introd. par Antoine de Latour, pp. xiv–xxxiv.

[11] Essays on Sismondi's *Histoire de France* and Thierry's *Conquête d'Angleterre, op. cit.*

magne, the régime in power and the panacea just ahead.[12] Yet with all its good will, new knowledge, and humane ethics, the Romantic period was unable to establish a view of national history that was truly conciliatory. In spite of all their attempts at finding unity in diversity, historians were swept along in the current of the too recent past, and their ideas, catchwords, and facts became the ammunition of parties more and more hostile to one another and to the supposed enemies outside. Historiography first helped to create the temper that overthrew the Bourbons and set a pseudo-constitutional monarch on the throne; then it led to the split between Republicans, Clericals, Royalists, Nationalists, and Socialists which has gone on widening from 1850 to our own day.

Still another force helped political passion make historiography a real power: journalism. Thierry, we know, published his first works in newspapers; but he was not alone. The new press, in the words of Dickens's Mr. Pott, was "a mighty engine." It has even been said that the revolution of 1830 was the work of the journalists.[13] Certainly its occasion was journalistic rights, and the freedom of the press continued to be a rallying cry. Police searches, arrests of printers and editors, spectacular duels, and oratorical

[12] See, among others, Baron de Beaujour, *Tableau des révolutions de la France depuis la conquête des Francs jusqu'à l'établissement de la Charte, ou Examen critique des causes . . . qui peuvent l'améliorer encore,* Paris, 1825, p. 77; Dupuis, *Histoire des révolutions de France* (1801); Rouillon-Petit, *Essai sur la Monarchie Française* (1812); Comte de Montlosier, *De la Monarchie Française* (1814), 3 vols., an interesting work of liberal royalism that Thiers took special pains to refute in the *Constitutionnel;* J. de Maistre, *Considérations sur la France* (1797), an intransigeant monarchist classic written by a Savoyard during the Revolution, which gained popularity and took effect after the Restoration; Le Ragois, *Instructions sur l'Histoire de France* (1818); Anon., *Lettre à Fiévée; Lettre à Chateaubriand* (1815–18), a number of these pamphlets deal with questions of French origins, relating them to contemporary policies represented by these two men; *Tableau historique des monumens, etc. . . . des français depuis les Gaulois jusqu'à nos jours* (1824); Amédée Thierry, *Histoire des Gaulois* (1828), a very popular work until almost the end of the century; Alexandre Dumas, *Gaule et France* (1833): its motto is, *"Sans haine, sans crainte":* a liberal tract inspired by Augustin Thierry; Robert du Var, *L'école du Peuple, ou l'émancipation graduelle de la nation française* (1839), a socialist history on the same basis of 'early origins.' Ph. LeBas, France: *Annales,* 2 vols. (1840–43), a democratic history by a member of the Institute who was Louis Napoleon's tutor; Comte Antonin de Ladevèze, *Recherches sur l'Histoire de France,* 3 vols. (1842), an exclusively "Frankish" history arguing the sole legitimacy of the elder Bourbons, anti-English and jingoistic.

[13] Michaud, *Biographie Universelle,* art. Carrel.

appeals to liberty over the heads of the judges, were the usual features of the journalistic war.

The tribune of the people in the most brilliant stage of this war was a man whose early death in a duel in 1836 has obscured for us his contemporary influence. I refer to Armand Carrel. A rebel from military school onwards, Carrel had taken part on the liberal side in the Spanish War of 1822–23, suffered a torturing imprisonment in the south of France under a charge of treason, and had come to Paris after acquittal, deprived of his commission and without prospects. Someone procured him the place of secretary to Augustin Thierry, which he accepted with eagerness and filled with devotion. He helped the half-blind historian prepare his *Conquest of England* for the press, wrote two historical synopses of his own, as publisher's hackwork, and brought out in 1827 a book which at once made him famous. This was the *Counter-Revolution in England under Charles II and James II.* It was avowedly a "study for the time in which we live" and it proposed "an answer to the question, Why the Stuarts were expelled a second time in 1688."[14] The parallel with the restored Bourbons was so plain that Carrel did not bother to make any other allusion to it in his work. As for his answer, it is simply that the returned Stuarts tried to deny the bourgeoisie those liberties which they wished to enjoy under a constitutional monarch—obviously what Carrel himself wished for France. Carrel also borrowed from Thierry the idea of a racial antipathy as the initial cause of revolt in English history, but he does not carry it beyond the thirteenth century. He makes it clear that in the seventeenth century the English formally repudiated republicanism, but refused with equal obstinacy to reaccept absolute monarchy.[15]

With these sentiments Carrel joined a group of other journalist-historians comprising Thiers, Rémusat, Cousin, Villemain, Périer, Mignet, and Guizot, and discussed with them the advisability of a revolution in France. Only Carrel and Rémusat appear to have been ready to go to any lengths. With two others, Thiers and Mignet, Carrel founded, in January 1830, the daily newspaper *Le National,* and began advocating the government of the country by

[14] *Histoire de la Contre-Révolution en Angleterre . . .* , Paris, 1827, pp. 2–3. An English translation by Hazlitt appeared in London in 1846 as one volume of *The European Library,* a collection of historical works by Guizot, Michelet, Mignet, and others.

[15] *Op. cit.,* pp. 390–1, 422 ff., 428 ff.

the country, under a king who should reign and not rule. The success of the July Revolution, one might have thought, would satisfy Carrel; but as Thiers and Guizot cooled, he grew more warmly revolutionary and soon outdistanced all his colleagues. He became *Le National* all by himself in January 1832; the paper became republican and its editor the acknowledged leader of the liberal party. Four years afterwards, in the year of his death, he was in the midst of a campaign for economic reform.[16]

Carrel was no stand-patter. A sense of his fearless progressivism was what made J. S. Mill—always a close and sympathetic observer of French politics—admire him so strongly and lament his absence from the political scene in 1848.[17] Progressivism, for Carrel, meant an evolution on all fronts. France must first achieve "unanimity" and avenge her humiliation of 1815 against Prussia, regaining her natural frontier on the Rhine. To aid this purpose, he projected a life of Napoleon and demanded the return of his ashes to France. At home, this unity was to be assured by the sovereignty of the people, based on the knowledge that French history after 1789 showed only one class or race in power—the people. This meant democracy; for, said Carrel, an aristocracy cannot be created, it can only result from a conquest, and the last conquest of the sort is the Norman conquest of the Saxons in England, where we find Norman blood ruling through the House of Lords and Saxon through the House of Commons. In France the "glorious plebeians, our fathers and brothers," must establish a republic. It is the logical outcome of the series of revolutions they have fought. And the republic must insure the economic welfare of the citizen—for that is the meaning of the increasing proletarian outbreaks. These assertions were supported in *Le National* by historical descriptions—or rather denunciations—of the old régime, beginning with Mazarin and coming up to recent times.[18]

The pattern of the irrepressible conflict between republican and legitimist was now set. Reconciliation was becoming daily more impossible in the face of the insistent claims of party, now political, now economic, now nationalistic, which were all grounded on his-

[16] See art. Carrel in Michaud, and, for more accurate data, the essay by Littré in vol. I of the *Oeuvres Politiques et Littéraires de Carrel*, 5 vols., 1857 ff., II, 459 ff.

[17] In Mill's defence of the revolution of 1848 against Brougham. See Bain, *J. S. Mill*, N. Y., 1882; pp. 92–3, and for an earlier opinion, Mill's article on Carrel in the *London and Westminster Review*, October, 1837.

[18] *Oeuvres*, II, 293.

tory. Every issue was tied up with race or class genealogy. Thierry and his brother Amédée (a specialist on Southern Gaul); the lecturers at the Sorbonne; the writers of historical feuilletons —all were trying to decide whether France was Germanic or Gallo-Roman, and to show how all else followed, logically and historically, from this premise. Henri Martin took 19 volumes to prove that the essential France was exclusively Gallic or Celtic. The editors of *La Tribune,* a republican newspaper, were committed to a strong central government, and therefore "accepted" Richelieu and Louis XIV. Carrel who believed in decentralization, was a Gallo-Romanist because of the municipal liberties which the Gallo-Roman towns were supposed to have enjoyed. But his position was the more difficult because he was a Bonapartist and had to show that Bonaparte had inherited a centralized power rather than created or approved of it. And was Bonaparte in truth a Roman deliverer of the people from the Frankish aristocracy? What then became of popular liberties?

Alas, history is no divining book wherewith to decide our future. The past contains everything—the fruits of military glory as well as the bitter pill of dictated treaties. The words Gaul, Roman, Frank mean as many different things as the historian can find associated with each. Rome, for instance, can mean local self-government, Caesarism, the reign of law, the transmitted heritage of Greece. Historical genesis, in short, is not linear but many-branched, and the racial continuity of classes is but one example of the fallacy of forgetting it. The unanimity which Carrel urged in vain, and which every French political party has claimed as its monopoly ever since, was shattered from the start by the very method of discussion. At the time of his death, Carrel must be called a harbinger at once of the Second Republic and of the Second Empire. To which would he have remained faithful in the end? Mill thought, to the Republic; an acute French critic of the royalist camp thought, to Bonaparte.[19] The speculation is instructive, for it leads us into the heart of the intellectual *malaise* of the forties, and thence to the final phase of Romantic historiography.

What was needed by those who went to history for political guidance, and who wished at the same time to reconcile the warring groups within the nation, was a clear statement of the national idea,

[19] Barbey d'Aurevilly, *Journalistes et Polémistes* (*XIXe Siècle, 2e Série*), Paris, 1895, p. 19.

based on history but not fettered by the past—a truly liberal as against a fatalistic history. This would mean an abandonment of the race-class interpretation, a forgetting of conquests and defeats for the sake of a common understanding. Two men of the Romantic school devoted themselves to the task—men whose friendship and political action side by side for nearly fifty years have become legendary: Jules Michelet and Edgar Quinet. Michelet, as is well known, discovered his bent for history in the museum of Lenoir where the relics of medieval art, despised by the Revolution, were gathered in impressive array. His further preparation was cosmopolitan—Vico, Luther, Niebuhr, the history of Rome, modern Europe, and of the world, absorbed his imagination and gave matter to his genius for synthesis. His were just the qualities needed to transform Thierry's history by race conflict and transcend Carrel's inconsistent variety. Michelet was aware of the difficulties and met them. His conception, based on a vivid sense of French physical geography, was richer than Guizot's rationalism, wider than Thierry's special pleadings, and artistically finer than any previous view of the nation's history. As Michelet was later free to admit, the scheme had shortcomings of many kinds, but it was the first to make France what all the Romantic philosophers, from Herder to Quinet himself, declared that every true nation was —a living person.[20]

The result has been called an epic, both to praise and to condemn it. It would be better to call it an inspired natural history in the manner of Buffon. Not that Michelet neglects ideas, but rather that he never forgets—at least in the early volumes—the oneness of the national community. Had he been able to maintain this attitude towards the parties and policies around him, the product of his pen and the verdict of criticism upon it might have been very different. But unfortunately, though he began as the apostle of reconciliation and inclusiveness, he ended as an irreconcilable partisan. He could view with an equal mind the failures and achievements and errors of the medieval church, but he could not assess the importance or unimportance of the "Jesuit menace" in his own day. His violence lost him his chair and side-tracked his original idea.

[20] *"J'avais posé le premier la France comme une personne."* Michelet, *Histoire de France,* Paris, 1881, vol. I, Préface de 1869, p. 21. See also Duc de Caraman, *Etudes Contemp.: Michelet.*

He felt he must make sallies into the political arena by means of companion volumes to his great work in progress. He thereby confused the public mind—and his own—on the central question of race and class struggle. In the early volumes of his history he convincingly shows that political conflicts have no such fated continuity as earlier writers had assumed. The nobles expelled in 1789 were not lineal descendants from the Frankish barbarians any more than Armand Carrel was descended from a Gallo-Roman senator.[21] It should follow that political issues in nineteenth-century France ought to be discussed, no doubt, with the aid of history, but not as the latest phase of an ancestral feud. Michelet forgot his own proof. With his jump from medieval history to the volume on the French Revolution we find him using the Revolution against Guizot. The racial portraits of individuals—e.g. Louis XVI—increase; and the animus in and out of season shows that the gap between the Two Frances is still an open wound.

Curiously enough, Guizot's home and foreign policy did not make Michelet a militant nationalist. He did not use history to preach the English or the German peril, and he never repudiated his debt to German thought.[22] This rôle was reserved for his friend and comrade in arms, Quinet. The latter's early admiration for German scholarship was more profound than that of any other Frenchman of his time. He had lived in Germany, had married a German wife, and had gained renown with a translation and study of Herder before the 1830 revolution. But his alienation from Germany was proportionately rapid. His life's work after 1831 was a denial of the prevailing view that "Germany was a country of thinkers and critics."[23] Not that Quinet disputed the merits of Goethe or Herder; he reversed, rather, the opinion that they were representative of the temper of their own country.

Germany, he warned, was gradually but surely disowning philosophy at home and becoming a country of gregarious conquerors. National unity and the avenging of three centuries of humiliation formed the common aim. To protect herself against it, France

[21] *Op. cit.*, p. 6, and chapter IV, "Systèmes divers," pp. 183 ff.

[22] See the beginnings of xenophobia and the efforts to stem it in E. Lerminier, *Au delà du Rhin*, Paris, 1835; Victor Hugo, *Le Rhin*, 2 vols., 1838; LeBas, *Allemagne*, 2 vols., 1838; J. Matter, *De l'Etat moral, politique, et littéraire de l'Allemagne*, 2 vols., 1847.

[23] See Bulwer Lytton's dedication of *Ernest Maltravers* (1837).

must be a free and actively revolutionary nation.[24] And here Quinet's use of history brought him to the side of Michelet. For France to be free, she must make war on the Church, the aristocrats, the conservative bourgeoisie, and the legitimists, all of whom were blinded by the past, unable to see the necessary evolution of the nation towards democracy. Yet Quinet perceived that nationalism was stronger than liberalism, and for a time he turned Bonapartist. But by 1848 he was a republican; he fought the *coup d'état* in '51 and then took the road of exile.

But the imperialist pattern was too strong for the nation to escape. What Carrel had begun, Quinet fulfilled, almost in spite of his own premonitions. The nations had inherited the attributes of divine right, and new dynastic wars were to be fought under new names. The Holy Alliance against France and the Revolution, Quinet had predicted, "has descended to the peoples. . . . You will see rising at your doors—not tomorrow, perhaps—a community of interests, of ambition, genius, resentments, and faith in the future which will surge forth . . . from the depths of a whole race of men against a ruined and beleaguered France."[25]

Napoleon, in short, had unified Germany, but left France unguarded. In this light, historical origins scarcely mattered. Quinet blamed Thierry, Guizot, and others for their mystical faith in the racial germs of liberty or tyranny.[26] France was a living organism, not a collection of races and classes. Her problem was now purely political, national. The "nameless and classless" group, to which Quinet felt he belonged, had "picked up the remains of power and privilege which the aristocracy had let fall."[27] It was their duty to prevent democracy from perishing in France and in Europe at the hands of Germany.

To sum up, the historiography of the Romantic period in France, whether conservative with Chateaubriand and Guizot, or liberal with Thierry and Carrel, tried to disentangle the issues created by the French Revolution in the light of race and class history. But the two incompatible results of the Revolution—liberalism on the one hand, nationalism on the other—made the political plan mis-

[24] *France et Allemagne,* a collection of Quinet's articles edited by Cestre, Oxford, 1908, *Avertissement* and chapter II.

[25] *Ibid.,* p. 28.

[26] *Philosophie de l'Histoire de France* (1857), vol. IV of *Oeuvres,* pp. 357 ff.

[27] *France et Allemagne,* p. 38.

carry and the historiography lose its virtues. The Bourbon Restoration, too conscious of class, provoked the class and race historians to applaud or to protest. The government of Louis-Philippe, too little conscious of the nation and of its democratic base, fostered by reaction the glorifying of national unity through the memory of its last popular embodiment—Napoleon. And this in turn led to the intensification, through history, of a militant nationalism fearing its counterpart across the Rhine.

I have said nothing of the quality of the histories which were put to these political uses. It is obviously uneven, however sincere and painstaking the bulk. But criticism would fill a volume, and it can be found elsewhere under its proper heads. Nevertheless, a general comment can be offered on the wisdom of these historians or their lack of it. Romantic historiography certainly did not bring about the great battle of the west between liberalism and nationalism which is not yet ended; it undoubtedly gave it the now familiar form of a battle of ideas; it popularized the terms race and class, and it made the union of popular sovereignty with nationalism seem logical. Worse than all, through its use of the newspaper press, it made the toning-down of these absolutes impossible.

But to say all this is to stress only one side. Reverence for thought, true liberality, and generous human feeling exist side by side with the political passion. How did this keep the former sentiments from triumphing? The succeeding era of *Realpolitik* can perhaps best answer the question, for the idea of unlimited struggle with a view to the survival of the fittest did not become a political or an intellectual catchword until after 1850, nor did it spring up exclusively in France. The application of the "coarsest political standard" to the intellectual life, which was John Morley's complaint in the seventies; Nietzsche's dictum that wars are born of historical studies; the fact that not even the dignified aloofness of a Fustel de Coulanges could prevent his historical researches from giving rise to physical riot[28]—these symptoms of a nearer past are not chargeable to the account of Romantic historiography. They confirm, rather, its corruption, and they themselves require further explanation from outside the scope of this inquiry.

Columbia University.

[28] See Charles Maurras, "La Bagarre de Fustel" in *Cahiers d'Occident*, II, 1928.

ROMANTICISM AND THE RELIGIOUS REVIVAL IN ENGLAND

By Hoxie N. Fairchild

I confine myself to Romanticism in connection with the Oxford Movement. Even thus restricted, the subject is both extensive and difficult. Newman, after all that has been written about him by himself and others, remains a baffling figure; and his associates, though simpler as individuals, present wide differences of character and religious temper. And now this varied, fluctuating body of phenomena must be studied in connection with an undefined and probably undefinable concept! Which is the more Romantic, the mild, purely Anglican saint, John Keble, or the violently Ultramontane theocrat, W. G. Ward? Of the fourteen pioneers who wrote *Tracts for the Times,* only Newman joined the Church of Rome; all the other seceders belonged to the group of younger men, less interested in the Primitive than in the Universal Church, who added their impatience to the movement between 1839 and 1845.[1] Was it more Romantic to follow Newman, or to stay behind with Pusey? Professor Lovejoy has contended that there are many "Romanticisms," which the historian ought carefully to discriminate; the observation is pertinent to the special theme of this paper.

To some slight extent, Romantic literature influenced the thought and feeling of the Oxford men. Much more importantly, it prepared large sections of the general public to receive ideas which would have been bewildering or repugnant if presented without warning, in all their rigor, by the Tractarians. The movement, however, was by no means the child of Romantic poetry. It depended upon a quite different tradition. Although throughout the eighteenth century the motives of most High Churchmen were political rather than religious, the more spiritual Anglo-Catholicism of the Caroline divines did not wholly disappear. It was preserved by the Nonjurors and by other High Churchmen such as Bishop Wilson. Keble said that the ideas of the Tractarians were "the same as what my father always taught me."[2] In the closing years of the eighteenth century and the opening years of the nineteenth, this type of churchmanship was encouraged by the decay of rationalism and by the conservative reaction against the French Revolution. Archdeacon Daubeny, in his *Guide to the Church*

[1] The fact is noted by Isaac Williams in his *Autobiography* (1892), p. 120.

[2] E. Wood, *John Keble,* p. 2.

(1798), and Bishop Van Mildert, in his 1814 Bampton Lectures, defended the Real Presence and maintained the Apostolic Succession as the basis of Church authority and of the validity of the sacraments. Their somewhat chilly ecclesiasticism was warmed with Evangelical fervor by Alexander Knox. Bishop Jebb was his friend and pupil. For some years before 1833 a layman, Joshua Watson, was the center of a definitely Anglo-Catholic group at Clapton. Cambridge had an embryonic "Oxford Movement" even before Oxford, with Christopher Wordsworth, the poet's brother, and Hugh James Rose as leading members. The latter lent advice and aid to the Oxford men at the beginning of their campaign.[3]

These stirrings of the Anglo-Catholic spirit were brought to a head by the threats of a triumphant liberalism whose ideals were hostile to those of the historic Church. The repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts in 1828, and the emancipation of the Roman Catholics in the following year, placed Dissenters and Papists on the same political footing as Anglicans. The Reform Bill consigned the Establishment to the tender mercies of a Parliament no longer essentially Anglican or even essentially Christian. The ministry proposed ecclesiastical reforms for Ireland which included the abolition of ten Irish bishoprics: the heirs of the Apostles were to be cashiered, like so many superfluous clerks, at the bidding of an apostate secular power. Even more radical changes were in the air, and Bentham observed with pleasure that "The Church of England is ripe for dissolution."[4] "The Whigs had come into power," wrote Newman in later years; "Lord Grey had told the bishops to set their house in order, and some of the prelates had been insulted and threatened in the streets of London. The vital question was how were we to keep the Church from becoming liberalised?"[5] The preface to the second edition of *Tracts for the Times* (1835) declares that "the prospect of the loss of state protection . . . made it necessary to look out for other reasons for adherence to the Church besides obedience to the civil magistrate." In this crisis it was necessary to show that the Anglican priesthood derived its authority, not from the Reform Parliament of 1832, but from the Holy Apostles.

[3] For an excellent treatment of the subject of this paragraph, see Chap. IV of Yngve Brilioth's *The Anglican Revival.*

[4] H. J. Laski, *Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty,* p. 69.

[5] *Apologia pro Vita Sua* (Everyman's Library, n.d.), p. 52. This unpretentious but convenient edition is used throughout.

The Tractarians, however, were not merely reviving the old Tory war-cry of "The Church in danger!" Although doubtless their propaganda appealed to many parsons whose sole concern was to protect the vested interests of their caste, the motives of Keble, Froude, Newman and Pusey were as purely religious as human motives possibly can be in a world where God and Mammon are so closely intertwined. For them, liberalism was even more a spiritual than a political peril—a denial of everything implied by that not very Romantic assertion, "I believe one Catholic and Apostolic Church." They at once began to preach the doctrines on which their anti-Erastian ideals were grounded, and in so doing set in motion what we call the Oxford Movement.

These are the only facts absolutely essential to an understanding of the origins of the Revival. The influence of Romantic literature on this historical core, though certainly worth noting, is slight. In the eighteenth century, the submerged tradition of Anglo-Catholicism is so foreign to the spirit of the age that it almost never finds literary expression. The Nonjuror William Law may seem to be an exception, but he was much more influential as a practical moralist and later as a mystic than as a defender of the Apostolic Church. That complex of naturalistic hankerings which students of literature call "pre-Romanticism" is emphatically not pre-Tractarian. The sentimental deism which points forward to the religious experience of the great Romantics is the eternal foe of the Catholic ideal. After studying the work of 130 poets who flourished between 1700 and 1740, I have argued elsewhere that the eighteenth-century cult of sentiment is thoroughly Whiggish and Protestant, and that it descends, through latitudinarianism, from the Low Church Anglicanism and Nonconformity of the seventeenth century.[6] Pre-Romantic sentimentalism is Puritanism in a more or less pleasingly phosphorescent state of decay. For our purposes it is especially significant that the literary medievalism of the eighteenth century, when it does not ignore religion entirely, is doggedly anti-Catholic. Poets temper their enthusiasm for ruined abbeys with severe reflections upon the lazy, superstitious, hypocritical monks who inhabited them. Chatterton, whose Rowley forgeries arose from his passion for the Church of St. Mary Redcliffe, should have been an Anglo-Catholic, but as a matter of fact he was a sneering sceptic.

In France and Germany, the crest of Romanticism coincides

[6] H. N. Fairchild, *Religious Trends in English Poetry.* Vol. I: *Protestantism and the Cult of Sentiment, 1700–1740.*

with a revival of Catholicism. In England, on the contrary, the Oxford Movement does not begin until the close of the Romantic Period proper. The great poets who flourish between 1780 and 1830 do not, in their most representative works, sound like precursors of Tractarianism. Not Blake, surely, or Burns, or Shelley. Byron had an uneasy respect for the Catholic Church, and was one of those libertines who like to have their illegitimate daughters educated in convents; but of course the Tractarians regarded the author of *Cain* with horror.[7] Keats probably appealed to the later, more aesthetic generation of Puseyites, but we are concerning ourselves with the first half of the century.

With Wordsworth, Coleridge, and Southey the situation is more complex. In those works which any professor of English would select to illustrate the qualities of Romantic poetry, the Lake Poets seem completely detached from the Anglo-Catholic tradition. Gradually, however, they enter a conservative phase in which their religious and political sympathies are somewhat akin to those of the Tractarians. Naturally therefore the Tractarians admired them, and were quite willing to interpret their earlier, more distinctively Romantic work in the light of their later, more edifyingly Anglican productions. Parsons are always delighted to find a poet who seems to be on the side of the angels. In his article on "The State of Religious Parties" in *British Critic* for April, 1839, Newman praises the work of Wordsworth and Southey "as a reaction from the dry and superficial character of the religious teaching and the literature of the last generation, or century, and as a result of the need which was felt both by the hearts and by the intellects of the nation for a deeper philosophy."[8]

Keble's *Christian Year* (1827) has been termed "the connecting link between Romanticism and the Oxford Movement"[9] because of its indebtedness to the poetry of Wordsworth. That indebtedness, however, is exaggerated by those who regard the sacramental view of nature as an element common to Romantic and historic Catholic thought.[10] He who looks upon the Creation after rising from the

[7] For a typical example see Isaac Williams, *Autobiography*, p. 7: "The subtle poison of these books did me incalculable injury for many years; the more so as the infidelity was so veiled in beautiful verse and refined sentiment."

[8] *Apologia*, p. 104.

[9] Brilioth, *The Anglican Revival*, p. 71.

[10] See for example H. S. Holland in his Introduction to *Lyra Apostolica* (Library of Devotion Series), p. xliii: "The world was sacramental. That which was a truism inside the Church, Wordsworth had long ago verified in his own experience. Nature was the symbolic utterance of the unseen God."

altar-rails has a view of nature radically different from him who, ignoring the tabernacle, represents things in general as "sacramental" in a vague, unfocussed, quasi-pantheistic sense. Keble has a strong feeling—derived largely from Butler's *Analogy*—of the harmony between the natural and the supernatural revelations. But even in his nature-poetry Christian faith is absolutely central, whereas the "visionary gleam" in Wordsworth's most characteristic work has no specific connection with Christianity.

This distinction applies even more emphatically to the verse of Newman, Isaac Williams, Froude, and the minor contributors to *Lyra Apostolica*. Like almost all English lyrical writing other than that of the neo-classical period, it is "Romantic" in the loose sense of being primarily emotional and imaginative, but its exclusive devotion to the Catholic conception of the Church separates it sharply from the main trend of English Romantic poetry, which is seldom Christian and almost never Catholic.

Coleridge as a poet made little or no impression upon the Oxford men. The theological speculations of his later period of transcendental conservatism were more influential among Broad Churchmen than among Tractarians. But although, according to Newman, "he indulged a liberty of speculation which no Christian can tolerate,"[11] his attempt to provide a philosophical basis for faith was of service to the movement. "He had taken," writes Dean Church, "the simple but all-important step of viewing the Church in its spiritual character as first and foremost and above all things essentially a religious society of divine institution, not dependent on the creation or will of man."[12] But even here the influence of Coleridge was corroborative rather than formative: Newman first made acquaintance with his work in 1835.

To Sir Walter Scott the Tractarians acknowledged a considerable debt.[13] His Romanticism was very superficial, and he would have shrunk with horror from any imputation of popery. But he loved the Latin hymns, and his imaginative antiquarianism responded to old abbeys as well as to old castles. Though lacking in any real understanding of Catholic religion, he respected the medieval Church as a part of that fabric of feudal loyalties which appealed to his sentimental Toryism. Unquestionably his idealized picture of the Middle Ages did much to soften the anti-Catholic prejudices of Englishmen. But while his influence on the Oxford

[11] *Apologia*, p. 105.

[12] R. W. Church, *The Oxford Movement* (1922), p. 148.

[13] E. A. Knox, *The Tractarian Movement*, p. 30.

Movement is important, Keble and Pusey and the rest were not Anglo-Catholics because they admired *Ivanhoe*.

For the Tractarians to have remained completely untouched by the Romantic Movement would have been a psychological impossibility, but so far as specific literary influences are concerned the evidence of relationship is not impressive. Those who wish to describe the Revival as an aspect of Romanticism must therefore argue that the Oxford Movement and the Romantic Movement have some common source in the depths of the human mind.

To assume that religion in general and Catholicism in particular are "Romantic" because they are wishful illusions implies a prejudice which, though not uncommon among historians, is impracticable for historical purposes. Somewhat more fruitful is the conception of Romanticism as the sum of all the forces which assert the rights of feeling against rationalism, tough-minded empiricism, materialism, and utilitarianism. Interpreted thus broadly, Romanticism certainly includes the Oxford Movement, just as it includes Evangelicalism, the Broad Church Movement, Christian Socialism, and Spiritualism. In fact it includes so much that one is left with a desire for greater precision. There are many different kinds of feeling, many angles from which rationalism may be attacked. If all of these are Romantic, then Romanticism is not a very meaningful term.

The Tractarians were enemies, not of reason, but of the half-baked, cocksure, mechanical, logic-chopping kind of reason which was glorified by nineteenth-century liberalism. Far from being sentimental anti-intellectualists, they were learned and intelligent thinkers, able to argue with acuteness and depth for the truth as they had beheld it with the eye of faith. They had a far more mature and realistic understanding of the way in which the total human organism arrives at conclusions than did the rationalists. Of course the same may be said for Romantic thought at its best, but there are distinctions which should be noted. The Tractarian temper includes an austerely ascetic self-control which helps to explain why in our own day the New Humanists, those deadly foes of Romanticism, so readily become Anglo-Catholics. The Romantics found their intellectual environment too tight and disciplined; the Oxford men found it too loose and lawless.

In his letter to Jelf on *Tract XC*, Newman asks why the Anglican Church, equally with the Roman, should not lay claim to those "sentiments of fear, of mystery, of tenderness, of veneration,

of devotion, and other sentiments, which can be called Catholic.'"[14] These indeed are feelings which the Catholic and every other person of religious sensibility share with the Romanticist. But the Catholic enjoys them within a framework of traditional authority, dogmatic discipline, and objective ritualistic technique which would deprive them of all charm for a Romanticist. The Tractarian loves mystery, not for itself, but for the sharply-defined truths which Holy Church brings forth from its darkness. Tractarian truth is intuitive and precise; Romantic truth is intuitive and shadowy.

In Romantic thought, belief is highly individual and subjective. It is an active, creative assertion of the ego, akin to the "higher" reason, the transcendental faculty, and the shaping spirit of imagination. For the Oxford Movement, on the contrary, the essence of belief is not self-assertion, but self-denial. In *Loss and Gain*, Newman's largely autobiographical novel, a Romanist priest tells the hero that people "will not be blessed, they will effect nothing in religious matters, till they begin by an act of unreserved faith in the word of God, whatever it be; till they go out of themselves; till they cease to make something within them their standard."[15] Might we not substitute, "till they cease to be Romantic"?

Thus, even when Tractarianism is studied in relation to the broadest possible definition of Romanticism, some of its most essential features make us hesitate to label it as Romantic without important reservations. But at this point a narrower conception of Romanticism presses its claims. Medievalism was one of the main Romantic trends, and the Tractarians were medievalists. Surely, however, one can find strangeness and glamor in the Middle Ages without being attracted towards Catholicism in any but the most superficial respects, and conversely, one can follow the march of the Apostolic Church through those centuries without smacking one's lips over the flavor of old ballads. Unquestionably the Oxford men responded to the Romantic charm of the Middle Ages; it is their most significant point of contact with literary Romanticism. The *Tracts for the Times*, however, do not primarily represent a yearning for olden witchery. One can hardly think of writings less illustrative of what Watts-Dunton calls "the renascence of wonder."

In this connection we should guard against telescoping the Tractarianism of 1833–1845 with the ritualistic phase which the

[14] Quoted from E. A. Knox, *The Tractarian Movement*, p. 369.

[15] *Loss and Gain* (1874), p. 386.

movement had entered by the 1860's. The Tractarian leaders were ritualists as upholding the importance of sacramental rites, which of course should be performed with dignity and traditional correctness, but there is abundant evidence that they cared little about ceremonial for its own sake.[16] Their austerity shrank from all that was luscious, over-elaborate, prettified. The foundations of their Catholicism were dogmatic, not aesthetic.

Generally speaking, the English Romantic Movement illustrates what may be called "liberal" Romanticism. The religion of the liberal Romanticist is a Protestantism which has broken down into a quasi-pantheistic kind of deism. His sense of divine immanence has almost wholly submerged his sense of divine transcendence, and he likes to think of God, man, and nature as interfused in one great cosmic harmony. He believes in natural goodness, the moral sense, the inner light, the powers of genius. He likes to think of his imagination as a creative force akin to that which has thought the universe into being. Creeds, rules, logical formulas, sharp distinctions, external controls of every sort, are repugnant to him. Shunning the permanent and normative elements of life, he revels in spontaneity, diversity, uniqueness, individual expansiveness. His politics range from mildly humanitarian Whiggery to an emotional sort of radicalism.

One can describe the Oxford Movement in a single sentence by saying that it is, in every respect, the exact reverse of this type of Romanticism. Even if time permitted me to support this statement, to do so before this audience would hardly be necessary. It is impossible to imagine a more absolute antithesis. Not Newman, but Kingsley, is the child of liberal Romanticism.

In my own thinking, what I have here called liberal Romanticism covers every thing that I regard as genuinely Romantic. Even those who disagree will grant that my description applies to the most characteristic products of Romantic art and provides the accepted basis for distinguishing Romanticism from Classicism. It is also significant that the French, German and English Romantic Movements begin with liberal Romanticism. Witness Rousseau, the *Stürmer und Dränger,* and the young Lakists with their enthusiasm for the French Revolution.

But Mr. Laski asserts that "in its broader aspects, Tractarianism is no more than the English side of that reactionary Roman-

[16] Church, *The Oxford Movement* (1922), p. 141; Liddon, *Life of Pusey,* IV, 212; Newman, *Apologia,* p. 271; Brilioth, *The Anglican Revival,* pp. 325–326; Baker, *The Novel and the Oxford Movement,* p. 70.

ticism which, on the Continent, drove men like Schlegel back to the ideals of the Roman Church."[17] This "reactionary" Romanticism deserves much closer analysis than it has yet received. It will be found, I think, to be a mixture of a political and religious conservatism which not only is not Romantic, but is essentially anti-Romantic, and a thwarted liberal Romanticism which has been thrown into uneasy alliance with that conservatism by the course of European history. The liberal Romanticist turns to the Middle Ages for glamor, imaginative expansion, freedom from classical restraints. But the French Revolution shocks him, Napoleon scares him, the increasingly rationalistic tinge of the reform movement thwarts his craving for a warmly muddled emotional experience. Hence, unless he mercifully dies young, he is likely to become a sentimental reactionary. He will now look to the Middle Ages for ideals of discipline, loyalty, and traditional continuity, and consequently he may develop a good deal of politically motivated respect for the historic Church. At the same time, however, he may preserve something of the thrill of his youthful medievalism by using the Catholic religion as a means of satisfying impulses which are not Catholic at all.

Although this pseudo-Catholic Romanticism is not unfamiliar to those who have observed the behavior of present-day Anglo-Catholics, it is by no means the peculiar possession of the Anglican communion. There is no objective way of determining how large a part it played in the Oxford Movement. Individual members vary in this respect: Hurrell Froude, for example, has more of it than Pusey. One must grant that as the movement spread it attracted many superficial, insincere, and "arty" little people who merely played at being Catholic and whom Newman mercilessly satirizes in *Loss and Gain*. This element became stronger in the second half of the century, when Anglo-Catholic ritualism, no longer guided by Oxford, sometimes mingled with the Romanticism of the Pre-Raphaelites and even of the *fin-de-siècle* decadents. I believe, however, that from 1833 to the present day the core of the Revival is a faith which stands in eternal opposition to the Romantic spirit. That I have failed to prove this statement I am well aware, but I think I have shown that the Oxford Movement should not be described by historians merely as a special manifestation of Romanticism.

Hunter College of the City of New York.

[17] *Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty*, p. 69.

THE NATIONALITY OF PHILOSOPHY AND BERTRANDO SPAVENTA

By Marcel Grilli

When the extreme nationalists at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century sought to rationalize their dogmas on an ideological basis, they turned to the poetry and philosophy of the *Sturm und Drang* period. Distortion and perversion are the usual fate of religions and philosophies when they harden into dogma, but one can hardly think of a *volte-face* more complete than that which turned the teaching of the nationality of philosophies into the rigors and excesses of the philosophies of nationalism. The *rapprochement* of these two concepts, which, on paper, sounds like a play on words, needs to be disentangled from the willful confusion of the ultra-nationalists. Such clarification, though urgently needed, is not the province of this study. The purpose here is to examine the paradoxical phrase "the nationality of philosophy," to follow its development in one country, Italy, and to see its summation and resolution in the work of one philosopher, Bertrando Spaventa.

This self-imposed limitation of geography and personality will inevitably have to be broken by references to Spaventa's philosophical contemporaries and ancestors in Germany. These two countries, which at present exhibit the extreme development of nationalist perversion, have reached this stage after numerous previous encounters. There seems to be a fateful parallelism that directs the development of these two late-comers in the European family of nations. Born as political states almost within the same year, Italy and Germany exhibit many resemblances in their prenatal development, in the vicissitudes of their adolescence, and in the strutting aggressiveness of their coming of age.

I

Nationality of philosophy—the concept of philosophy as conditioned by the different countries in which it appears—has a paradoxical sound even today, after a century or more of nationalist thinking, when every human activity is supposedly affected by the national climate at its source. How much more strange must such a concept have appeared when it was promulgated at the end of the eighteenth century. At the very moment when the Age of

Reason was to see its doctrines of individualism and universalism externalized in the French Revolution, there appeared the beginning of a movement apparently intended to negate all cosmopolitan thinking. Herder, Fichte, Hegel in Germany, and later, Mamiani, Gioberti, and others in Italy, stressed the importance of recognizing the historical and national character of thought. Philosophy subjected itself to a process of introspection. It found itself on a rather barren pinnacle of universalism, clinging to a crag of abstract humanitarian ideals, a dizzy eminence far removed from concrete human preoccupations. It reluctantly realized that it had outstripped humanity in its advance, and that it could regain its living warmth only by re-descending to the level of a living philosophy, intimately bound up with the traditional thought of its own past and the creative thought of the present.

When philosophy thus self-consciously insisted on its national roots, it seemingly sacrificed its eighteenth-century sweep and grandeur for a deliberate parochialism of limited outlook. Yet this change was neither as sudden nor as deliberate nor as limiting as it appeared. Not limiting because the spokesmen for this nationality of philosophy generally maintained a goal of true universality, which they planned to reach by a path that led from concrete individual form to humanity in general. And, despite appearances, this shift in political outlook had had a long period of preparation before it became conscious of this transformation.

When the history of modern philosophy is examined from the point of view of nationality, it becomes apparent that a unified European philosophy, read and understood by all, began to crumble in the sixteenth century. Up to that time the existing political divisions had exerted little influence on scientific and religious unity. The international character of scholarship had been taken for granted in the schools founded by Charlemagne. Whatever national character appeared in the scholars who disputed Nominalism and Realism acted as a stimulus, rather than an obstacle; it provided a spur for these rivalries. The renaissance of the philosophic study of Plato and Aristotle began geographically in Italy, but it soon spread over western and central Europe. The same cause enlisted the support of Angelo Poliziano, the Tuscan; of Lorenzo Valla, the Roman; of Ulrich von Hutten, the German; of Erasmus of Rotterdam, and of his friend Luis Vives of Valencia.

The removal of the unifying forces of a common religion and of

a common language undermined the unity of thought. Philosophy did not feel its national separatism immediately after the formation of modern languages. For a time, French replaced Latin as a universal language, so that Locke, Clarke, Leibniz, Newton, and Boyle knew each other and sought to understand each other through direct correspondence. The cleavage became apparent by the mid-eighteenth century, when England, Scotland, Spain, Italy, France, and Germany, each followed a specialized direction in its thought, until the linguistic and religious divergence crystallized into specialized philosophical systems that were almost incomprehensible beyond their national frontiers.

At the opening of the nineteenth century, when our enquiry begins, European philosophy was compartmentalized. The philosophers of the various countries were more or less aware of this separatism and reacted to it in one of three ways, as universalists, nationalists, or cosmopolitans. Advocates of each of these trends were to be found both in Germany and in Italy.[1] Though obviously this is not the proper place for an adequate discussion of all these trends, and though this study, according to its title, is to stress the national aspect of philosophy, a brief definition of this terminology is in order. The universalists maintained (and do so to this day), that truth and the knowledge of truth that we call philosophy can be neither French nor German, any more than geometry is French or German. The nationalists reply that philosophy deals not only with objective truth, with truth pure and simple, but that it also comprises a method of grasping and explaining the truth. Since every system is subjective, it bears the stamp of the individual mind in which it was formed and of the nation and the period to which this individual belongs. Finally, the cosmopolitan view

[1] Efforts were made by Schelling, Cousin, and others, to effect a *rapprochement* and an interaction. Schelling, for example, declared quite bluntly that a philosophy which was unable to make itself understood by all enlightened nations, and that could not be readily expressed in every cultural tongue, could not be the true and universal philosophy. Cf. J. Willn, *Jugement de M. de Schelling sur la philosophie de M. Cousin*, Paris and Strasburg, 1835; p. XXIII. Yet Cousin drew upon himself the ire of both sides: that of the nationalists who accused him of wanting to "denationalize" philosophy, and that of such universalists as rebelled at the very mention of coupling of nationality and philosophy. Benedetto Croce quotes a passage from the diary of Margherita di Collegno (entry of Sept. 19, 1853) which said: "Manzoni admires the brilliant mind of Cousin, but he has no faith in his philosophy, which he finds empty and false. Cousin speaks of national philosophy! What absurdity! He might as well speak of national morality . . ." Cf. Croce, *Conversazioni critiche*, 4th Series, Bari, 1932; p. 8.

advocates the transportability of ideas, their adaptability in application to the varying local requirements, the reflux of diverse national strains into a comprehensive European or Western philosophy.[2]

II

The concept of the nationality of philosophy had two early foci, first in Germany, and then in Italy. It was natural enough that philosophy, as well as all human activity, should assume a nationalist slant in these two countries which at the opening of the nineteenth century were absorbed in an effort for political unification. In both countries such unification came only after almost a century of agitation in the realm of cultural nationalism. Literature, history, and philosophy had to clarify and to dramatize the idea of a national state before it could be placed on a political stage.

Herder was among the first modern Europeans to establish a seemingly essential link between culture and nationality. "... the realm of thought and activity of meritorious experienced men of a nationality is, so to speak, the nucleus without which it hardly deserves to be styled a nationality, to say nothing of a carefully planned sympathetic political body."[3] Not only are art, poetry, philosophy, language, and religion components of the cultural organism we call a nation, but all these spiritual activities can be developed only within the framework of a nationality. In contrast to the individualists of the eighteenth century, Herder urged that only in his social context is man important. As a precursor of nineteenth-century collectivism, he reiterated the idea that the wel-

[2] There is some confusion apparent between "universalists" and "cosmopolitans." Since both insist on the super-national character of philosophy, they are often united in their common opposition to national compartmentalization, without, however, a clear realization of their essentially divergent origin and goal. The "universalists" draw their data mainly from the natural sciences whose "laws of nature" are given an impersonal objective reality. The "cosmopolitans" generally derive their facts from psychology and the social sciences, and would re-apply their generalizations in theories or "laws" regulating social conduct.

[3] Quoted in R. R. Ergang, *Herder and the Foundations of German Nationalism*, New York, 1931; p. 222. On Herder and nationalism, cf. also Otto Vossler, *Der Nationalgedanke von Rousseau bis Ranke*, Munich and Berlin, 1937; Carlton J. H. Hayes, "Contributions of Herder to the Doctrine of Nationalism," in *American Historical Review*, XXXII, No. 4 (July, 1927), pp. 719–36; Arturo Farinelli, *L'umanità di Herder e il concetto della "razza" nella storia dello spirito*, a lecture read at the University of Turin in 1907, in *Studi di Filologia moderna*, Anno I, fasc. 1–2 (1908), reprinted in the author's *Franche parole alla mia Nazione*, Turin, 1919; pp. 139–235.

fare of the individual is bound up with that of the group, and that the individual can attain his full self-development only in the life of the group as a whole. This idea of the development of innate faculties assumes for Herder the rank of a religious duty, and since this development can best take place within a national group, the nation figures as an essential factor in the development of humanity. The nation thus becomes a divine instrument to facilitate human self-development and this advance is always seen within the framework of humanity at large.

As in Herder, Fichte's starting point is a reaction against the eighteenth-century individualism of a Rousseau, who saw a sharp cleavage between the individual and society. Fichte denies the possibility of the completion of the individual in isolation. For him all our valuable achievements—language, thought, science, art—are the result of communal activity. Again it is the state which becomes a means towards the perfection of society. For Fichte, the entire historical development is the unfolding of one civilization which takes on national character in the diverse nations that participate. Fichte recognizes national character (*Völkerindividualität*), values it, but does not deal with its deeper implications. The nation remains for him an intermediary station which cannot be circumvented, and which can become useful on the way to European civilization. Again we see here nationalism extolled for its cultural mission, as an expression of the individuality of peoples, in opposition to the vague formlessness of unconditional internationalism. But the final goal is and remains a "*Kulturmenschheit.*" Fichte never stops at the nation as an end—his later nationalist misinterpreters follow him only so far. Fichte's ideas continue on beyond national peculiarities and point to a union of all humanity on an ethical basis.[4]

This central idea of the national state as a necessary means for the development of the inherent gifts of a national group runs like a *leitmotif* through all the German thinkers of this period. We find it in Schleiermacher and in Arndt. In 1784, Kant viewed the process of history as "the realization of a hidden purpose in

[4] *Cf.* Helmuth C. Engelbrecht, *J. G. Fichte, a Study of his Political Writings, with special reference to his nationalism,* New York, 1933. Also Konrad Reidt, *Das Nationale und das übernationale bei Fichte, unter besonderer Berücksichtigung seiner Pädagogik,* Giessen, 1926; and Felice Momigliano, "Amedeo, Fichte e le caratteristiche del nazionalismo tedesco," in *Nuova Antologia,* Serie 6, Vol. 185 (1916), pp. 61–75.

Nature to achieve a political system . . . as the only possible condition in which all faculties of humanity can develop.'"[5]

But it is in Hegel, finally, that German philosophy sums up these ideas of the importance of a nation in the cultural development of a people. Hegel takes over Herder's concept of a *Volksgeist,* the essential character of a people, as composed of climate, tradition, time, and milieu. But that which Herder indicated but intuitively, Hegel proceeds to establish systematically, both as philosopher and historian. This *Volksgeist* is now regarded as a fragment of the *Weltgeist,* an emanation of the divine spirit. Empirically demonstrated, this *Volksgeist* becomes the historical character of a people, the very center of its history. Depending on the *Volksgeist,* and parallel in their development, are the evolution of religion, art, philosophy, and politics. The character of a philosophy is for Hegel fatally compounded of the blended influences derived from the original minds in which it takes shape and of the spirit of the time and the people in which these individual minds exist. Thus an indissoluble link is established between the individual, the *Volksgeist,* and the resulting philosophy born from this union. Philosophy is also repeatedly said to be the highest flower of the *Volksgeist,* in that it is the inmost center in which a people comes to understand itself.[6]

But Hegel did not stop at the formulation of such a principle of intimate relationship between a system of philosophy and the national frame in which it was produced. This interdependence of philosophy and nationality, an idea that was itself an outgrowth of an atmosphere of political striving,—this idea, in turn, reentered the political lists and served the cause of German unification. Philosophy was now spoken of as German philosophy. There was such an upsurge of philosophical activity in Germany, such a preëminence over contemporary thought in the rest of Europe, that Hegel can perhaps be forgiven his extravagant conclusion that Germany was preordained as the nation fitted *par excellence* for the highest flowering of philosophic activity. We find an assertion of this German mission in a lecture Hegel delivered in 1816 at the opening of his course at Heidelberg.

[5] Immanuel Kant, *Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht,* in *Sämmtliche Werke, Kleine anthropologisch-Praktische Schriften,* herausgegeben von Friedrich Wilhelm Schubert, Leipzig, 1838; Vol. VII, pp. 329–330.

[6] F. D. Dittman, *Der Begriff des Volksgeistes bei Hegel, Beitrag zur Geschichte des Begriffs der Entwickelung im 19. Jahrhundert,* Leipzig, 1909.

We shall see in the course of the history of philosophy that, in the other European countries where the sciences and the development of the intellect are cultivated with zeal and authority, there is left hardly a trace or notion of philosophy other than its name; but it has through some chance managed to survive in the German nation. We have received from Nature the high mission of being the preservers of the holy fire, just as the Eumolpidae of Athens were entrusted with the keeping of the Eleusinian mysteries, or as the inhabitants of the isle of Samothrace were entrusted with the preservation of a higher divine cult, or as, at a still more remote time, the universal spirit had vouchsafed for the Jewish people the consciousness that it was out of their ranks that this spirit was to be revived. We have now come so far, we have attained such seriousness and intellectual consciousness, that we accept only ideas and concepts that can pass muster before our reason; the Prussian State is thus brought nearer when it is founded on intelligence.[7]

Here is the apogee of fusion between philosophy and nationality. Here is philosophy not only given over for safekeeping to one definite people, but a certain political formation is made the prerequisite for the further development of the speculative process. In common with Herder, Fichte, and Kant, Hegel thus regarded the political state as the milieu necessary for the development of the highest human faculties.

There is a contradiction apparent in this sequence of ideas. All these German philosophers stress the need of a political state as a necessary means for further cultural development. Yet the formation of a state is said to depend on an already existing culture, that is, the political state has its *raison d'être* in the strengthening and unification of a people that has achieved a common tradition and a culture. Thus they unconsciously admit that a culture can develop within a looser framework called a *Volk* which need not necessarily have political unity. Hegel, for example, traces the Germanic *Volksgeist* back to the days of barbarian invasions and beyond; this *Volksgeist* later flourished and reached the peak of German philosophy which Hegel glorified. If all these thinkers nevertheless continue to strive for political unification, we must, in the light of subsequent knowledge, interpret their thinking as a rationalization imposed by an atmosphere of nationalism, rather than as a strictly logical chain of ideas.

If it is natural and inevitable for philosophy to bear this national imprint; if it is true that philosophy can exert a useful

[7] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie*, herausgegeben von Carl Ludwig Michelet, in *Werke*, vollständige Ausgabe, Berlin, 1840; Vol. XIII, p. 4.

influence on the life of a people only when it is national, that is, when it corresponds to a nation's needs and is adapted to its spirit; then it must also be true that the more completely imbued a philosophy becomes with the nationality of a certain people, the less pertinence and validity it retains for the service of another people. Hegel was enough of a student of world-history to see that philosophy in general is richer and more complete when it is not entirely limited to one nationality.

III

In Italy, starting with a similar ferment of nationalism and a similar pressure toward unification, philosophy could not avoid nationalist implications parallel to those we have just outlined for Germany. With this important distinction: Germany felt itself for the first time to be in the vanguard of European thought, whereas Italy was perpetually harking back to its Golden Age of the Renaissance. This early primacy, that Italy had achieved long before the other European states, always loomed as a criterion for subsequent Italian culture. No political apologist could, therefore, say that political unification was a prerequisite for cultural development in Italy. On the contrary, this cultural preëminence was exploited as a stimulus for national unification. The relationship between philosophy and nationality was felt as intimately as it was in Germany, but with the inverted conclusion that a country that had once stood at the very peak of European civilization, now merited the dignity and self-assurance that reside in a strong national state. Political unity was felt to be an empty formula unless it were accompanied by a revival of the glorious tradition of Italian philosophy. The main theme which, in multitudinous variations, is encountered in the works of nearly all nineteenth-century Italian poets and thinkers is the refrain that Italy will rise again only when the Italians have revived the great heritage of thought which made them preëminent over other people in the past. The nationality of Italian philosophy was thus proclaimed.

It was, indeed, inevitable that critical self-analysis should lead Italian philosophy to look to its long-past glories. In 1834, when Count Terenzio Mamiani wrote his *Del Rinnovamento della filosofia antica italiana,* Italian philosophy could hardly be said to have any present existence, and its recent history showed an appalling emptiness. From the sixteenth century on, the stream of philosophy had begun to run dry, until it lost itself completely in a desert on

whose horizon there appeared but one oasis in the work of Giambattista Vico. Had this single exception but been understood by his contemporaries, Vico alone might have sufficed to invigorate a whole country of thinkers. But Vico remained an isolated phenomenon, closed to most of his fellow-Italians, and not understood by the outside world until nearly a century after his death.[8] When Mamiani proclaimed the necessity of reviving the philosophic traditions of his country, he turned back to the sixteenth century and extolled the teachings of the Italian Renaissance philosophers. This reaching back into the past was nostalgic and rhetorical, rather than constructive, in its evaluation of the great giants among the Italian thinkers. Mamiani misunderstood the greatness of Telesio, Campanella, Galilei, in whose philosophy he found only the "natural method" and the supreme authority of empiricism. "No other method since then," he wrote, "has been found sufficient for the discovery of scientific truth."[9] In the resumption of this empirical trend, in the sheer repetition of a once fruitful method, Mamiani saw the hope for an Italian philosophic renascence. "I know of no reason why today we should not repeat the glory of our philosophers of the past and resume the mastery in speculative studies that we once held, a mastery which was recognized by all foreign students, and which we held uncontested and unrivalled throughout the sixteenth century. It is true that we

[8] The above sentence is, if anything, an understatement, for Croce points out the many superficialities or misinterpretations that characterize the approach to Vico of numerous thinkers up to the opening of the twentieth century. Mere contact with Vico's work began to appear beyond the Alps from the mid-eighteenth century onward. Of special interest to our study is the extent to which Herder knew the work of the Neapolitan philosopher. In a short paper entitled *Vico, Hamann, und Herder, Eine studie zur Geschichte der Erneuerung des deutschen Geisteslebens im 18. Jahrhundert,* by Otto von Gemmingen (Leipzig, 1918), the author mentions the fact that Herder, in 1797, knew not only the *Scienza Nuova,* but also Vico's Autobiography (p. 37 ff.). On the basis of the following quotation, he would attribute to Herder a great enthusiasm for and a considerable grasp of Vico's thought: (Herder begs permission) ". . . to renew the almost forgotten memory of a man who laid the foundations . . . for a study of the science of humanity in the truest sense of the word, Giambattista Vico. . . . In his new science he was seeking the principle of the humanity of peoples (*dell'umanità delle Nazioni*) and found it in foresight (*provvidenza*) and wisdom." For a full discussion of the later history of Vico's influence, cf. Benedetto Croce, *The Philosophy of Giambattista Vico,* Eng. trans. by R. G. Collingwood, New York, 1913; Chap. XX and Appendix II.

[9] Terenzio Mamiani della Rovere, *Del Rinnovamento della filosofia antica italiana,* 2nd. Ed., Milan, 1836; p. 7. (This work originally was published in Paris in 1834).

are bowed down by a long period of misfortunes and humiliations, but we are stimulated by the recollection of the immutable laws of Nature—and has not Nature so constituted Italy as to make her the happy center of the highest wisdom of the nations?"[10]

Mamiani's rhetorical flight of wishful thinking was incapable of moving Italian thought an inch nearer to that "happy center."[11] A stronger impetus came from the work of Vincenzo Gioberti.

Gioberti was equally aware of the aridity of the Italian philosophy of his day, but he was so deeply imbued with the grandeur and sweep of its history, that the present for him was but a momentary eddy in a rushing stream. In his *Del primato morale e civile degli italiani* (1843) he presented the concept of a cycle of philosophic thought, whose center was in Italy, whence it had once irradiated the world, and to which it was indissolubly bound by force of this primacy. This affirmation was based on three supposed prerogatives: that Italy "had created the civilization of all the other nations; that it still maintained intact the vital force of that creation; and that it still had the strength to purify it when it decayed, and to revive it when it was weak and declining."[12] The historic justification of this argument Gioberti found in the glowing colors of a panorama in which the continuity of Italian thought was traced from earliest primitive times, from the Pelasgic culture to the Pythagorean school on Italian soil, thence to Greece and back to Rome, through Christianity and Scholasticism. Throughout there runs the implication that the Italians had been preëminent in the past because of the unity of their thought. More than an implication was his teaching that political unification could be brought about by an intellectual regeneration. How much Gioberti con-

[10] Mamiani, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

[11] Among students of Italian philosophy, Mamiani's book is remembered mainly for having provoked an obscure polemic with Antonio Rosmini (1837–38). Cf. Rosmini's *Il Rinnovamento della filosofia in Italia proposto dal Conte T. Mamiani della Rovere, Milan,* 1837; and Mamiani's *Sei lettere all'abate Rosmini intorno al libro intitolato: Il Rinnovamento, etc.,* Paris, 1838. For other criticisms of Mamiani's work, cf. Luigi Blanch's review, "Discorso sul Rinnovamento del Mamiani," in the *Progresso* of Naples, 1835; Ausonio Franchi, *La Filosofia delle scuole italiane, lettere al Professore G. M. Bertini,* Capolago, 1852, p. XX; Bertrando Spaventa, "L'Accademia di filosofia italiana e Terenzio Mamiani," in *Atti dell'Accademia di filosofia italica,* Genoa, 1855 (reprinted in B. Spaventa, *Rinascimento, Riforma, e Controriforma e altri saggi critici,* Venice, 1928; pp. 305–25.

[12] Vincenzo Gioberti, *Del primato morale e civile degli italiani,* Turin, (U. T. E. T. Ed.), 1925; Vol. I, p. 41.

sidered the national problem a problem of philosophy may be seen in an eloquent passage contained in the Introduction to the *Primato:*

> In pursuing this work, I do not believe that I am departing from my primary aim which is philosophy. Firstly, the argument in itself is highly philosophic and thus belongs to the realm of rational ethnography; and secondly, because it is necessary to clear the ground, to uproot the foreign weeds, before it is possible to sow the abundant seeds of a truly Italian philosophy. Our greatest affliction, which paralyzes and renders sterile our natural talent, springs from the fact that we deem ourselves impotent and that we must acquire from other lands the seed to fructify the Italian intellect. This seems to me the opportune moment when, in order to initiate a new philosophic epoch on our peninsula and to pave the way for an intellectual re-awakening, we must show how in all the phases of culture and humane progress we were the first and should so remain. We were ordained to lead others, and not to be led. This noble prerogative is so firmly ours that no one can take it from us to his own or anyone else's advantage.[13]

Why then has Italy, even momentarily, lost this leadership? Gioberti gives no clear explanation, save for a superficial criticism in which he berates the Italians for their frivolity, their imitativeness, their servility to foreign customs, and the weakening of their national spirit.[14] The ills here catalogued one would judge to be results of some more profound breakdown, rather than its causes. This is all the more evident when Gioberti's Catholic training first attributes Italy's former unity of thought to the unifying force of Catholicism, and then describes a decline and disunity which took place in a land still dominated by that same Catholicism.

Gioberti's Italy, like Hegel's Germany, has a world mission as the transmitter of a philosophical heritage. But while the German philosopher saw a national mission in the cultivation of the body of philosophy itself, Gioberti conceived the Italian mission to be the preservation and identification of philosophy and Catholicism. Antonio Anzilotti, one of the leading students of Gioberti's works, thus sums up the essence of Gioberti's teachings: "The central idea from which all his philosophy proceeds, the idea which he calls Platonic and which reconciles God and man, . . . this idea is embodied in the eternal flow of Italian thought from Pythagoras to Vico. As expressed by the concept of God as Creator in revealed Christianity, this idea forms the fulcrum of all human knowledge.

[13] Gioberti, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 35.

[14] Gioberti, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 200.

Italy which has become the keeper and propagator of this idea has thereby acquired a hieratic mission, a duty toward the other people of the earth. As the seat of Catholicism, Italy has been and still remains the 'sacerdotal nation.' Thus the concept of a Catholic religion is identified with a special philosophic intuition which for Gioberti is the supreme rational truth.'"[15]

Thus we see two philosophers in two divergent national tongues using almost the same vocabulary to express their convictions about a philosophy which they see linked to the formation of their own national state. This obsession with a concept in which philosophy is fused with nationality is obviously the only point of resemblance between the thinking of a Hegel and a Gioberti. And paradoxically enough, this same conclusion of a national mission in philosophy is arrived at from two antipodal starting points: Hegel claims German leadership in philosophy because of its strength as an emerging phenomenon, as a *Volksgeist* surging up into the highest realms of thought and summing up in this forceful movement the heritage of all European culture; Gioberti claims Italian primacy on the basis of traditionalism, on the strength of historical continuity and the unifying power of Catholicism which had once given Italy a cultural superiority and which was now regarded as its eternal birthright.

It can be readily imagined that Gioberti's teachings found a warm reception in an Italy that since the French Revolution had been actively engaged in a struggle for political liberation and national unification. Gioberti's glowing rhetoric and his myth of the continuity of Italian culture imparted to the activism of the *Risorgimento* a strong philosophical basis, whose influence was second only to Mazzini's blend of thought and action.[16] Like

[15] Antonio Anzilotti, *Gioberti*, Florence, 1922; p. 82.

[16] The thinking of Mazzini and Gioberti touched at many points. They both held the conviction of Italy's mission to regenerate the world, but their divergent programs concerning the means towards this goal brought about an inevitable break. Gioberti, the monarchist, federalist, and Catholic was offended by the revolutionary character, the uncompromising democracy, and the rationalist elements in Mazzini's teachings. The religion of which Mazzini was the prophet and for whose realization he fought was the emergence of Italy as part of a united Europe. Nationality as a mould in which a fragment of a larger humanity was to be formed,—that concept stems from Herder. "Each has its special mission, which will contribute towards the fulfillment of the general mission of humanity. That mission constitutes its nationality. Nationality is sacred." (*Life and Writings of Mazzini*, London, 1891; Vol. III, p. 33). In 1843, Mazzini freely acknowledged his indebtedness to Herder when he wrote: "One and all, like Herder, we demand of the instinct of our conscience

Gioberti, Antonio Rosmini, the other major Italian philosopher of the day, had been a severe critic of the European systems of philosophy outside of Italy.[17] Their followers, as so frequently happens with ardent disciples, far outstripped their masters in nationalistic arrogance. Speculative and philosophic advances of other nations were at first regarded with suspicion, and then their value was ignored. Finally, out of the compounding of nationalistic conceit and provincial narrowness there developed an outright opposition to the circulation of foreign ideas in Italy, where they were regarded as hampering or even obstructing the free expression of the Italian temperament. The most extreme instances of this aberration took the form of opposition to German philosophy. In Naples, for example, where the first battles were fought between Hegelians and the followers of Gioberti, the students of German philosophy were accused of revolutionary activity against the Bourbon monarchy. A certain Luigi Palmieri, a strong Catholic and loyal to the Bourbon dynasty, who in 1847 had succeeded Galluppi in the chair of Logic at the University of Naples, reached the *reductio ad absurdum* when he went so far as to propose that restrictions should be placed on the circulation of foreign ideas as upon the importation of commercial wares.[18] In the introductory lecture to his course at the university, in 1847, Palmieri revealed his nationalistic bias:

> In declaring myself openly to be a loyal follower of our native thought I cannot but reprove the repeated attempts to enable certain foreign doctrines to take root among us. Today . . . we are infested with German encroachments because there are some teachers who would indoctrinate our

a great religious thought which may rescue us from doubt, a social faith which may save us from anarchy, a moral inspiration which may embody that faith in action, and keep us from idle contemplation." (*Op. cit.*, Vol. IV, p. 57.)

[17] It is to be noted that Rosmini attacked sensationalism on the basis of the nationality of philosophy. In 1830, in a note to his *Nuovo Saggio sull'origine delle idee* (Eng. trans. as *The Origin of Ideas*, London, 1883), Rosmini wrote: "We must remember that even before other nations began to lisp in philosophy, she (Italy) was laying down the immovable foundation of that doctrine which is called from her *Italic*—a doctrine wholly intended to explain the lofty and recondite nature of ideas by demonstrating their infinite superiority to the senses and to man himself, and hence, the impossibility of their proceeding either from the senses or from man. And in no period has this, our ancestral inheritance, been entirely forgotten, and let us hope that it never will be." (Vol. II, pp. 4–5.)

[18] Luigi Palmieri in his *Prolusione alle lezioni di Logica e Metafisica nella cattedra della R. Università degli Studi*, lecture read on November 13, 1847; cf. Giovanni Gentile, *Bertrando Spaventa*, Florence, 1920; pp. 21–2.

youth with German pantheism, especially with that brand which is rigged out in the imposing and grandiose cloak of Georg Friedrich Hegel.[19]

However, this nationalist intoxication was by no means universal in Italian thought. At the opposite pole of the traditionalists and separatists who would renovate Italian philosophy by cutting it off from foreign influences and throwing it back on its former laurels, there was a group of pessimists who shed tears over the irreparable decadence of the Latin race. These confirmed mourners maintained that civilization had now shifted to the new and more vital nations of the north, to whom had been given the task of developing the latest phase in the freedom of the human spirit. Their despair over the decline of Italian philosophy took a form which we may call "trans-Alpinism," because they saw the center of all future philosophic activity moved across the Alps, to France, England, and Germany.

This Gordian knot, which would confine philosophy to some geographical center north or south of the Alps, was severed by a handful of "universalists," of whom we may take Augusto Vera to be a representative incarnation. Vera's goal is the contemplation of truth in its universal objectivity without any connection with the world of life, much less, national life. "What does it matter to us whether philosophy be Italian or non-Italian? We seek the truth; and truth has nothing to do with nationality."[20] To attain this truth, he thought it necessary to rise above individual consciousness, feeling, or human pre-occupations. This would seemingly locate the realm of truth in a Nirvāna far removed from petty human considerations. And yet Vera thought of himself as a true Hegelian; he was filled with a mystic worship of his divinity, whom he called the "Christ of philosophy." He apparently was entirely blind to Hegel's vigorous empirical correlations between mind and its national habitat. Guido de Ruggiero has rightly summed up this difference between Hegel and his would-be Italian echo. "It is indeed amazing to see how the pages of the *Phenomenology* and the *Logic,* which are so full of life, in which the whole world of his-

[19] Gentile, *op. cit.,* p. 22.

[20] Bertrando Spaventa, *La Filosofia italiana nelle sue relazioni con la filosofia europea,* a cura di G. Gentile, Bari, 1926; p. 233. On Vera, cf. Raffaele Mariano, *Augusto Vera,* Naples, 1887; and Giovanni Gentile, *Le origini della filosofia contemporanea in Italia,* Vol. III, (Parte prima: *I Kantiani e gli Hegeliani*), Messina, 1921; pp. 271–387. Also Benedetto Croce, *La vita letteraria a Napoli dal 1860 al 1900,* in the Appendix to his *La letteratura della nuova Italia,* Vol. IV, Bari, 1915; pp. 244–45.

tory is fused into a magnificent epic, are supplanted in the work of this somnolent Hegelian by a watered Platonism that takes the ideas for entities and for mere representations of things, and works on them with its dialectic till they vanish from our sight among the clouds.''[21]

Obviously, neither of these extremist trends, that of ultra-national traditionalism or that of empty universalism, could offer a fertile field for the further development of philosophy in Italy. This is not to say that Gioberti or Vera had no followers after the mid-nineteenth century. The extreme nationalist trend persisted in various ramifications that led up to philosophy under Fascism. But the progressive branch of Italian philosophy lay elsewhere.

Not elsewhere in a geographic sense. The same city of Naples that harbored a Palmieri and a Vera, also brought forth a school of philosophy that extends up to the present day, to such men as Benedetto Croce and Giovanni Gentile. This last-mentioned group, which is now to occupy us, is usually termed the Neo-idealist school. From our present vantage point, from the consideration of its relationship to the problem of nationality in philosophy, we may term this school a ''realist'' school. They were realists in that they conceived contemporary philosophy in Italy as being neither exclusively a traditional Italian product, nor yet an abstract universal science, but a study linked to Italian traditions and allied to trans-Alpine thought. In other words, this group contained the cosmopolitan minds among the Italian thinkers, the men who would invigorate the traditional current of thought in Italy by deflecting southward some of the tributary streams of European philosophy.

European philosophy at that moment was almost synonymous with Hegelianism. In Naples, Ottavio Colecchi, a venerable mathematics instructor from Abruzzi, who acted as a mentor for a group of younger men who were reacting against the barrenness of Galluppi and his school, served as a sort of link in the transmission of this German thought. Colecchi, with his insistence on

[21] Guido de Ruggiero, *Modern Philosophy*, Eng. trans. by A. H. Hannay and R. G. Collingwood, London, 1921; p. 332. For Bertrando Spaventa's personal opinion of Vera, *cf.* the letter to his brother, Silvio, (Dec. 17, 1861): "Yesterday Vera read the opening lecture to his course. I did not hear him; but those who were present have told me that they had never heard such empty generalities. As I already knew, Vera knows nothing outside of Hegel, and even there his knowledge is very superficial. But let this remain between you and me." (Bertrando Spaventa, *op. cit.*, p. 283.)

a first-hand study of the original German texts, opened up for these youthful enthusiasts new vistas in the teachings of the master of Stuttgart and in the works of the other Germans.[22] The young liberals, who were striving to renovate not only the old political order of their country, but also its philosophical systems, received the new gospel with a rapture which can be compared only to the enthusiasm with which a previous generation of Neapolitan youths had received the doctrines of the French Revolution. Marc Monnier gives a vivid picture of the bubbling-up of this intellectual ferment. "These studies," he wrote in 1865, "were the concern not merely of a few hours per week; they were their daily life. After the regular university lecture, the lesson was continued on their walks and in the informal discussions between teacher and students, discussions which sometimes extended far into the night. The café, formerly called *'D'Italia'* and which later discarded this dangerous name to become the *'Caffè delle Belle Arti,'* became a sort of annex of the university, almost an academy in itself. Here the philosophers held forth with a fervor which aroused the suspicion of the government. Del Carretto, the minister of police, sent one of his cleverest agents to keep his eye on these meetings. As soon as he was recognized, this agent was in turn watched by the students who deliberately set out to confuse him. They spoke only Hegelian in front of him, a language far more difficult than Basque. The spy was all ears. He was bathed in perspiration, but could not understand a word. He finally left the place in dismay."[23]

The passionate nature of these studies also emerges from the recollections of one who was a member of this eager band. "It was an irresistible and all-pervasive necessity," wrote Bertrando Spaventa in recalling those days of 1843, "which drove us on

[22] In 1867, Bertrando Spaventa wrote as follows: "Hegel and the other German philosophers were perhaps better known in Naples before 1848 than they are today. In addition to Galluppi, their works had also been studied, interpreted, and discussed by Colecchi, and following him by Cusani, Ajello, Gatti, and by my friends, Tari and Calvello. Some of these men even took these philosophers for companions and for consolation in the Bourbon jails and dungeons." (*Logica e Metafisica,* pp. 12–13.) On Colecchi, *cf.* B. Spaventa, *Studi sopra la filosofia di Hegel,* Turin, 1850; p. 9; also Filippo Cicchitti-Suriani, *Ottavio Colecchi, filosofo e matematico abruzzese e i primordii del Kantismo in Italia,* Aquila, 1889; and G. Gentile, *Storia della filosofia italiana dal Genovesi al Galluppi,* 2nd. Ed., Milan, 1930; Vol. II, pp. 137–210, and Appendix.

[23] Marc Monnier, "Le mouvement italien à Naples de 1830 à 1865, dans la littérature et dans l'enseignement," in *Révue des Deux Mondes,* April 15, 1865, pp. 1023–24.

toward an unknown but shining future, toward the organic unity of the various branches of human knowledge. These young students of medicine, of the natural sciences, of jurisprudence, of mathematics, of literature, all participated in the general ferment of new ideas, and all earnestly yearned to be philosophers like the great Italians of old. Who can adequately recount all the joys, the hopes, the enthusiasm of those days? Who can describe the fraternal bond which intimately united masters and disciples who were together striving for a re-discovery of the truth? It was a cult, a religion, in which this new generation of Neapolitans showed themselves worthy progeny of Giordano Bruno."[24]

The enthusiasm here displayed for Hegelian studies would have remained a merely idolatrous cult had it not been backed up by a clear-sighted critique of the actual condition of philosophy in Italy, of the powers and limitations of a nationalist trend in philosophy, and of the value of blending the Hegelian system with the local heritage of thought.

Since this was the Naples that was the stronghold of the ultra-nationalist faction of Italian philosophy, the first task that confronted this nascent neo-Hegelian school was an attack against the nationalistic prejudices of a Luigi Palmieri and the latter-day Giobertians. It might be heresy to question the past glories of Italian achievement, but a shock was needed to shake the traditionalists from their complacency. In 1844, in the introductory program to a short-lived Neapolitan review, its founder, Silvio Spaventa, exposed the intellectual emptiness of the Italy of his day and the fallacy of the belief in a glory which had in fact long departed from Italy:

> Let us open any history of modern philosophy and it will readily be seen how little, if anything, Italy has accomplished after the sixteenth century in this leading branch of human knowledge. It is of no avail to keep on recalling the glorious development which the positive sciences, based on the natural method, enjoyed in our land until their advancement was blindly obstructed. . . . Since that time all interest in philosophical speculation has gone into a sharp decline; at best it was relegated to the spinning of some solitary genius, far removed from all contact with life and without any application to the society of his day.[25]

[24] Quoted in Gentile, *Le origini della filosofia contemporanea in Italia,* Messina, 1923; Vol. III (Parte seconda), p. 83.

[25] Silvio Spaventa, *Dal 1848 al 1861, lettere, scritti, e documenti,* a cura di Benedetto Croce, 2nd. Ed., Bari, 1923; p. 8.

Alas for past glories! Silvio Spaventa next proceeds to an inquiry into the reasons for the present decline.

> If in the past Italy has been the center of civilization, if the entire period of the Middle Ages centered its life in this land, it might be assumed that in modern times this civilizing force would continue to pour forth from its store-house. Instead, we find this stream checked in its course by the materialistic society of the time, so that it was turned aside and allowed to flow into foreign lands. There it found a virgin spirit free from old encumbrances, and living in a society well disposed to receive new teachings. At this point we cease to count. . . . It shall therefore be our duty to show how the entire modern philosophic movement, which today is stirring all of mankind, has in our country been confined to the work of isolated philosophers, thinkers, and men of letters. But while in other countries this movement was generally encouraged and stimulated in its development, in our land it was imprisoned in out-worn forms, subjected to persecutions, tortures, and finally reduced to abject poverty. Whereas abroad philosophy has freely passed through the various intellectual crises which are the preliminary steps necessary to the full growth of speculative thought, here it has remained timorous and prudent. Up to now our philosophy has not been able to arouse the nation as a whole; and so, while it may be aware of the sufferings and needs of humanity, it could only sit on the side lines, and watch and wait patiently.[26]

In concluding, Silvio Spaventa proposed the aims of the new review to be twofold: firstly, "to gather up the scattered thread of our tradition, . . . as a means of clarifying the uncertain ideal which governs our future"; and secondly, "to raise the present level (of Italian thought) . . . in order that it may realize its aims to be of actual value within its social frame."[27]

In this, the first public article from the pen of the future Minister and eminent liberal statesman, the young author recognized the fact that the much-vaunted preëminence of Italian philosophy had been deflected to other countries. He hints at the reason for this loss when he mentions the reactionary persecution of original thought in Italy, but as a practical man of affairs he does not fully analyze these causes. He is intent on a possible correction.

Stanislao Gatti, another young Neapolitan of this group, in his essay *Della filosofia in Italia* (1846), was also attacking the nationalistic prejudices and pretensions, and ridiculed the idea of a deliberate isolation of a hypothetical national philosophy which was not strong enough to show any actual signs of life. But Gatti, as a

[26] *Ibid.*, pp. 9–11.

[27] *Ibid.*, p. 11.

Hegelian, stressed the significance of the nationality of philosophy, in so far as philosophy is inseparably connected with the spirit of a people. This concept was further developed in an essay written in 1851. Here he also inveighs against the reactionary attitude which threw a blight over Italian philosophy.

> How the human spirit was deprived of its liberty in the Italy of the sixteenth century is seen in the fate of our very illustrious and very unfortunate philosophers. For their greatness and their courage they were rewarded with the stake and imprisonment by men of the same type of mentality as those who today would mete out the same reward to all those free spirits who try to break the ever-present chains which insure an arbitrary power to an unholy few. . . . They think that in the nineteenth century they can shackle the inevitable unfolding of the human spirit just as those others tried to do in the sixteenth century. At that time they only succeeded in banishing it to foreign lands, to countries in which happier circumstances left the spirit free and unhampered. If the stake that burned Vanini and Giordano Bruno, if the imprisonment of Campanella and the persecution of Galilei brought about the annihilation of free thought in Italy and prepared the way for the upheaval and barbarism of the next three centuries, yet they were powerless to prevent the spirit from re-emerging in the more favorable atmosphere of Germany. . . . Thus it came about that we who had once been masters have now been forced to become disciples. But, even though the Italian Socrates did not have the time or the opportunity to produce our Platos and our Aristotles, we still have the strength to seek abroad the completion and the inner fulfillment of a system of thought, which, born in our land, was violently stifled, only to re-emerge stronger than ever under another sky.[28]

Thus we see that Gatti, like Silvio Spaventa, conceived of philosophy as having a basis in nationality, as being the highest summation of a people's thought. But Gatti went much further than Spaventa in analyzing the reasons that caused the *avant-garde* of philosophy to leave Italy and to seek a new home in more liberal countries. Here then is the real diagnosis. Here is a clear grasp of the most urgent prerequisite for the unfolding of a great system of thought—thought arising out of a national spirit, out of the Hegelian *Volksgeist*, but only when that spirit is unhampered by prejudices and dogmatic restrictions. Here is also an accusing finger pointing at the Catholic Church in Italy and blaming the Counter-Reformation for its violent suppression of all forms of human inquiries that arose beyond the bounds of Church authority.

[28] Quoted in Gentile, *Le origini, etc.*, Vol. III, Parte prima, 268–69.

All these accusations, analyses, and fragmentary formulations find their completion and philosophic evaluation in the work of Bertrando Spaventa, the older brother of Silvio Spaventa. This man played perhaps the leading part in the reform of modern Italian philosophic studies. Besides being the leading exponent of the Hegelian system in Italy, Bertrando Spaventa established the proper perspective between Italian thought and European culture as a whole.

IV

Bertrando Spaventa's own historical researches, reinforced by his contact with the ardent Hegelians of Naples, led him beyond the narrow restrictions of the usual nationalist training. He was one of the first students in Italy to read the German philosophers in the original at a time when such leading figures as Rosmini and Gioberti derived their acquaintance with these same German thinkers from secondary distortions and fragmentary sources.[29] Bertrando Spaventa deemed the knowledge of German to have the same importance for philosophical studies as calculus had for astronomy. He had made a most detailed study of Hegel and his system and, by discarding much that had already become a deadweight and by revising the living parts, he ended by adopting that system as a dominating weapon of criticism. Thus he was able to rise above the shoulders of his contemporaries to a general view of the historical process of European thought in order to survey its continuity and unity. Out of this survey he emerged with a reevaluation of Italian philosophy based on concrete and historical criteria.

But before we Italians really begin our work and give free vent to the precocious originality which is pent up within us, it is our duty first to take stock of ourselves, to look about us, to reach an understanding of what other people have done within the last sixty years, and especially to see what they are doing at the present moment. Only in this way shall we accomplish in the realm of thought what we are accomplishing in the political world—an Italy which will last, not an imaginary Italy—Pelasgic, Pythagorean, Scholastic, and I know not what else—but an historical Italy, an Italy which will have a worthy position in the life of all the nations.[30]

[29] In Piedmont, only Jacobi, according to Gentile, enjoyed some popularity, due to the work of Luigi Ornato, which, in turn had influenced G. M. Bertini. On Ornato and Bertini, cf. Gentile, *Le origini, etc.*, Vol. I (I Platonici), pp. 189–214. Also L. Ottolenghi, *Vita, studi, e lettere inedite di Luigi Ornato*, Turin, 1878; and the article by Piero Gobetti, "La filosofia di Luigi Ornato e la cultura politica dell' 800," in *Rivista d'Italia*, XXIV, fasc. VI (June 15, 1921), pp. 194–206.

After the reaction of May 15, 1848, the Bourbon rule of Naples was strengthened. Along with the suppression of all liberal constitutional movements, the new school of philosophy had to be disbanded. The daring young philosophers were dispersed; some were thrown into prison, others, like Bertrando Spaventa, went into exile and gradually made their way to Piedmont, which at that time had become the center for all the political emigrés from the rest of the peninsula.

Bertrando Spaventa settled in Turin, which he believed to be the logical center for a renovation of Italian thought, since it already held the leadership in political unification. But after a brief moment of hope he was forced to the realization that Turin was hardly the most congenial place in the world in which to continue a dispassionate study of Hegel. Firmly entrenched, both in teaching and in philosophical speculation, were the systems of Gioberti and Rosmini, whom we have already noted as severe critics not only of German philosophy but of all the European systems from Descartes down. Spaventa could see only a long period of "intellectual darkness" for Italy. This pessimism may have sprung from the overthrow of the liberal movement throughout Italy after 1848, but his mood must have been darkened still further by the anti-Hegelian bias prevalent among the Piedmontese intelligentsia and by the general degradation of philosophical studies which extended even to a scorn of the Italian philosophers of the Renaissance.

In the face of all these unfavorable conditions, Spaventa nevertheless went to work on a detailed exposition of Hegel's *Phänomenologie des Geistes.* The outcome of this study was the publication of two works, *Studi sopra la filosofia di Hegel* (1850) and *Principii della filosofia pratica di Giordano Bruno* (1854), which together served as a corner-stone for nearly all of Spaventa's future works.

The displeasure aroused in Piedmontese official circles by this study of Hegel was reflected in Spaventa's unsuccessful candidature for a university post in 1850.[31] As a qualification for this post, the young emigré philosopher had offered a study on Hegel which he had recently had published in a Turin periodical. That

[30] These words were uttered in 1861, in the concluding lecture to Spaventa's course at the University of Naples; cf. Bertrando Spaventa, *La filosofia italiana nelle sue relazioni con la filosofia europea,* a cura di G. Gentile, Bari, 1926; pp. 195–6.

[31] Gentile, *Bertrando Spaventa,* p. 35.

this study would militate against his application and would certainly close for its author the doors of the orthodox university at Turin, may be seen from the following passage concerning German philosophy, a statement nothing short of heresy in a circle under the aegis of Rosmini and Gioberti:

> There are those in Italy who still consider German philosophy to be abstract and obscure. Since they also hold it to be contrary to the speculative nature of the Italian temperament, they are content to follow a manner of thinking which has certainly no connection whatever with our philosophical traditions. It is, on the contrary, an everlasting insult to the memory of our illustrious and unfortunate thinkers; and hence this procedure is the principal reason for the decadence of all science in our country. These same people have forgotten the history of Italian thought, in which our philosophers figure as heroes as well as martyrs. They no longer remember the burning stake that consumed Giordano Bruno and Giulio Vanini, the long imprisonment of Tommaso Campanella, and the humble stone in the cemetery of the Gerolomini in Naples which covers the ashes of Giambattista Vico, the last light of our intellectual world. This was the time when Italian thought was an important force in the life of the civilized world. Our history ceased as a manifestation of it when science, art, religion, and all the other forms of the activity of the spirit became an individual preoccupation. At that time the philosophers embodied the independence of the mind, and the chains and the tortures which they endured were the first signs that pointed to the beginning of our decline. It seemed as if we suddenly became separated from the life of the rest of mankind,—as if the human spirit had abandoned its ancient seat in our land, in order to manifest its infinite wealth among the new and rising people of the Germanic race. These new nations moved from barbarism to civilization and their history now became the history of the world. As for us, from masters we sank to the level of indifferent spectators and the servants of their triumph. Our destinies were decided under foreign skies.[32]

Equipped with the instrument of the Hegelian method, Spaventa embarked on his careful re-evaluation of the Italian philosophers from the Renaissance up to his contemporaries, Rosmini, Galluppi, Mamiani, and Gioberti. He saw little of value in their works, and he was especially harsh and impatient with Gioberti. "It has been ten years or more since I read Gioberti," he wrote in a letter to his brother in 1857. "He has never appealed to me,

[32] Bertrando Spaventa, *Logica e Metafisica*, a cura di G. Gentile, Bari, 1911; pp. 12–14. Spaventa here used the term *"alemanna"* to denote "German" philosophy, for, as he himself remarked in 1867, "I did not dare to use the word *tedesca* (German) at a time when that term was generally applied to the Austrians (*tedeschi*), who held sway not only over Lombardy and Venetia, but in Tuscany as well."

but now he appears as a veritable word-slinger. There is really nothing of philosophy here. No broad view, no historical criterion, no profound grasp of philosophical systems, no understanding of his times or of the human mind. A continuous chatter, a continuous preaching, a continuous spinning of idle fancies. Alas, for our poor country!"[33]

Gioberti's later writings, especially the posthumous publications, Spaventa viewed more tolerantly.[34] He sees Gioberti becoming less dogmatic and more self-critical. But he can still not forgive him his lack of scientific method. "He has proceeded by means of aphorisms," is the way Spaventa characterized Gioberti's rhetorical outbursts.[35]

In his review of the path taken by Italian philosophy from the sixteenth century onward, Bertrando Spaventa places that philosophy in its proper relation to European thought. He agrees with Gatti in tracing speculative thought from sixteenth-century Italy northward into other lands. Between the high Renaissance and the time when Vico came upon the scene, in a span of about a hundred years, Italy failed to produce a single original thinker or a single new idea.[36] But within the same period, Bruno had become Spinoza; Campanella and Telesio had become Descartes and Locke; while the monads of Bruno, having been transformed into the *esse cognoscere* of Campanella, became the concept of monads of Leibniz. At the opening of the eighteenth century, the solitary giant, Vico, with his *Scienza Nuova,* almost single-handedly produced most of the speculative material that was to occupy two subsequent centuries of German thinkers. "He anticipated the problem of knowledge by demanding a new metaphysic based on human perception. He formulated the concept of words and myths, and thus founded the study of philology. He intuitively arrived at the idea of a continuity of mind, and thus laid the foundation for a

[33] Letter of October 11, 1857, in Silvio Spaventa, *op. cit.,* p. 244.

[34] Gioberti's posthumous writings which, on his death in 1851, were left in a rather imperfect and fragmentary state, were carefully edited and published by the author's friend, Giuseppe Massari, as *Opere inedite di Vincenzo Gioberti,* Turin (Botta)-Paris (M. Chamerot), 1856–1862. These include such important works as *Della riforma cattolica della Chiesa,* 1856; *La filosofia della rivelazione,* 1856; and *Della protologia,* 1857.

[35] Letter to Silvio, September 2, 1858, in Silvio Spaventa, *op. cit.,* p. 262. In the same letter, Bertrando Spaventa announced that he had finally completed his study on Gioberti, *La filosofia di Gioberti,* a work which was not published until five years later (Naples, 1863).

[36] B. Spaventa, *La filosofia italiana nelle sue relazioni,* p. 109.

philosophy of history. Vico is the true precursor of all German thought.''[37]

When Hegelian philosophy is enthusiastically cultivated in Italy, Spaventa calls it a return of thought to its original birthplace, the completion of the cycle of modern philosophy. The implication here, obviously, is the idea that European thought is but Italian philosophy adapted and developed into the various systems.

Spaventa gave utterance to this idea of the ''circulation of Italian thought'' in the introductory lecture to a course which he presented at the University of Bologna in 1860. Speaking on ''The Character and Development of Italian Philosophy from the Sixteenth Century to the Present,'' he summed up his purpose as follows:

> I wish to resume the sacred thread of our philosophic tradition. To revive the spirit of our free thought in the study of our major philosophers. To seek in the philosophic systems of other nations the germs and the influences received from our philosophy,—which was later returned to us in a new and more elaborate form. To understand this circulation of Italian thought, whose spirit we have so long neglected. And to appreciate this return as evidenced in the work of our most recent thinkers. In other words, to find out what power we once held in the past, what position we occupy today, and what is to be our mission in the modern philosophic current. To understand our rôle, not as a group isolated and distinct from the life of other people of this earth, nor as slavish imitators bound to the triumphant chariot of some foreign nation, but as a people free and equal in the community of nations.[38]

The formulation of this idea of the ''circulation of thought'' served two purposes: it answered those ultra-nationalists who feared to lose the originality of Italian thought under an avalanche of German philosophy, and at the same time it provided a rational explanation for the claim of Italian intellectual primacy. The Giobertians were answered in the following passage:

> The thinking of Galluppi, Rosmini, and Gioberti has proceeded along a road which is well-worn if not worn flat by others. Therefore, they are of necessity imitators and repeaters, even when they claimed to be the opposite. I know that I am pronouncing a heresy, and that my statement will be interpreted as an attack against the originality of Italian thinking. I know this only too well, but I must express what I think. This much-vaunted and idolized Italian originality is often harmed by its own worshippers and has nothing to fear from my criticism. It is no discredit to

[37] *Ibid.*, p. 31.

[38] B. Spaventa, *Logica e Metafisica*, p. 10.

anyone's originality to say that he who comes after is necessarily preceded by someone who came before. We have arrived late, we who were once first on the scene. That is all. But who is to blame for that? Only they who have tied us hand and foot and have left us no alternative. The blame, in part at least, falls on those same idolators. There can be nothing worse than a false conception of originality. It is certainly false to believe that to be original means to sever all contact with reality and with the historical process and to act alone, outside of time and space, to create a new world at will and at a moment's notice. Of such so-called original minds I know only too many.[39]

So much for Spaventa's immediate opponents, the anti-Hegelians. Their fault lay in the artificial severance of Italian thought from the rest of Europe. But they came too late to bear the responsibility for the initial decay of Italian philosophy. The blame for that decadence Spaventa places unequivocally at the door of the fanatic intolerance of the Counter-Reformation and the brutality of the despotic governments in Italy. Like his master, Hegel, who saw the essence of historical development in the striving for universal freedom, Spaventa logically demonstrated how the absence of intellectual freedom inevitably led to mental decay. After the sixteenth century, he sees Italy divided by two diametrically opposed forces:

. . . that of our greatest thinkers and that of our persecutors (*carnefici*), who claimed that theirs was the true current of our life,—the true Italian philosophy. This mode of thinking is not yet totally extinguished in our land, for there are still those who insist that the Italy we are now making is not the true Italy; that the true Italy is the one we are doing our best to destroy. Such a conflict in the midst of our national life prevented the normal development of our traditional speculative thought. That was the reason why Vico and Gioberti have been misunderstood among us, and I would even go so far as to say that they failed to understand themselves. This lack of freedom has made us strangers unto ourselves, and the central thread of our thought, which became alien to us, was taken up by others, and prospered and grew in foreign lands.[40]

When Spaventa throws the light of his critical analysis over Gioberti's grandiloquent myth of the superiority of Italian philosophy, so dear to the heart of those who would propound Italian glories even at the expense of truth, Spaventa finds that magnificent construction spiked with multitudinous errors. Gioberti had seized upon a hypothesis found in Vico's *De antiquissima Italorum*

[39] B. Spaventa, *La filosofia italiana nelle sue relazioni*, pp. 194–5.

[40] *Ibid.*, pp. 32–3.

sapientia (1710), wherein Vico presupposes in Etruria the ancient home of Pythagorean thought. It fell in most aptly with Gioberti's nationalistic purpose to show that Greek philosophy, which is always unquestioningly termed the mother of Scholasticism and of all subsequent European thought, was itself an Italian derivative, in that Pythagoras came to Magna Graecia not to transplant Ionic-Greek thought, but, on the contrary, because he was attracted to Italian shores by the renown of a philosophic school which already existed there.[41] Gioberti's error did not stop at this uncritical acceptance of a mythical primitive Italian culture, be it Pelasgic or Etruscan. He failed to follow Vico to the ultimate conclusion that this primitive Italian culture had in turn been imported, supposedly from Egypt. Whether this omission of Gioberti's was deliberate or not, it would have undermined the resplendent edifice of Italian primacy in philosophy which so admirably fell in with nationalistic doctrine.

But the guilt of the Giobertians is far more serious than that of their master. The Giobertians not only continued to propagate the errors of Gioberti, but they turned the master's myth into a rigorous dogma, that was blind and deaf to all subsequent scientific discoveries made since the time of Gioberti. Even Vico's own revisions of his first hypothesis were ignored.[42] And there ap-

[41] At this time when Gioberti was so ardently developing an idea found in Vico (*De antiquissima Italorum sapientia ex latinae linguae originibus eruenda, libri tres,* Naples, 1710), there already existed an extensive literature dealing with the fanciful idea of Italy as the source of nearly all primitive Mediterranean cultures. The following works may be cited as stemming directly from Vico: Vincenzo Cuoco, *Platone in Italia,* Milan, 1804–1806; G. Micali, *L'Italia avanti il dominio dei Romani,* Florence, 1810; Niccolò Tommaseo, *Dell'Italia,* Paris, 1835 (for political reasons originally published as *Opuscoli inediti di fra Gerolamo Savonarola*); Angelo Mazzoldi, *Delle origini italiche e della diffusione dell'incivilimento italiano all'Egitto, alla Fenicia, alla Grecia e a tutte le nazioni asiatiche poste sul Mediterraneo,* Milan, 1840. Parallel with Vico, the same argument had been treated in the eighteenth century by Monsignor Mario Guarnacci, *Origini italiche, o siano Memorie istorico-etrusche sopra l'antichissimo Regno d'Italia e sopra i di lei primi abitatori,* Lucca, 1767–1772. In a way, these works may be regarded as the sources of Gioberti's *Primato.* For nationalistic discussions of the influence of Vico on the Risorgimento, cf. G. de Montemayor, "La buona politica dal Vico al Cuoco al Risorgimento italiano," in *Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia del Diritto,* (special issue commemorating the second centennial of Vico's *Scienza Nuova,* 1725–1925), Rome, 1925. Also G. Ottone, *La tesi vichiana di un antico primato italiano nel "Platone" di Vincenzo Cuoco,* Fossano, 1905; and Benedetto Croce, *Storia della storiografia italiana nel secolo decimonono,* Bari, 1921.

[42] Spaventa cites the revisions embodied in Vico's polemic in the *Seconda risposta*

pears no trace that these fanatical traditionalists lived in a world in which the investigations of philologists and historians (especially the work of Mommsen) had revealed the following errors which Spaventa pointed out: "(1) The Pythagorean school—such as we know it from the history of philosophy, and not such as Vico conjectures it—is a pure creation of the Greek mind, especially of the Doric mind. (2) At the time which Vico described, the Egyptians did not yet know how to sail the sea, and hence they could not have transported their philosophy into Tuscany. (3) The first Etruscans in Italy had so primitive a culture that it cannot reasonably be upheld that they could have managed to sail the sea, much less that they could have reached a level of philosophy. (4) All the investigations made up to now concerning their language have not yet succeeded in classifying it; and therefore nothing certain can be deduced about their national origin. (5) It is certain that the Etruscans ultimately reached a high level of culture, but it is no less certain that this culture had far less influence on the language and the customs of the ancient Romans than is usually believed."[43]

Spaventa works himself up into a just indignation over such unscientific distortions.

> That Vico should have made such errors a century and a half ago can be easily understood; but I cannot understand how today, after the great progress that has taken place during this interval, such errors can still be repeated. Or rather, I understand it well enough: the aim here is to consecrate an intellectual caste system, and the authority of Vico is thus ensnared to carry out this purpose. Thus, in the name of Vico, we ought to be Etruscans or even Egyptians in our philosophy. But why not then also in religion? Egyptian philosophy must have stood in intimate relation to Egyptian religion; and I don't understand why religion should be more universal and less national than philosophy. That is what I should like to have explained by our Brahmin.[44]

After this *reductio ad absurdum,* Spaventa cannot see any basis for the conception of an Italian philosophy before the time of the Renaissance.

---

al Giornale de' letterati d'Italia (August 1712), and in the *Scienza Nuova.* (For reliable editions of these works, cf. the edition of Vico's works in the *Scrittori d'Italia* series, brought out under the direction of Benedetto Croce: *Orazioni inaugurali, De studiorum ratione, De antiquissima, e polemica col Giornale de' letterati,* a cura di Fausto Nicolini e Giovanni Gentile, Bari, 1914; and the *Scienza Nuova seconda,* testo del 1744 con le varianti dell'edizione del 1730, a cura di Fausto Nicolini, Bari, 1928.)

[43] B. Spaventa, *La filosofia italiana nelle sue relazioni,* p. 61.

[44] *Ibid.,* p. 62.

The Renaissance brought to a close the last phase of European philosophy united by means of the unity of religion. This break-up of a central religious idea, aggravated by the flourishing growth of national tongues, was largely responsible for the increasing consciousness of separation between the various countries. That was the moment at which Spaventa saw the beginning of a characteristically Italian philosophy. That is also the moment which gave rise to the question with which he opens his inquiry into the "Nationality of Philosophy."

> Is it possible to speak of as many national philosophies as there are civilized peoples in Europe after the close of the Middle Ages or in modern times? Or are those currents which we call national philosophies merely particularized instants in the general development of modern philosophy as it played itself out within the various nations? And is it possible to speak of an Italian philosophy as distinct from a French, English, or German one, as we speak of Greek philosophy as being essentially different from Hindu philosophy? And in general, is it true that the particular genius of a people which is clearly and consciously reflected in its language, literature, and art, and also in its customs—can this genius be distinguished in the Europe of today in that form and universal activity of the mind which we call philosophy?[45]

The answers to these questions are not nearly so succinctly formulated; in fact, the reply to this problem comprises the essential ideas of Spaventa, as a philosopher of Italy and of Europe.

As an Italian, living in an era of intense nationalism, Spaventa is acutely aware of the specific Italian contribution to culture. As a close student of Hegel, and through him an heir to the ideas of Herder and Fichte, Spaventa interprets the stream of contribution that arose on Italian soil as being a product of the local *Volksgeist*, which in every country he calls the "true hero" of its history.[46] Like his German teachers, Spaventa saw the protective union of a nation as the prerequisite for the complete development of this spirit. This is why Spaventa felt himself to be entirely out of harmony with the universalism of Augusto Vera, who for years was his colleague at the University of Naples. Philosophy detached from the soil and cut off from the human concerns for which it is supposedly the most articulate spokesman, is inconceivable for Spaventa. In his famous opening lecture at the University of Naples in 1861, he said:

[45] *Ibid.*, pp. 1–2.

[46] B. Spaventa, *Principii di etica*, a cura di G. Gentile, Naples, 1904, p. 164.

If philosophy is not merely a vain exercise of the intellect, if it is that real manifestation of human life in which the great achievements of the spirit are summed up and find their true significance, then it is a natural phenomenon that a free people should find its fullest self-expression in the thought of its philosophers. Wherever this realization is lacking, the importation of foreign systems will not help. Self-awareness is not a merchandise which can be purchased when it is needed. It is a reflection of our innermost being, of our true self.[47]

As a student of world philosophy, he cannot stop at national philosophy as its own ultimate aim. The soil and the *Volksgeist* of each country may have its definite national characteristics, but the philosophy that arises from this local source cannot be confined within the categories of English, French, German, or Italian philosophy. Modern philosophy always aspires to the level of European thought[48]—just as Hegel's *Volksgeist* was a part of and aspired to the *Weltgeist*. Thus it is the second of his own questions listed above that Spaventa answers in the affirmative: national philosophies are in truth particularized instants in the development of modern philosophy.

It is not the separatist character of the various national philosophies that is stressed, but the special function assigned to each in the concert of European thought. Before Italian thinkers can take any bombastic pride in the achievement of their forebears, Spaventa would have them try to understand the nature of their achievement, and then ask themselves what the essential nature of this Italian philosophy might be.

It is sometimes stated that there had been or that there still is a specifically Italian philosophy, in its essence different from or opposed to that of other nations. If so, what is the character of this philosophy and where can it be found? It is well known that in Italy there has existed very little, if any, speculative freedom, and that those who have dared to attempt it have paid dearly for their courage. Where, then, is this Italian philosophy? Is it in the writings of the victims or in those of the executioners? The problem that is most difficult for us—without whose solution we cannot move forward—is the problem of understanding the nature and the whereabouts of Italian thought. Until this task is accomplished—and it is not easy of performance—to parade nationalism at every instant may well serve to arouse and to befuddle the emotions and sometimes even the passions, but it will produce nothing of permanent value to knowledge.[49]

[47] B. Spaventa, *La filosofia italiana nelle sue relazioni*, p. 10.
[48] *Ibid.*, p. 22.
[49] *Ibid.*, pp. 2–3.

Fruitful progress in speculative thought, according to Spaventa, is achieved by the tripartite method of examining the historical evolution of thought, of evaluating the specific national contribution, and of planning a further program on the basis of this deliberate comprehension of one's talents and strength.

Italy's historic rôle in the development of speculative thought was the impulsive tossing-up of some germinal fragments which, through Spaventa's vehicle of the "circulation of thought," were transferred to the more methodical northern countries, where circumstances were favorable to their further growth. Spaventa singles out two important moments when Italian thought thus fructified European philosophy:

> If there is any difference between the philosophical genius of Italy and that of other nations; in other words, if it (Italian philosophy) has, or ever did have, any distinction above that of other people, it was only because it had twice acted as a precursor at the two most important moments of modern philosophy. Cartesianism had its roots in the philosophers of the Renaissance, and especially in Bruno and Campanella, just as the Kantian system sprang from Vico. Which is to say that Italy acted as a precursor for the new naturalism and the new theory of mind.[50]

Out of the analysis and evaluation of the historical development of philosophy in Italy, Spaventa gathers no trace of any mystical separatist character. The only hint of any specifically national characteristic in Italian thought would be its power to stir up problems whose solution transcends national capabilities and involves the interaction of European thought. The task for contemporary philosophy lies, therefore, not in a narcissistic adulation of its past achievements, but in a virile resumption of this generative power. In the mid-nineteenth century, the main philosophic problem awaiting its solution was the problem of knowledge, and it is in that direction that Spaventa would point his program for a renaissance of Italian thought.

> If today we still desire to have and are able to achieve any distinction, it is that of once more instituting and effecting for the problem of mind a new and a wider field of action, a new and more far-reaching solution. But all this can be achieved only on one condition, that of not rejecting all that has been accomplished for some time outside of Italy, but of studying it, understanding it, and making it our own. Only thus, by reaching out for a wider horizon, by learning to know ourselves better, by enchanneling our life with the eternal current of universal life, will we achieve a great step forward,

[50] *Ibid.*, p. 2.

not into a vacuum, but into a full realization of our strength, of our duty as part of all human duty.[51]

From the national to the international and back again—in the resolution of this dialectical antithesis—Spaventa, the Hegelian, sees the development of philosophy. The efficacy of this counsel seems to find its demonstration in the subsequent course of philosophy in Italy. The progressive branch, the school whose ideas are once more reaching beyond the confines of national boundaries, includes the chief followers of Spaventa's method, Benedetto Croce and Giovanni Gentile. Both of these philosophers have obeyed Spaventa almost to the letter in training themselves through an absorption of all contemporary philosophy without, however, falling into the fallacy of a vaporous universalism in which philosophy plays itself out in some abstract realm out of all contact with concrete human needs.[52] Through their ability to apply this international material to immediate national preoccupations, these two Italians have managed, in their different manners, to re-emerge with concepts which, especially in the case of Croce, have once more stimulated the trend of world philosophy.

V

At the outset of this paper there was posed the question as to the feasibility of such a concept as "nationality of philosophy." The words may have a paradoxical sound, since philosophy is generally held to be a *corpus* of ideas that have proven universal validity. Yet if that definition were rigidly enforced, philosophy would occupy a very narrow field, for there are but few ideas that belong to all time and all latitudes. Far more numerous are the particular philosophies that are associated with definite men, epochs, and countries. Some of these ideas remain linked to the needs of an age, form the basis of its institutions, and constitute the philosophy of that age. Some ideas belong even more specifically to one people and constitute a sort of national philosophy. One might, therefore, speak of individual philosophies, temporary philosophies, and national philosophies. Very few ideas transcend all these alliances to wing their way to a level of universal philosophy.

But the question is at best academic. Regardless of all definitions involving its universality, philosophy, at least during its

[51] *Ibid.*, p. 2.

[52] For Croce's insistence on the international, if not universal, character of philosophy, cf. his *Conversazioni critiche*, 4th series, Bari, 1932, pp. 5, 6.

formative stages, is unescapably allied with time and space and with human minds living in a human environment. That environment is at times densely permeated with non-universal principles of so impassioned a nature that no human activity can defend itself against them. Not even philosophy can readily withdraw into an ivory tower, there to maintain its calm, its dispassionate contemplation of so-called objective verities.

The intense nationalism of the nineteenth century created such a period of duress. It forced all philosophers to take a stand, to express their attitude toward the possible effects on thought of this principle of nationality. As we have seen in the case of Italy, philosophy can react in one of three ways: first, it can submit entirely to this pervasive compulsion, restate its aims with a new nationalistic bias, and form the sort of ultra-patriotic philosophy that reached its apex in Gioberti; secondly, it can refuse entirely to yield to such impulses, attempt to retreat from the mêlée, and insist on calling itself the repository of objective truth, as was seen in the case of Vera; and thirdly, it can achieve a resolution of these opposing forces, recognize its own roots in concrete human problems occurring in the lives of concrete people, and generalize these same problems in a manner that attains universal human validity, even if it does not rise to the unscalable objective heights whence truth could be seen *sub specie aeternitatis*.

As a personification of the third of these attitudes, Bertrando Spaventa took his place as a thinker confronted with the need to justify his system at a time when his country was intolerant of any activity which did not direct itself toward national unity. This is not to imply that he attempted to create his system merely with the practical intent of placating public opinion. None of the philosophers here discussed can be suspected of such utilitarian distortion, certainly not Gioberti, whose thinking seemed to furnish constant ammunition for the most fervent soldiers of the *Risorgimento*. Nineteenth century nationalism was not yet so rabid as to force its speculative minds to deliberate fabrications. Each of the attitudes here discussed may have been conditioned by its environment, but the very fact that such a choice remained open can be taken as evidence of the idealistic basis from which this nationalism sprang. We also know enough of the mentality and training of the representatives of the three attitudes here discussed to see how each trend arose out of the temperament and the scholarship of the men who formulated it.

Bertrando Spaventa's contact with German philosophy protected him from the error of extreme patriotic and nationalistic conceit. He also was sufficiently thorough as a scholar to be aware of all the latest findings that were then being made in the related fields of anthropology, philology, and history. Mommsen's monumental history of Rome, for example, prevented him from repeating the errors that the followers of Gioberti were still mouthing. Spaventa was thus able to rise above exclusive national boasts to the concept of a super-national and European culture which is a summary of individual national cultures. In the face of the limitations of Mamiani, the barrenness of Rosmini, and the patriotic exaggerations of Gioberti and his followers, Spaventa dared to propose a clear-cut program of thoroughgoing reorganization for the future of philosophic studies in Italy. In the face of the omnipresent isolationism that was then entrenched in all institutions where philosophy was professed, Spaventa dared to propound the radical doctrine that Italian philosophy must look to wider horizons and see its own position within the expanse of European thought. To those opponents who attacked him for corrupting the originality of Italian philosophy by the importation of Hegelianism, he answered as follows:

> You may transplant truth as much as you like, but if that truth is not in harmony with our national genius, it will remain an abstract truth, without any meaning for us; it will always remain a dead-weight. If we demonstrate how we have always lived in the stream of European thought and have participated in the advancement of that thought, and that we have nevertheless retained our individuality, we make this statement not for any calculated effect or for some diplomatic manipulation, but out of a compelling sense of duty, as must anyone who professes philosophy.[53]

Spaventa thus combatted a narrow nationalism, without sacrificing his conviction that philosophy is intimately connected with the temperament and the interests of a people. Instead of a complacent dependence on historic glories and on old philosophic traditions, he called upon Italian philosophers to bring their studies into harmony with new currents of civilization. He would have philosophy become a living principle once more, to suffuse all the manifestation of national life, to become a vehicle for the summation of the speculative thought of a people, and to carry that thought from its national source onward to a reservoir of international or world culture.

New York, N. Y.

[53] B. Spaventa, *op. cit.*, p. 233.

BOOK REVIEW

Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction: Studies in Modern Social Structure. Karl Mannheim. (Based on *Mensch und Gesellschaft im Zeitalter des Umbaus,* Leiden, 1935. Translated from the German by Edward Shils. Revised and enlarged by the author, London, 1940.) New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1940. Pp. xxii, 469.

Karl Mannheim, foremost exponent of that promising type of investigation that emerged in the Weimar Republic, the "sociology of knowledge," is best known to English readers as the author of *Ideology and Utopia.* His previous volume has already had considerable influence on American students. His empirical approach, his balanced and temperate acceptance of the promise of many different methods of social inquiry, and his wide familiarity with the more recent literature of social theory in English, have made him seem closer to the temper of American social thinking than most other German students of the problems of history and civilization. Above all, his activistic and instrumentalistic view of social ideas has interested those attracted by the Marxian insights but unable to stomach the monism and lack of psychological sophistication in most Marxian theory. Mannheim has figured as one of the outstanding representatives of "historical relativism," and was chosen for criticism as such by Maurice Mandelbaum in his able and acute *Problem of Historical Knowledge.* Hence any writing of Mannheim's is of great interest to the student of the history of ideas and of historical method.

For such a student *Man and Society* may not offer the theoretical interest the two-volume work on *The Sociological Approach to the Study of History* Mannheim has in preparation will presumably possess. A fair and adequate criticism of the fruitfulness and the limitations of the methods of Mannheim's sociology of knowledge must obviously await the completion of this large-scale inquiry. Mannheim modestly calls his present volume "a few sociological essays"; they were written and rewritten at different times without too much regard for reconciling differences in mood and inconsistencies in insight. Three of the six studies were first set forth in German shortly after Hitler's assumption of power; they reflect the preoccupation of the German intellectual with the terrible question, "Why did it have to happen?" At that time he felt compelled to accept the wave of the future, and to look forward to an industrial society planned by some "creative élite" with the energy and capacity to seize political power. "For he involuntarily shared the feeling prevalent in Central Europe that the democratic system had already run its course." These essays consequently illustrate the sociology of appeasement and acceptance. They are primarily attempts to diagnose "the disintegrating tendencies of liberal democratic society," in terms of the anarchy and chaos produced by the "negative democratization" and mass instability of a society trying to exist half-regu-

lated and half-unplanned. They are full of the nostalgic feeling of the exile for the vanished "intellectual élites" which had tragically lost their chance to dominate German events.

The other three essays were written after Mannheim's arrival in England, where he has been teaching at the London School of Economics. In a country where liberal democracy was still functioning almost undisturbed, he was tempted "to free himself from his deep-rooted scepticism as to the vitality of democracy in our age," and to forget in his new optimism that all Western society was sitting on the same volcano that had erupted so disastrously in Germany. For him, freedom and personal responsibility had always been the highest values. But he had hitherto scorned "mere ideological assertion" of their merits, and in the desire to avoid self-deception and to be "realistic" he had preferred to analyse what was actually happening to them. In pre-war England, and in fresh contact with British and American social thinking, he began to believe that while a planned society is inevitable, there is a great difference between good and bad planning; and he began to hope that a planned society might still be subject to some measure of democratic control, that planning might include planning for freedom, even "the planned retention of ancient liberties." And so the central theme of these later essays, and of the whole book as rewritten, became the vindication of democracy and freedom, "by means of a concrete sociological analysis of what sort of freedom, democracy, and culture would be possible under an altered social system. . . . We are not concerned today whether any abstract form of freedom is better than any abstract form of regimentation. The problem is rather to discover what structural changes in the different countries led to the downfall of the type of freedom, culture, and democracy which prevailed in the nineteenth century. The disastrous situation in which we find ourselves cannot be diagnosed, let alone remedied, merely by repeating the classic liberal arguments, with their relatively undeveloped sociology, and applying analyses which were only valid at a former stage of social development and for a completely different structure." (9)

Mannheim's strong emphasis on the historical and class conditioning of ideas had made the net effect of his previous book to reinforce that feeling of mere vague "relativism" in general that is so large a part of the irrationalism of the age. Ideas were left as the weapons of warring groups struggling for power, and the outcome was determined by "social forces" and "mechanisms" beyond human control. There is still plenty of this fatalism of "social forces" that must be conformed to here, especially in the German chapters. But his more recent English experience has altered the whole temper of his thought, and brought him close to the Anglo-American philosophy of social control and intelligent reconstruction of society. Into the idea of "planning" he now puts all the enthusiasm and much of the content Americans associate with Dewey's gospel of "social intelligence."

Taking pretty much for granted the economic aspects of the transition from *laisser-faire* to a planned society, he here concentrates upon the attendant changes in human behavior and attitudes, the new "mechanisms" of social control set up, and the social techniques that can modify that behavior. His sociological relativism now reinforces the emphasis on the variability and plasticity of "human nature" he finds in the divergent schools of psychological theory: his most brilliant chapter, Part V, combines with great success psycho-analysis and a behavioristic social psychology in the exploration of the various techniques for modifying men's behavior in detail. His diagnosis of the ills of a society in transition is primarily psychological: there has been a disproportionate development of man's mastery over nature and of his techniques for controlling his own impulses and behavior—a contrast stated as the disproportion between "functional" rationality or specialized skills and "substantial" or "moral" rationality, which considers the whole social situation in which technical activities have their setting and consequences. The remedy also is treated in the broadly psychological terms of political education, of developing the skills and techniques that will influence human behavior and get men to act together in a desired way. This type of analysis, in which all other operative factors are focused upon their fruits in man's behavior, is of course familiar enough to American students.

The captious critic, indeed, might bring against Mannheim the same objections so often advanced against the American psychological interpretation of history and philosophy of social control. In his earlier and more pessimistic section he asks, "Who will plan the planners? Which of the existing groups shall plan us?" Though he later tries to delineate in detail the kind of planning that would save us from existent totalitarian pseudo-planning, he nowhere really answers this pertinent question. Indeed, he inclines to minimize as a sociologist the struggle for power between classes and nations. The changing patterns of such conflicts are dwarfed by the more fundamental and inescapable consequences of the transition to a planned society; the political programs of different groups are at present only more or less bewildered attempts to deal with the common problems of a type of society that is emerging everywhere. "The modern semi-totalitarian democracies have the same basic social structure as the manifestly totalitarian states. For there is a basic pattern in modern society which is altering its very structure. Political organizations are more or less efficient experiments for coping with the problems presented by the changing structure. Thus the process of becoming totalitarian is only accelerated but is not initiated by the universal preparations for war." (338) This scientific detachment, which while recognizing clearly the imminence of war could regard its outcome as of little ultimate moment for Western society, accords ill with his insistence on the great gulf between totalitarian and democratic planning.

Yet Mannheim's sturdy protest against both the fatalism that accepts dictatorship as inevitable, and the blind and thoughtless drifting that is sure to bring it, is a welcome reinforcement to those still devoted to intelligent reconstruction. The features of the coming society that are in his view inevitable are not incompatible with certain kinds of democratic self-determination, and certain types of liberties—albeit the kinds and types will be different from those familiar to nineteenth-century liberalism and *laisser-faire*. Indeed, the immense multiplication of social controls, that is, of mechanisms for changing human behavior, has given us a whole new series of powers to learn to use; and with each new power comes a new freedom. Mannheim is now keenly aware of the disastrous consequences of the loss of faith in the power of reason in those very groups possessed of the intelligence to bring order out of the chaos of transition. "If we are going to learn anything at all in the decades to come it must be that power in itself does not suffice unless it be linked up with a scientific as well as a human understanding of the social situation. . . . But one can only learn if one has belief in the power of reason. For a time it was healthy to see the limitations of the *ratio*, especially in social affairs. It was healthy to realize that thinking is not powerful if it is severed from the social context and ideas are only strong if they have their social backing, that it is useless to spread ideas which have no real function and are not woven into the social fabric. But this sociological interpretation of ideas may also lead to complete despair, discouraging the individual from thinking about issues which will definitely become the concern of the day. This discouragement of the intelligentsia which may lead them to too quick a resignation of their proper function as the thinkers and forerunners of a new society, may become even more disastrous in a social setting where more depends on what the leading élites may have in mind than in other periods of history. The theory that thought is socially conditioned and changes in different periods in history is only instructive, if its implications are fully realized and applied to our own age. . . . It is true that even today ideas can create no new worlds by themselves, but it is decisive for future events whether or not sound thinking goes on today and whether it reaches the ruling élites." (365, 366)

This is not only Mannheim's challenge to the social scientists to work out a program that will justify men's faith in the power of reason to guide society. It is also a personal insistence that his sociological interpretation of ideas must be taken as no mere instrument to the passive understanding of the past, but as sharply focused on the problems of the present. This conviction is close to the heart of his *Wissenssoziologie:* it is what makes a volume dealing with the analysis of rapidly shifting conditions, already considerably dated by the outbreak of war, genuinely illuminating as an illustration of the intellectual method he has elsewhere tried to set forth more abstractly. The historian of ideas will be especially interested in what is

thus revealed about that method. Hence we shall not here further pursue Mannheim's detailed analysis of the kind of liberties compatible with a planned society, nor his reflections on how to avoid bureaucratic absolutism under democratic planning. His treatment is often brilliant and always suggestive. But his broad conclusions are both tentative and not fundamentally different from those arrived at by many other students. This is natural enough, for "the relevance of principles of political organization can only be discovered by empirical means," and as yet "all existing planned societies are dictatorial. . . . The experiments we know are blended with the spirit either of oriental despotism or military dictatorial traditions." (9, 341, 7) Hence, alas, we do not yet know "whether there is any form of planning which is in itself a guarantee against despotic abuse." (7)

All of Mannheim's subtle analyses are rooted in his view of the function of ideas and thought in the historically changing processes of society. His social instrumentalism is formally stated in rather crude terms. "Thought is not an independent self-contained and abstractly intelligible fact but is intimately bound up with action. The form and content of thought vary with the situation we are thinking about. Thought does not create the world, but rather in a given world with a given structure a given form of thought is an instrument which may, at a certain moment either be adequate or inadequate or else be in the process of becoming increasingly adequate. There is no thought 'as such'; a specific type of living creature thinks in a world with a specific type of structure in order to fulfil certain specific life-functions." (149) But this protest against absolutism and formalism Mannheim goes on to interpret more subtly and in broadly social terms. "The pragmatic nature of thought is not revealed . . . by considering individual action alone, but only if one focuses attention on group action of which the former is a part. . . . Abstraction is by no means determined by the object but rather by the form of activity of the knowing subject and especially by the group organization of which the subject is a member. . . . Hence, there are just as many possible forms of abstraction as there are collective, active approaches to the handling of things in an historical community. . . . The community in its language and concepts builds up a store of experiences and abstractions, corresponding to approaches which were current in its history. . . . In actual fact the existing body of ideas never exceeds the horizon and the radius of activity of the society in question. . . . The individual can retain the illusion of his intellectual independence since he no longer has the chance to see how his own actions and experiences grow out of the collective ones. . . . The sociological history of intellectual life is fundamentally nothing more than the *post factum* reconstruction of the functional units and the trend of action in a given society, through which, even with the help of many intermediate links, we can explain why this or that person was interested in this or that subject and why from his standpoint he saw, or distorted, things in such and such a way." (208–10)

What this means concretely becomes clearer in connection with the idea of freedom. Ideas grow out of a certain social experience, and are relevant within the limits of that experience; they are modified in the light of the further data furnished by a broader experience. "The nineteenth century inevitably meant by freedom those forms of freedom which were possible and customary in its own social order. When this order changed new situations arose, and it gradually became evident that the old definition was based on examples that were too limited in scope, and these fundamental terms had to be revised to embrace the new empirical material and the wider aspects of the problem. This seems to be the reason why every new epoch begins by redefining its terms. . . . All the ideas that must be described as historical, since they are essentially embedded in the cultural setting of the age, change with the changing conception of human nature, and with the ethics and psychology which go with it. . . . Every age defines these terms afresh, for in the historical sciences the new empirical material can only be obtained during the changing course of history. The natural sciences are always redefining their terms in order to keep pace with the growth of knowledge. . . . But while the natural scientist can increase that range of new empirical facts at any time to cover more and more data, the sociologist very often has to wait for the appearance of a new social order in which facts appear in a new setting." (10, 11)

Ideas thus change their content and their range of applicability with changes in men's socially-conditioned experience. This is but one aspect of the variability of those organized patterns of man's behavior we call human nature. "Everyone involuntarily regards the historical form of human nature which is current in his own epoch as eternal. . . . There is no economic study, and no economic history in particular, that does not imply some conception of the constancy or variability of the profit-motive and its relation to other human incentives, no political science that does not involve unconscious theories about the nature of power and the desire for prestige. . . . It will only be possible to look at history from a new angle when we can study the changes of the human mind in a historical setting, in close connection with the changes in the social structure." (16, 17).

Just what is that connection? At times Mannheim assumes very loosely: "As soon as a new type of conduct emerges in history a corresponding type of thought necessarily follows to accompany it." (149) This assumption leads him to advocate behavioristic techniques to transform men from their external behavior inward. "This kind of approach is favored by the fact that man has hitherto been changed from the outside through uncontrolled processes of growth and selection, and real assimilation and inner adaptation to a situation have followed a long way behind. The normal way has been for man to find himself a new situation first, to adapt himself to it through a series of more or less unconscious acts and then, later, to make those inner psychological changes which bring the indi-

vidual into harmony with the situation." (224) But it is clear that Mannheim does not remain on this purely biological level: he is really operating with a much subtler notion of intellectual adaptation. Discussing several types of thinking, he says: "The danger zone of each of the modes of thought which we have dealt with so far is that it either runs ahead of or lags behind the kind of thought best fitted to a given stage of history. The possibility and the necessity of certain modes of thought at a certain period of history are defined primarily by the nature of *the problems to be solved* (italics ours) and by the level of reality to which it is necessary to penetrate. We noted the disastrous effects of this lag where we showed how man tried to solve problems which arose from the interdependence of events by thinking only in watertight compartments and considering only individual, isolated goals." (233)

Again, approaching this problem of intellectual "adaptation" from the other side, Mannheim often speaks loosely and animistically of "the spontaneous forces of society" which ideas cannot violate with impunity. "Planning can only have a positive value if it is based on the creative tendencies in society; *i.e.* if it controls living forces without suppressing them." (14) "Whereas education becomes empty preaching when there is no real situation to which it refers, it accelerates the process of transformation when it is bound up with social forces which are moving in the same direction." (195, 196) "We may indeed behave as if we were acting according to our own plan, but in reality we are acting according to a law which is imposed upon us and which lies beyond us. We can indeed direct and control the rational and irrational forces in certain spheres, but after a certain point they are beyond our reach and dominate us." (74)

Mannheim is quite aware of the need of analyzing in detail these vague "social forces" which must in some sense be worked with rather than against. At times these "forces" seem to be simply the limits of our control, as when he remarks: "It is possible that at a later stage all that we now call history, namely the unforeseeable, fateful dominance of uncontrolled social forces, will come to an end." (193) His clearest analysis is in terms of what, borrowing from Mill, he calls the "*principia media*" of a given time, "those regularities and inter-connections . . . which do not operate in every society but which define the particular character of a certain social pattern," (168) "a kind of regularly recurring special laws, special relationships of a certain historical phase in a particular social setting." (177) "An epoch is dominated not merely by a single *principium medium* but by a whole series of them." (183) They seem, indeed, to be the particular and concrete organizations of human behavior institutionalized at any given time. They are always in process of formation and modification, in active interplay with each other; they are the "trends" in a society, always manifold, conflicting, and fundamentally uncertain and ambiguous. "Whoever

believes that he knows in advance exactly what structure society will tend to adopt . . . treats a structure in the process of becoming as though it had already taken its final shape. A scientific technique for describing the developing historical process must be worked out. This technique should serve those who are trying to discover existing trends and who are determined to deal with future events in terms of open alternatives, *i.e.* to approach ambiguous facts with an open mind." (188) The *post mortem* historian prefers the certainty of regarding everything that has happened as the only thing that could possibly have happened; political groups, likewise desiring certainty, equally renounce the experimental for the prophetic attitude. It is fundamental in analyzing either past or present to realize that at any given time in reality all the *principia media* are *in statu nascendi*, and that the uncertain future discloses a wealth of various possible outcomes. "The task of really scientific observation is to describe these *principia media* as multiple possibilities." (189) "A method of approach must be developed which treats the horizon of expectations as an open horizon, and not as a map which charts already established facts." The attitude of the planning age must have the courage to intervene in the interplay of these tendencies as the strategist "who only watches over the factors at work in society in order to detect the new possibilities which are coming to the surface at the proper moment, and to reinforce them at those points where vital decisions must be made." (190)

This pluralistic and open view of history makes clear the controlling assumption underlying Mannheim's whole analysis of the present: "In the period before us planning will be inevitable. . . . There is no longer any choice between planning and *laisser-faire*, but only between good planning and bad." (6) What is inevitable is no particular form of society, but rather the necessity of facing certain problems and planning their solution. Mannheim's social determinism in no wise destroys man's power of choice: for what is determined is the fact that we must choose. And we must choose because we have already chosen. "Our society has been forced into planning by the heritage of regulations accumulated from the past. Once the preliminary steps have been taken, we cannot escape the task of acquiring sufficient technical skill to steer the social machine instead of letting ourselves be crushed beneath its wheels." (242) "Planning begins with the use of what is immediately available. . . . In dealing with the *principia media* we have no free, unlimited power of disposition. Instead of this, what we need is the right *strategy* by which to work with or against the current in which these *principia* are moving, according to the most favorable points of control, which the planning will can find." (192)

Thus it is precisely such historically presented *problems*, rather than any fixed and predetermined solutions, which the "sociology of knowledge" reveals that ideas and methods of thinking have had to "follow." How-

ever vague his preliminary statement, Mannheim's analysis when pressed always leads to this conclusion. And it is in these terms that he here suggests a pluralistic "technical" interpretation of history. Technical invention is indeed, as Marx held, the "dynamic factor" or "independent variable" in history. The invention of new techniques in one field demands the invention of further techniques in others. But Marx was in error in limiting invention to technology proper and to the economic sphere. Every field has its own techniques, and not least are the techniques of organizing human behavior. And since all these inventions are brought to a focus in the modifications they effect in human ways of acting, it is sociology—or social psychology—rather than economics that can best claim to be the unifying social science. "We are not far from a multi-dimensional conception of society, in which a dynamic survey of social history must be prepared to reckon with several focal points of influence, such as the technical progress in economic production, in political power, in administration, and in psychological influence. Every real theoretical advance consists in discovering that a phenomenon which was once believed to be an independent variable, only seemed to be such because we had failed to take into account the special historical circumstances which gave it such extraordinary importance. . . . Just as economic technique may become the centre of certain social changes which permeate the whole social structure, so the remaining techniques in their turn also tend to radiate influences which have an equally far-reaching effect. . . . Today it is wiser to be pluralistic at first, to keep each of the various *principia media* of technical progress in mind, and to study their intervention empirically as it occurs." (249, 248)

In a society where the major problem forced upon men is the problem of problem-solving, of planning the reconstruction of our whole culture, that is, the transformation of all human behavior, the primary problem is naturally the invention of the intellectual technique of planning itself. Mannheim displays many of his most fertile insights in treating the development of this "functional" type of thinking. "Planning" he carefully distinguishes from trial-and-error, and from mere technical invention in a particular field; and more narrowly, from the static establishment of a social order, as well as from the mere administration of one already established. Dictatorship is not planning, for genuine planning must plan a place for self-criticism and inquiry. Planning occurs "when man and society advance from the deliberate invention of single objects or institutions to the deliberate regulation and intelligent mastery of the interrelationships between these objects." (152) It rests "on the new capacity for perceiving interdependent connections in a social structure"; (228) it is "interdependent thinking." It deals with social situations as wholes. "The most essential element in the planned approach is that it not only thinks out individual aims and limited goals, but also realizes what effects those indi-

vidual aims will in the long run have on wider goals." (154) "Planning is the reconstruction of an historically developed society into a unity which is regulated more and more perfectly by mankind from certain central positions." (193)

There is no need to point out in detail the proposals to which this latter rather ambitious program leads Mannheim. Some of them smell of his German rather than of his more recent British experience; they seem ludicrous enough to the unregenerate American mind. And Mannheim would be the first to insist on the abstractness and inconclusiveness of much of his argument. Any reader would want to introduce many a proviso and a qualification on every page; but he would also find scarcely a page without an illuminating insight on which to ponder. And the student of the history of ideas in particular would do well to read and reread a volume in which the understanding of history is intimately bound up with its further making; in which ideas, and the right choice of ideas, are treated as of fundamental importance, with a permeating influence throughout our multi-dimensional society; and in which thinking is at once so persuasively and so sanely related to all those other types of human behavior of which it is revealed as the crown and glory. No one can arise from this book without realizing that Karl Mannheim, the apostle of "historical relativism," is one of the foremost in the struggle to relate thinking to the guidance of living, and to bring reason to bear on the problems of understanding wisely and acting intelligently in our time.

JOHN HERMAN RANDALL, JR.

Columbia University

BOOKS RECEIVED

HISTORY OF LITERATURE AND ART

IGNATIUS HIS CONCLAVE OR HIS INTHRONISATION IN A LATE ELECTION IN HELL. By John Donne. Reproduced in facsimile from the edition of 1611 with an Introduction by Charles M. Coffin. New York: Columbia University Press, 1941. Pp. xxiv, viii, 149. $1.60.—Herein Donne treats both of the "new philosophy" and of the religious and civil controversies raging at the time over spiritual and temporal authority.

MILTON IN THE PURITAN REVOLUTION. By Don M. Wolfe. New York: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1941. Pp. xiv, 496.—An analysis of Milton's political beliefs in relation to the historical events and social ideas of his influential contemporaries (1640–1660): Lilburne, Winstanley, etc.

FROM BEAST-MACHINE TO MAN-MACHINE. Animal Soul in French Letters from Descartes to La Mettrie. By Leonora Cohen Rosenfield. With a Preface by Paul Hazard. New York: Oxford University Press, 1941. $3.50.—"The purpose of this book is to examine from the viewpoint of the historian of ideas the twofold theme"

expressed in the title, "with particular attention to the implications of the controversy in science, philosophy, theology and belles-lettres. The objective in these pages will be to trace the transition from seventeenth-century animal mechanism to eighteenth-century human mechanism."

THE IMAGINARY VOYAGE IN PROSE FICTION. A History of Its Criticism and a Guide for Its Study, with an Annotated Check List of 215 Imaginary Voyages from 1700 to 1800. By Philip B. Gove. New York: Columbia University Press, 1941. Pp. xi, 445. $3.50.—This theme intrudes "into the history of locomotion and human aspiration, geographic knowledge and discovery, philosophy, political science, sociology, religion, and the development of fiction from folklore."

JEAN-BAPTISTE ROUSSEAU. His Life and Works. By Henry A. Grubbs. Princeton University Press, 1941. Pp. viii, 310. $3.00.—Newly discovered material (an autobiography of the French poet's life, 1671–1741); chapters on his neo-classical taste, lyric and didactic poetry, epigrams and dramas.

LETTERS OF JONATHAN OLDSTYLE. By Washington Irving. With a Biographical Notice. Reproduced in facsimile from the edition of 1824 with an Introduction by Stanley T. Williams. New York: Columbia University Press, 1941. Pp. xxiv, 68. $1.60.—"Youthful satires of Irving on duelling, dress, marriage customs, grandiose plays, ranting actors, vulgar audiences, inaudible music, and half-wit critics."

TAMERLANE AND OTHER POEMS. By Edgar Allan Poe. Reproduced in facsimile form the edition of 1827 with an Introduction by Thomas Ollive Mabbott. New York: Columbia University Press, 1941. Pp. xvi, iv, 44. $1.80.

ENGLISH INSTITUTE ANNUAL, 1940, Columbia University Press, 1941. Pp. xii, 228. $2.00.—"Mimesis and Allegory," by W. H. Auden; "The Poem as Organism: Modern Critical Procedure," by Cleanth Brooks, Jr.; "Scholarship and Contemporary Literature," by William York Tindall; "Literary Forms and Types; or, A Defense of Polonius," by Norman Holmes Pearson; "Periods and Movements in Literary History," by Rene Wellek; "The Problem of Greatness in Writing Literary History," by Willard Thorp; "Intellectual History and Its Relation to a Balanced Study of American Literature," by Harry Hayden Clark; "The Popular Review and the Scholarly Book," by Ralph Thompson; "Who Uses a Library of Rare Books?" by Randolph G. Adams; "Copyright and Scholarship," by Walter Pforzheimer.

CORONA, Studies in Philology in Celebration of the Eightieth Birthday of Samuel Singer. Edited by A. Schirvkauer and W. Paulsen. Durham, No. Carolina: Duke University Press, 1941. Pp. 282. $4.00.—Four groups of essays on Folklore, Linguistics, Middle Ages, and Modern German Literature, including Archer Taylor's "A Metaphor of the Human Body in Literature and Tradition," G. von Grunebaum's "On the Development of the Type of Scholar in Early Islam," Thomas Mann's "Goethes Werther," and G. E. Mueller's "Solger's Aesthetics—A Key to Hegel (Irony and Dialectic)."

SPACE, TIME AND ARCHITECTURE. The Growth of a New Tradition. By Sigfried Giedion. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1941. Pp. xvi, 601, 321 illustrations. $5.00.—"The reflection in architecture of the progress our own period has made toward consciousness of itself."

ARTISTIC THEORY IN ITALY, 1450–1600. By Anthony Blunt. New York: Oxford University Press, 1940. Pp. 163. $2.75.—The ideas of Alberti, Leonardo, Colonna, Michelangelo, Vasari, and minor writers of the High Renaissance that consciously motivated Italian artists in this period.

THE WRITINGS OF MARGARET FULLER. Selected and edited by Mason Wade. New York: The Viking Press, 1941. Pp. xi, 608. $5.00.—Selections from the five volumes left by Miss Fuller (1810–50), mirroring the ideas and interests of her era, and linking "the microcosm of Boston and Concord with the macrocosm of Europe."

LA LITTÉRATURE FRANÇAISE ENTRE LES DEUX GUERRES, 1919–1939. By Fernand Baldensperger. Los Angeles: Lymanhouse, 1941. Pp. 206. $3.50.—Begins with "L'individualisme de 'l'adolescence inquiète,'" and ends with "Espoirs et déceptions de l'Humanisme moderne." Complete bibliography.

SOCIAL AND POLITICAL HISTORY

ATHENIAN STUDIES. Presented to William Scott Ferguson. Harvard Studies in Classical Philology. Supplementary Volume I. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1940. Pp. 535. $4.00.—Includes essays on "Athens and the Early Age of Greece," by W. Blegen; "The Unity of Thucydides' History," by J. H. Finley, Jr.; "Studies in Historical Literature of the Fourth Century B.C.," by H. Bloch, "Athenaeus and the Slaves of Athens," by W. L. Westermann.

HARVARD STUDIES IN CLASSICAL PHILOLOGY. Edited by a Committee of the Classical Instructors of Harvard University. Vol. LI. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1940. Pp. 335. $2.50.—Includes essays on "The Roman Censors," by R. C. Cram; "The Economic Motive in Thucydides," by S. B. Smith; "Notes on History and Value," by R. L. Stroock.

ARGUMENT FROM ROMAN LAW IN POLITICAL THOUGHT 1200–1600. By Myron P. Gilmore: Harvard University Press, 1941. Pp. 148. $2.00.—"Examples of the way in which political theorists adapt and modify to their own uses distinctions taken from an authoritative and traditional source." The authoritative text is the Roman Law of Justinian's jurists, and the examples are drawn from the period of the emergence of the national state in Western Europe, particularly in France.

A HISTORY OF FRENCH COMMERCIAL POLICIES. By Frank A. Haight. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1941. Editor's Preface by Michael T. Florinsky of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Pp. xvii, 285. $2.50.—From Colbert's mercantilism and its physiocratic *laissez faire* critics to state and monopolistic control of trade during and after the first world war with the consequently high nationalistic protectionism obstructing the free flow of international commerce.

MODERN DEMOCRACY. By Carl L. Becker. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941. Pp. 100. $2.00.—The development of the ideal and practise of democracy since the liberal democratic revolutions of the seventeenth century. "To solve the economic problem by the democratic method, or to cease to be democratic societies"—this is the dilemma which confronts the latter.

HANDS OFF. A History of the Monroe Doctrine. By Dexter Perkins. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1941. Pp. 455. $3.50. A summary and continuation of the author's three monographs on different periods in American history of the diverse uses of the Monroe Doctrine, its efficacy, and its ideologies.

THE GERMAN ELECTIONS OF 1907. By G. D. Crothers. New York: Columbia University Press, 1941. Pp. 277. $3.00.—The impact of the ideas of German national sentiment upon German politics in 1907 and the way the government preached and otherwise encouraged these concepts.

WORKERS BEFORE AND AFTER LENIN. By Manya Gordon. New York: E. P. Dutton Co., 1941. Pp. 524. $4.00.—Statistical comparisons of the social and material living conditions of the average Russian worker before, during, and after the Bolshevik revolution. It is contended that the failure of the present bureaucracy to improve these conditions is due to its failure to permit peasants and factory workers freedom to criticize the ruling party's policies.

INTERNATIONAL LABOR, DIPLOMACY AND PEACE 1914–1919. By Austin Van Der Slice. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1941. Pp. xi, 408. $4.00.—The war and peace aims of French, British and American labor during the five years after 1914.

BRITISH LABOR AND THE WAR. By Frieda Wunderlich. New York: New School for Social Research, 1941. Pp. 67. $.40.—The recruitment, allocation and political status of British labor in the present war.

REPORTAGE ON MEXICO. By Virginia Prewett. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1941. Pp. 322. $3.00.—A popularly written study of Mexico, with emphasis on its recent politics.

PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION THEORIES. The Formative Period. By George J. Stigler. New York: Macmillan, 1941. Pp. 392. $3.50.—"Critical study of the theories of distribution (1870–1895) which arose out of the theory of subjective value, and which were finally systematized into the general marginal productivity theory."

LEGAL REALISM AND JUSTICE. By Edwin N. Carlan. New York: Columbia University Press, 1941. Pp. xiii, 161. $2.00.—The ideas and practices of Holmes, Cardozo, and Pound as illustrations of the functional approach to legal problems and ideals.

LAW WITHOUT FORCE. By Gerhart Niemeyer. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941. Pp. 402. $3.75.—Analyzes the function of law in international politics, and the relations between legal theory and political reality. Rejects a moral basis for international law and suggests that a functional basis should be substituted for it.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF FREEDOM. By Gaston Haxo. New York: Land and Freedom, 1941. Pp. 210. $1.00.—A simplified version of Henry George's "Progress and Poverty" for the general reader.

HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY, RELIGION AND SCIENCE

THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE. Edited with an Introduction by Richard McKeon. New York: Random House, 1941. Pp. xxxix, 1487. $4.00.—"More than most ancient philosophers, Aristotle was conscious of the influence of earlier theories on the formation of his own doctrines. In most of his important works, as in the *Metaphysics,* the *Physics, On the Soul,* he discusses other men's speculations and conjectures, as they bear on his investigations, before formulating his own first principles."

A HISTORY OF MAGIC AND EXPERIMENTAL SCIENCE. Volumes V and VI: The Sixteenth Century. By Lynn Thorndike. New York: Columbia University Press, 1941. Vol. V: pp. xxii, 695; Vol. VI: pp. xvii, 766. $10.00 the set.—Cover roughly the period from 1500 to 1630. The extent of the classical reaction against the ideas and institutions of the Middle Ages, of the spread of gullibility in high places to quacks, charlatans and intellectual vagabonds, and of the lack of scientific specialization; how the quest was for the secrets rather than the laws of nature. Also new information on persecution and intolerance and the degree to which people escaped therefrom, and on the increase of free thinking and differences of opinion.

PRINCEPS CONCORDIAE, Pico Della Mirandela and the Scholastic Tradition. By Avery Dulles. Harvard University Press, 1941. Pp. 182. $2.00.—The Harvard Phi Beta Kappa Prize essay for 1940. "Written to call attention to the medieval foundations of Pico's system, and to demonstrate that his philosophy was primarily a scholastic synthesis."

THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGIOUS TOLERATION IN ENGLAND. Attainment of the Theory and Accommodations in Thought and Institutions (1640–1660). By W. K. Jordan. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1940. Pp. 499. $5.00.—"This volume, the fourth of the series, completes the study of the development of religious toleration in England during the tumultuous yet fruitful era of the Reformation to the restoration of the monarchy in 1660."

THE SHAKER ADVENTURE. By Marguerite F. Melcher. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941. Pp. ix, 319. $3.00.—History of the Shaker movement since the revocation of the Edict of Nantes.

THE SACRED TREE SCRIPT. The Esoteric Foundation of Plato's Wisdom. By Andrew Efron. New Haven, 1941. Pp. xxiv, 372.

THE STEPS OF HUMILITY BY BERNARD, ABBOT OF CLAIRVAUX. Translated with Introduction and Notes as a Study of his Epistemology, by George B. Burch. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1940. Pp. xi, 287. $3.00.—The Introduction analyzes Bernard's epistemology. The Latin text of *De Gradibus Humilitatis* faces the English translation. One appendix is on "The Metaphysical Presuppositions of Cistercian Mysticism According to Isaac of Stella," the other discusses Bernard's criticism of Abelard's theology.

THE WRITINGS OF ROBERT GROSSETESTE, BISHOP OF LINCOLN, 1235–1253. By S. Harrison Thomson. Cambridge: At the University Press, 1940. Pp. 302. $5.50. —An extensive bibliographical study of Grosseteste's works based upon the original sources, 2500 *Mss* scattered widely in 140 libraries of Europe, including the philosophical and scientific works, sermons, translations from the Greek, Anglo-Norman works, doubtful and spurious works of the teacher of Roger Bacon.

THE MEDIEVAL PAPACY IN ACTION. By Marshall W. Baldwin. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1940. Pp. xiii, 113. $1.00.—Between the accession of Saint Leo IX in 1049 and the death of Innocent IV in 1254, the papal supremacy was again achieved after a long period of decentralization.

BENEDICTINE MONASTICISM as Reflected in the Warnefrid-Hildemar Commentaries on the Rule. By Sister M. Alfred Schroll. New York: Columbia University Press, 1940. Pp. 215. $2.75.

DISCUSSION OF HOLIDAYS IN THE LATER MIDDLE AGES. By Edith C. Rodgers. New York: Columbia University Press, 1940. Pp. 147. $1.50.—This study of holidays between the years 1200 and 1520 is of interest to the social historian as well as to the student of church history.

THE ORIGIN OF PRINTING IN EUROPE. By Pierce Butler. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1940. Pp. xv, 155. $1.50.—The cultural import and technological basis of typography, the earliest extant specimens of printing, and the traditions and equipment of the earliest printing offices, are explained to the layman on the basis of documented evidence.

DE MORBIS ARTIFICUM BERNARDINI RAMAZZINI DIATRIBA. Diseases of Workers. The Latin text of 1713 Revised, with Translation and Notes by Wilmer C. Wright. The History of Medicine Series (No. 7) of the Library of the New York Academy of Medicine. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1940. Pp. xlvii, 549. $5.00.—Ramazzini (1633–1714) of Modena and Padua, author of this first comprehensive treatise on occupational diseases, is described in Mrs. Wright's extensive introduction, as having visited the workshops of Modena and observed the hazards of over 50 local industries. A valuable source-book for the period from about 1680 to 1713.

CATHOLICISM AND THE PROGRESS OF SCIENCE. By William M. Agar. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1940. Pp. xi, 109. $1.00.—A brief survey of the historical development of science and its relationship to the growth of Christian thought. A distinction is made between the scientific theory of evolution in biology and evolution as a philosophy, in order to show what elements of the idea are not acceptable to the Catholic view.

A HISTORY OF SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND PHILOSOPHY IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY. By A. Wolf. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1939. Pp. 814, 345 illustrations. $8.00.—Covers the achievements of the mathematical, physical, and biological sciences in the eighteenth century, followed by the progress of technology and the human studies of psychology, social sciences, and philosophy.

LA CRITIQUE PHILOSOPHIQUE DE PASCAL AU XVIIIe SIÈCLE. By David Finch. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1940. Pp. 84.

THE MAKING OF THE MODERN MIND. Revised Edition. A Survey of the Intellectual Background of the Present Age. By John Herman Randall, Jr. Cambridge: The Riverside Press, 1940. Houghton, Mifflin Co. Pp. xiii, 696.—A new edition, with changes and additions, especially in dealing with recent scientific, philosophical, religious, and political changes.

THE RISE OF THE SOCIAL GOSPEL IN AMERICAN PROTESTANTISM 1865–1915. By Charles H. Hopkins. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940. Pp. xii, 352. $3.00. —"The social gospel originated in the early years of the gilded age. . . . Its prophets were legion and their message an integral part of the broad sweep of social and humanitarian efforts that concerned America during the half century between the Civil War and the World War."

SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION. A Symposium. New York: Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion, 1941. Pp. viii, 443. $1.50.—Papers read (some by title), in September 1940, on the Social Sciences and Humanities (E. E. Aubrey, H. J. Carman, H. N. Fairchild, M. Hadas, R. M. MacIver, P. A. Sorokin), Philosophy (M. J. Adler, E. Chapman, D. C. Macintosh, J. Maritain, H. A. Overstreet), the Natural Sciences (K. K. Darrow, A. Einstein, Ph. Frank, C. P. Haskins, H. D. Lasswell, W. E. Ritter), and on Religion and the Philosophy of Education (W. F. Albright, Van Wyck Brooks, S. G. Cole, F. Ernest Johnson, A. C. Pegis, D. W. Riddle, P. Weiss).

FROM DESCARTES TO KANT. Readings in the Philosophy of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment. By T. V. Smith and Marjorie Grene. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1940. Pp. viii, 899. $4.50.

A HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. By William Kelly Wright. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1941. Pp. ix, 633. $3.00.—An introductory text. The prevailing characteristics of modern philosophy are the scientific attitude, individualism, and internationalism.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF GEORGE SANTAYANA. Edited by Paul A. Schilpp. Vol. II in "The Library of Living Philosophers." Evanston and Chicago, Northwestern University, 1940. Pp. vii, 698. $4.00.—Critical essays on Santayana's philosophy by B. Brownell, C. J. Sullivan, Jr., D. M. Cory, S. P. Lamprecht, C. Hartshorne, M. K. Munitz, S. C. Pepper, G. Boas, P. B. Rice, I. Edman, E. Vivas, H. L. Friess and H. M. Rosenthal, P. A. Schilpp, E. L. Schaub, W. R. Dennes, C. A. Strong, B. Russell, and A. Banfi. An autobiography and reply to his critics by Santayana and a Bibliography of his writings (compiled by Shohig Terzian) complete the volume.

PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF EDMUND HUSSERL. Edited by Marvin Farber. Publ. for the Univ. of Buffalo by the Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1940. Pp. viii, 325. $4.00.—Phenomenological essays by D. Cairns, J. Wild, M. Farber, A. Gurwitsch, H. Spiegelberg, H. Kuhn, Felix Kaufmann, J.

Klein, A. Schuetz, Fritz Kaufmann, L. O. Katsoff, C. Hartshorne, V. J. McGill, W. E. Hocking, G. Husserl, H. Weyl, and an essay in German by Edmund Husserl on the "Origin of Spatiality."

GESCHICHTE DES HEGELIANISMUS IN RUSSLAND. Erster Band. Von Boris Jakowenko. Prague: Josef Bartl, 1940. Pp. xv, 446.—This first of three volumes deals with Hegelianism in Russia from 1820 to 1850.

METAPHYSISCH-MATHEMATISCHE ABHANDLUNGEN. Von Brunislav Petronievics. Prague: "International Bibliothek für Philosophie." Bd. IV, 5–6. Mai–Juni, 1940. Pp. xi, 72.—Six short essays illustrating dialectics in Zeno's problem, the infinite, criteria of truth of "empirio-rationalism," mathematical proof, and number theory.

BEITRÄGE ZUR GESCHICHTE DER TSCHECHISCHEN PHILOSOPHIE. Erstes Heft. Von Boris Jakowenko. Prague: "International Bibliothek für Philosophie." Bd. IV, 9–10. Sept.–Okt., 1940. Pp. viii, 78.—Four essays on Th. G. Masaryk's intellectual relationship to Kirejewskij and Dostojewskij, his "Russland und Europa," and his appraisal of certain Russian thinkers.

SCIENCE IN PROGRESS. By L. J. Stadler, F. W. Went, J. F. Fulton, Douglas Johnson, Alfred C. Lane, H. P. Robertson, Carl D. Anderson, D. A. MacInnes, J. W. Beams, J. C. Hunsaker. Edited by G. A. Baitsell. Second Series of National Sigma Chi Lectureships. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940. Pp. xii, 317. $4.00.—Recent progress in physical and biological sciences.

JOHN ALFRED BRASHEAR. Scientist and Humanitarian, 1840–1920. By Harriet A. Gaul and Ruby Eiseman. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1940. Pp. viii, 220. $2.25. Biography of a pioneer in the construction of precision instruments.

A HISTORY OF GEOMETRICAL METHODS. By J. L. Coolidge. Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press, 1940. Pp. xviii, 451.—The purely technical problems, methods, and formulae of Synthetic, Algebraic and Differential Geometry are traced from their beginnings to contemporary developments.

CLASSIFIED INDEX TO THE PUBLICATIONS OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY. A list of papers, monographs, treatises and books published by the Society, 1769–1940, classified according to subjects. Philadelphia, 1940. Pp. 173.

THE SOCIAL RELATIONS OF SCIENCE. By J. G. Crowther. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1941. Pp. xxxii, 665. $3.50.—"The scientific and proto-scientific activities of man in pre-historic, classical, medieval and modern times are surveyed, in order to discover what social conditions are essential for the birth and growth of science. It is concluded that the birth of modern science was completed in the seventeenth century. Since then, no fundamental innovation has been made in the method."

AN INQUIRY INTO MEANING AND TRUTH. By Bertrand Russell. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1940. Pp. 445. $3.75.—Concerned with the theory of knowledge as approached from the analysis of language and pre-linguistic behavior, the author finds himself "as regards method, more in sympathy with the logical positivists than with any other existing school." He differs from them, however, "in attaching more importance than they do to the work of Berkeley and Hume."

PERIODICALS AND REPRINTS RECEIVED

"Philo Judaeus and the Concept of Creation," by F. V. Courneen. *The New Scholasticism,* XV, 1 (Jan. 1941), 46–58.

"Necessity and Liberty: An Historical Note on St. Thomas Aquinas," by A. C. Pegis. *The New Scholasticism,* XV, 1 (Jan. 1941), 18–45.

"New Interest in John Wesley," by Francis J. McConnell. *Journal of Religion,* XX, 4 (1940), 340–358.

"The Philosophical Unity of More's *Utopia,*" by Robert P. Adams. *Studies in Philology,* XXXVIII, 1 (Jan. 1941), 45–65.

"*Ut Pictura Poesis:* The Humanistic Theory of Painting," by Rensselaer W. Lee. *The Art Bulletin* XXII, 4 (Dec. 1940) 197–269.—"In Italy of the sixteenth century the humanistic theory of painting rested on the classical doctrine that 'the proper study of mankind is man.' All critics assumed that painting, like poetry, was the imitation of human action, and it followed . . . that it must resemble the sister art in subject matter, in human content, and in purpose. . . . Opposed to the humanistic point of view was the growing interest in external nature (Rousseau) . . . and also during the eighteenth century the growing importance of the doctrine of original genius which was encouraged by the pervasive influence of the treatise of *Longinus on the Sublime.* Appendix IV (pp. 266–7) of this article consists of an interesting note on "The Cartesian Theory of the Passions."

"The Cartesian Deformation of the Structure of Change and its Influence on Modern Thought," by John Wild. *The Philosophical Review,* L, 1 (January 1941), 36–59.

"The Early Program of the Royal Society and John Evelyn," by Margaret Denny. *Modern Language Quarterly,* I, 4 (Dec. 1940), 481–497.

"The Polemics in the First Book of Locke's Essay," by G. Espelin. *Theoria* (A Swedish Journal of Philosophy and Psychology), VI (1940), pt. II, pp. 109–122.—Locke's arguments against innate ideas were not directed against Descartes, but rather, against academic traditions at Oxford University as represented by Thomas Barlow's philosophical lectures (*Exercitationes aliquot metaphysicae*). Locke's labor-theory applied to the intellectual as well as to the economic world: both knowledge and private property are obtained by toil, not by innate privilege.

"Sem Luther: Working Class Rebel," by Louis Hartz. 401–418. "Emerson: Whig or Democrat," by A. I. Ladu. 419–441. *New England Quarterly,* September 1940.

"Jonathan Edwards to Emerson," by Perry Miller. *The New England Quarterly,* XIII, 4 (Dec. 1940), 589–617.

"Emerson and Economics," by Alexander Kern. *The New England Quarterly,* XIII, 4 (Dec. 1940), 678–696.

"Rousseau Hero-Worship. An Unpublished Intimate Record of 1766," by Ernest C. Mossner. *Modern Language Notes,* June 1940, 449–451.

"Plato and the Rule of Law," by Glenn R. Morrow. *Philosophical Review,* L, 2 (March 1941), 105–126.

"Plato's Republic, Totalitarian or Democratic?" by Clyde Murley. *The Classical Journal,* XXXVI, 7 (April 1941), 413–420.

"God in History," by Archibald Chisholm. *The Hibbert Journal,* XXXIX, 2 (Jan. 1941), 201–9.

"The Usefulness of Useless History," by Robert Schuyler. *Political Science Quarterly,* LVI, 1 (March 1941), 23–27.

"Adam Smith and Edmund Burke: Complimentary Contemporaries," by William C. Dunn. *The Southern Economic Journal,* VII, 3 (Jan. 1941).

"Francis Lieber and Nationalism," by Merle Curti. *The Huntington Library Quarterly,* IV, 3 (April 1941), 263–292.

"A Pragmatic Transcendentalist," by F. I. Carpenter; "His Metaphysics of Evolution," by Charles Hartshorne. *New England Quarterly* XIV, 1 (March 1941), 34–48, 49–63.—Two articles on Charles Sanders Peirce, 1839–1914. The first article shows the influence of Emerson's transcendentalism and the Concord school on Peirce's pragmaticism; the second shows Peirce's idealistic metaphysics as original in breaking with traditional determinism.

"The First American Novel," by Robert H. Elias. *American Literature,* Vol. 12, No. 4 (Jan. 1941), 419–34.—"Was *The Power of Sympathy* (Boston, 1789) the first American novel? . . . Fourteen years earlier, if circumstantial evidence can be believed, Thomas Atwood Digges, of Warburton, Maryland, had had *Adventures of Alonso: Containing Some Striking Anecdotes of the Present Prime Minister of Portugal* anonymously printed by John Bew in London."

"Plato and Aristotle as Historians. A Study of Method in the History of Ideas," by Richard McKeon. *Ethics,* LI, 1 (Oct. 1940), 66–101.

Errata

The April issue of this journal (Vol. II, No. 2) contained two typographical errors that have come to our attention: on page 132, line 17, Professor Dewey, referring to Marsh's linguistic accomplishments, had written: This was no mean attainment . . . (The word *mean* was omitted by the printer.) In Professor Stapleton's article on "Halifax and Raleigh," on page 212, line 26, the text should read: A pamphlet, attributed to Marvell, *A Dialogue between Brittania and Raleigh.* (The name Marvell was misprinted as Maxwell.)